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Peruvian Democratic Movement, 375
Variables and Codes for 1950-1962
For the concepts and variables below, use these links to Political Parties: A Cross-National Survey:
Governmental Status
Issue Orientation
Goal Orientation
Organizational Complexity
Organizational Power
Organizational Coherence
Membership Involvement
The "ac" code is for "adequacy-confidence"--a data quality measure ranging from 0 (low) to 9 (high)
Party name and code number
Peruvian Democratic Movement, 375
Movimiento Democratico Peruano, MDP

Institutionalization Variables
, 1.01-1.06
1.01 Year of Origin and 1.02 Name Changes
1955, AC9
7, AC8
Shortly after General Odria, the Peruvian Dictator, surprisingly announced his decision to allow openly contested elections at the conclusion of his one term, six-year "presidency" (in deference to the constitution), several parties, including the MDP, were organized. Originally founded as the Movimiento Democratico Pradista, the party sought the election of former dictator Manuel Prado Ugarteche as President. In 1956, the year of the election, the party's name was revised to Movimiento Democratico Peruano. No other name change occurred during our time period.
1.03 Organizational Discontinuity
0, AC3
There is no evidence which would suggest that the MDP experienced any splits or mergers during our time period. The party was closely allied with APRA throughout the 1956-63 period, but the coalition does not constitute a merger.
1.04 Leadership Competition
2, AC3
Manuel Prado was the leader of the MDP from its inception through the remainder of our time period. Although he was unable to constitutionally succeed himself as president in 1962, Prado apparently remained the party's leader through the 1962 and 1963 elections. Our low adequacy-confidence score reflects our assumption that Prado was the legitimate leader as well as the effective leader of the MDP.
1.05 Legislative Instability
Instability is 1.11, AC6
MDP representation in the congress fluctuated from nearly 40 percent of the seats to only 2 percent at the close of our time period. APRA appears to be the party that benefited the most from the shift of support away from the MDP.
1.06 Electoral Instability
Instability is 1.67, AC4
The MDP was formed as the campaign vehicle for Manuel Prado, who won the 1956 elections with APRA support. With Prado ineligible to succeed himself as president, the MDP offered no candidate of its own for the 1962 and 1963 elections, and of course the party did not exist for the 1950 elections.

Governmental Status Variables, 2.01-2.07
2.01 Government Discrimination
0 for 1956-63, AC5
There is no convincing evidence of government discrimination in favor of or against the MDP during our time period. In 1962, President Prado may have attempted to influence the outcome of the national elections by appointing only MDP supporters to the national electoral board. These men ignored the numerous voting irregularities which apparently aided the MDP-supported presidential candidate of APRA, Dr. Haya. Other than refusing to annul the elections, the board's impact on the election results was negligible. The use of indelible ink which washed off the voter's hand cannot be considered government discrimination in favor of the MDP.
2.02 Governmental Leadership
7 out of 8 for 1956-63, AC9
Manuel Prado, leader of the MDP, became President of Peru in 1956. His predecessor, General Odria, served throughout the first half of our time period. In 1962, only months before Prado's rule would have terminated, a military coup deposed the president. Belaunde Terry of the Accion Popular party won the presidential elections of 1963.
2.03 Cabinet Participation
7 out of 8 for 1956-63, AC5
Information concerning the party affiliation of cabinet members is scarce. It is assumed that MDP people held cabinet posts in the Prado administration. Beltran, who became Premier and Minister of the Economy midway through Prado's reign, was an independent. A publisher and head of the newspaper "La Prensa," whose views paralleled those of the MDP, Beltran was appointed in order to cease his charges of economic mismanagement. These charges appeared in one of Lima's most influential newspapers, "La Cronica," also published by Beltran.
2.04 National Participation
5 for 1956-63, AC3
Information concerning the MDP's national orientation is incomplete. The party apparently competed nationally, but with varying success . Since the party drew the support of business, landed aristocracy, and commercial interests, its support was probably greatest in the Lima area and the coastal region. After 1962, the party largely disappeared except in Lima.
2.05 Legislative Strength
Strength is .28 for 1956-63, AC6
MDP representation in the congress fluctuated from nearly 40 percent of the seats to only 2 percent at the close of our time period. APRA appears to be the party that benefited the most from the shift of support away from the MDP.
2.06 Electoral Strength
Strength is .45 for 1956-63, AC9
The MDP was formed as the campaign vehicle for Manuel Prado, who won the 1956 elections with APRA support. With Prado ineligible to succeed himself as president, the MDP offered no candidate of its own for the 1962 and 1963 elections, and of course the party did not exist for the 1950 elections.
2.07 Outside Origin
6, AC5
The MDP was formed in 1955 by friends and supporters of Ex-President Prado. The Prado family was one of Peru's "forty families," those traditionally wealthy in land, business, and commerce. These prominent citizens seem to have originated the party.

Issue Orientation Variables, 5.01-5.15
5.01 Ownership of Means of Production
3, AC3
There is little information concerning the issue orientation of the MDP. A code can be inferred from references to the general ideological outlook of the party and the policies pursued by the Prado administration. Representative of conservative, wealthy business and commercial interests, as well as the landed gentry, the MDP probably opposed government ownership of the means of production. The Prado administration opposed expropriation of undeveloped hacienda farmland and cooperated with foreign-owned industry. Beltran served Prado in the capacity of Minister of the Economy and was apparently supported by the MDP in his "free enterprise" approach. Government regulations were relaxed under Jose Prado, Prado's relative and first economic minister, and Beltran.
5.02 Government Role in Economic Planning
3, AC3
Although information is scarce, a code can be inferred from references to the party's general ideological outlook and the policies pursued by the Prado administration. As Prado's Economic Minister, Beltran attempted to create a free market economy. Although many of his measures (tariff adjustments, credit restrictions, and investment benefits) appear to increase the government's economic role, they generally had the opposite effect.
5.03 Redistribution of Wealth
5, AC5
Although the Prado administration improved Peru's financial position considerably, most of the new riches benefited wealthy business, commercial, and landed interests, both domestic and foreign. The tax structure, which apparently favored the wealthy, remained intact despite promised reforms. Business boomed and foreign investors were allowed to increase their prices and , therefore, their profits. The International Petroleum Company was noted in particular in this context. Undeveloped estates remained in the hands of landed interests as squatter Indians were driven off by the military. Prado suggested the development of jungle areas for the Indian poor, rather than redistribute land. No action was taken, however. These policies in all likelihood conformed to the position of the MDP on wealth distribution.
5.04 Social Welfare
Although the MDP probably opposed government programs of social welfare, information is too sparse to assign a definitive code for the party's position.
5.05 Secularization of Society
The church and state were separated constitutionally in Peru. Although most Peruvian parties were probably favorably disposed towards the Catholic Church, no information concerning party policy towards secularization is evident.
5.06 Support of the Military
Information is unsatisfactory for the purpose of coding the MDP on the issue of support of the armed forces. The MDP, like most Peruvian parties, avoided clashes with the powerful military. Relations between the Prado regime and the army were apparently good until 1962, when the MDP-supported presidential candidate, Dr. Haya of APRA, appeared to have won the presidential contest. The military disapproved of APRA in general and Haya in particular.
5.07 Alignment with East-West Blocs
5, AC3
A code can be inferred from available evidence. The MDP, as implied by Prado's policies, actively sought foreign investments, especially those of US companies. The party also desired military and economic aid from the United States. There is no indication that the party wished to withdraw from the Organization of American States.
5.08 Anti-Colonialism
3, AC5
It is assumed that the MDP position was similar to that of the Prado regime. Foreign investments were encouraged by Prado through increased profit margins and price limitations, exemption of US-owned IT+T and IPC from export taxes, the new convertibility of Peru's currency, and "other benefits."
5.09 Supranational Integration
No information
5.10 National Integration
No information
5.11 Electoral Participation
No information
5.12 Protection of Civil Rights
No information
5.13 Interference with Civil Liberties
3, AC3
Although Prado is often criticized in the literature on various points, his record of non-interference with civil liberties is only lauded. Prado ended General Odria's suspension of constitutionally guaranteed civil liberties. The media was no longer censored, and APRA was legalized. Outside of a temporary restriction in 1958, parties were allowed to convene freely. This record probably reflects the position of the MDP.
5.14 / 5.15 US--Soviet Experts Left-Right Ratings
Us says 1, conservative
Soviets say nothing

Goal Orientation Variables, 6.01-6.55
6.00 Open Competition in the Electoral Process
4, AC7
The MDP relied exclusively on open competition in the electoral process as its strategy for gaining governmental power. The party participated in the elections of 1956, 1962, and 1963, while in coalition with APRA.
6.10 Restricting Party Competition
0, AC7
The MDP did not rely upon restricting competition as its strategy. The party did win the 1956 elections because it received the support of an illegal APRA, but the party did not restrict competition itself. APRA was legalized as Prado's first presidential act, and parties acted rather freely during his reign.
6.20 Subverting the Political System
0, AC7
The MDP did not rely on the strategy of subverting the political system. The voting irregularities in 1962, and the subsequent non-action of the MDP dominated electoral board, cannot be considered party subversion. (see variable 2.01.)
6.30 Propagandizing Ideas and Program
6.31 0, AC3 although information is negligible, the party probably did not engage in operating mass communications media to an appreciable extent.
6.32 0, AC3 although information is negligible, the MDP probably did not engage in operating party schools.
6.33 0, AC3 although information is negligible, the MDP probably did not engage in passing resolutions and platforms to an appreciable extent.
6.34 0, AC3 although information is negligible, the MDP probably did not engage in publishing position papers to an appreciable extent.
6.50 Providing for Welfare of Party Members
6.51 AC1 no information
6.52 AC1 no information
6.53 AC1 no information
6.54 AC1 no information
6.55 AC1 no information

Autonomy Variables, 7.01-7.05
7.01 Sources of Funds
2 (sectors 04, 05), AC5
Although information concerning party funds is incomplete, the MDP apparently received most of its funds (which were considerable) from the business, commercial, and large landowner sectors of Peruvian society.
7.02 Source of Members
6 (sectors 04, 05), AC3
Information regarding party membership is scarce. There were probably no membership requirements in the MDP. Most party members were probably businessmen, commercial artisans, and landed gentry.
7.03 Sources of Leaders
2 (sectors 04, 05), AC3
References to the MDP suggest that its leadership was dominated by business, commercial, and landed interests.
7.04 Relations with Domestic Parties
5, AC9
Throughout the second half of our time period, the MDP was in coalition with APRA. Occasionally referred to as the "Allianza Democratica," the coalition was formed ten days prior to the 1956 elections. APRA, which may have controlled as much as forty percent of the vote, supported the MDP candidates in return for legality, which Prado bestowed upon the party as his first presidential act. Although promised and later offered cabinet posts, APRA chose to reject them in order to avoid further internal party dissention. This coalition supported the Prado regime in the legislature. The MDP, after much hesitation, chose to support the APRA candidate in the 1962 presidential elections and, apparently, again in the 1963 elections. The party seems to have remained in the coalition through 1963. Our code reflects the mutual dependence of the coalition partners in the legislature.
7.05 Relations with Foreign Organizations
5, AC3
There is no evidence of MDP relations with any foreign organizations.

Organizational Complexity Variables, 8.01-8.07
8.01 Structural Articulation
2, AC3
Only one national organ of the MDP was mentioned in the literature. The party's national convention was convened in 1961, prior to the elections of 1962. There is no information concerning selection of the convention delegates.
8.02 Intensiveness of Organization
No information
8.03 Extensiveness of Organization
No information
8.04 Frequency of Local Meetings
No information
8.05 Frequency of National Meetings
0, AC3
There is no information regarding the existence of a national committee.
8.06 Maintaining Records
0, AC3
No references to party propaganda, archive, or membership lists are present in the literature. It seems likely that the MDP did not carry on these activities.
8.07 Pervasiveness of Organization
0, AC3
The small following of the MDP probably had no socioeconomic organizations of its own, nor would they have enlisted a significant membership.

Organizational Power Variables, 9.01-9.08
9.01 Nationalization of Structure
No information
9.02 Selecting the National Leader
8, AC5
Prado was the effective leader, and probably the legitimate leader, of the MDP throughout our time period. No means of transferring leadership were noted in the literature.
9.03 Selecting Parliamentary Candidates
No information concerning the selection of parliamentary candidates is apparent. However, all candidates were probably subject Prado's approval.
9.04 Allocating Funds
No information
9.05 Formulating Policy
7, AC5
Major policy decisions were announced by Prado or his spokesmen. Policy was probably determined by Prado, although others in the MDP may have influenced policy decisions.
9.06 Controlling Communications
0, AC3
The MDP did not appear to control any influential media at any level.
9.07 Administering Discipline
0, AC6
The MDP had no means of disciplining its members. Party members were subject to government rewards and Prado's approval for candidacy from 1956 to 1962.
9.08 Leadership Concentration
6, AC3
Prado apparently exercised sole leadership of the MDP. His power to commit the party to courses of action was probably real, although some believed him to be a puppet of interest groups.

Coherence Variables, 10.01-10.06
10.01 Legislative Cohesion
.80, AC3
While MDP legislators were not disciplined by the party by any method other than Prado's power of candidate approval, government favors and disfavors under the Prado regime seemed to evoke considerable legislative cohesion.
10.02 Ideological Factionalism
Ideology, while not an important MDP characteristic, may have beenebated. However, there is no reason to suspect that ideological concerns provoked factionalism.
10.03 Issue Factionalism
Issues may have been debated by MDP members, but there is no evidence of issue factionalism in the party.
10.04 Leadership Factionalism
0, AC5
There is no reason to suspect the existence of a leadership faction in the MDP. The party was personalistic and apparently gave full support to Prado.
10.05 Strategic or Tactical Factionalism
3, AC3
Some disagreement probably arose within the MDP when the 1956 coalition with APRA was negotiated. It is likely that this faction remained through the convention of 1961, when it was decided to continue the coalition and support the presidential candidate of APRA.
10.06 Party Purges
0 for 1956-63, AC3
No purges seem to have occurred in the MDP during our time period.

Involvement Variables, 11.01-11.06
11.01 Membership Requirements
No information
11.02 Membership Participation
No information
11.03 Material Incentives
3, AC3
The amount of rewards received by MDP militants during Prado's reign was probably immense. Patronage was apparently extensively employed. The economic policies of the Prado regime certainly favored the wealthy, many of whom were MDP militants.
11.04 Purposive Incentives
0, AC3
Purposive incentives motivated few MDP militants, although some nominal members may have been so affected. The party's purposes, other than the election of Prado in 1956 and the material rewards to members, were difficult to identify.
11.05 Doctrinism
0, AC5
The MDP referred to no written literature to justify its activities.
11.06 Personalism
1, AC3
While some nominal members may have been motivated by Prado's personality, personalism was a minor motivator of militants. Although Prado apparently lacked charisma he was a leader.