Path: Table of Contents > Essay on Party Politics > Party 373
Peruvian Popular Revolutionary Alliance, 373
Variables and Codes for 1950-1962
For the concepts and variables below, use these links to Political Parties: A Cross-National Survey:
Governmental Status
Issue Orientation
Goal Orientation
Organizational Complexity
Organizational Power
Organizational Coherence
Membership Involvement
The "ac" code is for "adequacy-confidence"--a data quality measure ranging from 0 (low) to 9 (high)
Party name and code number
Peruvian Popular Revolutionary Alliance, 373, also known as Peruvian Aprista Party, PAP
Allianza Popular Revoluncionaria Americana, APRA

Institutionalization Variables
, 1.01-1.06
1.01 Year of Origin and 1.02 Name Changes
1924, AC7
0, AC7
The Allianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) was founded in 1924 at Mexico City. Dr. Haya de la Torre and other student leaders, exiled by Peruvian dictator Leguia following the student-worker demonstrations of 1920, originally conceived the party as an international movement. The organization flourished in its homeland, Peru, and was legalized in 1930, subsequent to Leguia's reign. Its Peruvian name became the Peruvian Aprista Party (PAP), and PAP and APRA have since been used interchangeably in reference to the party. In 1945, APRA apparently changed its name to Partido del Pueblo in order to participate in the national elections. The new name seems to have terminated immediately following the election and will not affect our code.
1.03 Organizational Discontinuity
7, AC7
APRA experienced one split of minor proportions in 1958. APRA disillusioned many of their supporters by endorsing the candidates of the conservative MDP in 1956 and continuing the alliance in the legislature in support of the MDP government. Several radical members, led by Luis de la Puente Uceda, left the party in 1958 and formed the APRA Rebelde.
1.04 Leadership Competition
2, AC7
Dr. Haya de la Torre, one of APRA's principal founders and philosophers, was considered the party's leader from its founding through our time period. Haya was the party's presidential candidate in 1962 and 1963, the only elections during our time period in which APRA was able to nominate its own candidate. When in exile prior to 1956 (except for three years during the Bustamante administration), and while touring Europe during much of Prado's reign, APRA was managed by the party's secretary generals. These men apparently attended to the more routine party affairs while Haya was in Peru. During our time period, Ramiro Priale served as Secretary General of APRA. Priale rejuvenated the party organization in 1955, when he returned from exile, and served through 1963. Manuel Seone was apparently his predecessor and he remained second-in-command under Priale. For coding purposes, Haya was both the legitimate and effective leader of APRA during our time period.
1.05 Legislative Instability
Instability is .86, AC4
APRA had been declared illegal and was not allowed to participate in the 1950 or 1956 elections. After the 1956 elections, the party was legalized, and many independents announced their affiliations with APRA. When the party was allowed to field candidates for the 1962 elections, APRA's strength jumped from 16 percent of the seats to 44 percent.
1.06 Electoral Instability
Instability is 1.0, AC6
APRA was not allowed to contest the 1950 or 1956 elections, but it took approximately one-third of the votes in the 1962 and 1963 elections.

Governmental Status Variables, 2.01-2.07
2.01 Government Discrimination
16 for 1950-55, AC9
0 for 1956-63, AC5
APRA was illegal during General Odria's presidency (1948-1956), although the party was allowed to conduct limited business activities after 1954. No governmental discrimination directed at APRA occurred during the second half of our time period. The Prado regime appointed MDP members to the National Electoral Board prior to the 1962 elections which were marred by voting irregularities. These infractions, which probably benefited MDP-supported Dr. Haya of APRA, were ignored by the board. This incident will not affect our code regarding government discrimination.
2.02 Governmental Leadership
0 out of 6 for 1950-55, AC9
0 out of 8 for 1956-63, AC9
General Odria served as Peru's president during the first half of our time period. President Prado of the MDP reigned from 1956 through 1962, when he was deposed by a military coup. In 1963, Belaunde of the AP became president.
2.03 Cabinet Participation
0 out of 6 for 1950-55, AC9
0 out of 8 for 1956-63, AC8
No APRA members were included in General Odria's cabinets during the first half of our time period. Although APRA people were offered cabinet positions by President Prado, the party chose to oppose an APRA-MDP governmental coalition since it would further tarnish APRA's liberal image, which suffered by the parties" electoral and parliamentary pact. No cabinet seats were held by the party under Belaunde .
2.04 National Participation
5, AC6
APRA competed nationally, but its success was highly variable across regions. Its main stronghold was the north. The party was rather successful in the east. Based on a 1968 sample survey, APRA's support deviated from the population distribution by an average of 5.8 percentage points calculated across four regions, eastern jungle, coast, highlands, and Lima.
2.05 Legislative Strength
Strength is .22 for 1956-63, AC4
APRA had been declared illegal and was not allowed to participate in the 1950 or 1956 elections. After the 1956 elections, the party was legalized, and many independents announced their affiliations with APRA. When the party was allowed to field candidates for the 1962 elections, APRA's strength jumped from 16 percent of the seats to 44 percent.
2.06 Electoral Strength
Strength is .34 for 1956-63, AC6
APRA was not allowed to contest the 1950 or 1956 elections, but it took approximately one-third of the votes in the 1962 and 1963 elections.
2.07 Outside Origin
11, AC9
APRA was formed in Mexico City by exiled student radicals, led by Dr. Haya de la Torre.

Issue Orientation Variables, 5.01-5.15
5.01 Ownership of Means of Production
3, AC5
Originally favoring general nationalization of basic industries, APRA moderated its position after it was banned in 1948. The party apparently favored government ownership of some basic industries, including some not then nationalized, during our time period. Expropriation and nationalization on a general basis was no longer advocated. By 1962, many political observers believed that APRA was favorably disposed towards capitalism.
5.02 Government Role in Economic Planning
3, AC8
The party had increasingly become favorable towards a "free-enterprise " economic system. Although APRA no longer advocated government prescription of resource allocation, as it did in 1924, the party did not repudiate its entire plan for a government controlled economy. During our time period, APRA proposed the creation of a National Economic Congress, which would formulate an economic "game plan." A proposed national bank would offer government credit to approved businesses.
5.03 Redistribution of Wealth
3, AC8
Originally APRA was a party of the "oppressed masses" and favored a major redistribution of Peru's wealth. During our time period, the party advocated limited land redistribution in order to supply the Indian population with farming land. As for further redistribution of wealth, APRA conceded that such plans were premature since Peru had not yet acquired substantial wealth. The party advocated tax reform.
5.04 Social Welfare
3, AC8
During our time period, APRA advocated a comprehensive social security plan which would be available to all workers. The party favored government requirements whereby industry would provide its employees a pension plan and other fringe benefits. APRA was apparently concerned about raising the standard of living for Indians and labor.
5.05 Secularization of Society
3, AC9
Since APRA's history dates back to 1924, it is the only Peruvian Party whose views on secularization are documented. However, information only cites the party's desire for separation of church and state. This position remained intact through our time period. Dr. Haya, APRA's founder, leader, and philosopher, allegedly abhorred the Catholic Church, and the party was supposedly atheistic.
5.06 Support of the Military
0, AC5
Historically, APRA opposed the military in principle. In the past, the party advocated the abolishment of the military in favor of an Indo-American Army. However, the party's post-war plans included compulsory military service and the utilization of army personnel and training in the development of Peru's industrial and agricultural resources. The size of the army would be increased, but the organization would be more technical than defensive. The army would become a tool of socialization, education, and training, as well as a government controlled manpower resource. The army had traditionally opposed the APRA party, and two military coups (1948 and 1962) can be in part attributed to this animosity.
5.07 Alignment With East-West Blocs
3, AC7
APRA was strongly Anti-Communist in Peru, probably due to competitive reasons. Since World War II, APRA has softened its Anti-US policies. The party accepts United States aid and wishes to remain friendly. However, APRA denounces the OAS as US-dominated. The party seeks Latin American Unity, development, and power.
5.08 Anti-Colonialism
1, AC7
APRA, once violently opposed to foreign investments, advocated a reduction of foreign influence in Peru's economy during our time period. The party accepted some foreign investment with the condition that the Peruvian government controls its use in some manner. APRA did not wish continued economic dependence on foreign capital. The party desired a gradual movement to economic self-sufficiency while remaining friendly to the United States and US investments.
5.09 Supranational Integration
3, AC9
APRA proposes the creation of a United States of Latin America. Including South and Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean Isles, the federation would be modeled after the United States of America. As an initial step towards this goal, APRA favors the establishment of an Indo-American Common Market. The party has also proposed an Inter-American bank system, a volunteer Indo-American army, and Indo-American citizenship.
5.10 National Integration
1, AC8
APRA advocated the decentralization of Peruvian Government. The federal system would include economic and political regions. Within regions, municipalities would be developed. The federal government would have jurisdiction over questions involving two or more regions.
5.11 Electoral Participation
1, AC3
The file contains no information concerning APRA's position on extending the franchise. Our consultant, however, states that a 1967 study of party leaders finds APRA leaders to be opposed to further expansion. No details concerning the nature of this opposition were revealed.
5.12 Protection of Civil Rights
2, AC5
APRA favored elimination of discrimination against women and Indians. The party probably preferred discouragement of discriminatory practices through a free educational system and socialization in the armed forces.
5.13 Interference with Civil Liberties
3, AC4
During the 1945-48 period, when APRA held considerable influence as the majority party in the legislature, the party advocated press censorship of political content. It is unlikely that APRA favored this policy during our time period, however, as it was opposing the government and seeking political power.
5.14 / 5.15 US--Soviet Experts Left-Right Ratings
U.s. says 3, non-communist left
Soviets say 2, it has represented the interests of the upper bourgeoisie, although the party included significant numbers of workers, white collar workers, artisans, and the petty bourgeoisie.

Goal Orientation Variables, 6.01-6.55
6.00 Open Competition in the Electoral Process
3 for 1950-55, AC7
4 for 1956-63, AC7
APRA relied mainly on the strategy of open competition during the first half of our time period, despite illegality. After legalization in 1956, APRA relied exclusively on this strategy. The party participated covertly in the 1956 elections, and nominated candidates in the elections of 1962 and 1963.
6.10 Restricting Party Competition
0, AC7
APRA did not attempt to restrict party competition during our time period. The party strongly supported the government in its suppression of the Communist Party of Peru, for this group threatened to draw many of APRA's members. However, the act of restricting communist competition was a governmental one. APRA also refused to support Belaunde's presidential candidacy in 1956 because his program might have attracted considerable APRA defections. APRA chose to criticize Belaunde as an opponent to APRA's goals, thereby discrediting him before party members.
6.20 Subverting the Political System
1 for 1950-55, AC7
0 for 1956-63, AC7
APRA opposed any undemocratic seizure of power. The party may have been able to initiate a revolution with its massive following (estimated at fifty percent of the population), but this action was not considered. Accusations of APRA subversion were generally unfounded, although occasional subversive acts were carried out by APRA members during Odria's reign. Before our time period, moreover, APRA was involved in several plots and uprisings.
6.30 Propagandizing Ideas and Program
6.31--0 for 1950-55, AC5. 2 for 1956-63, AC7. Since APRA was illegal during the first half of our time period, it is quite unlikely that the party operated any type of mass communications media. The name "APRA" was seen carved into mountains and trimmed onto the hair of dogs, but these devices will not be considered communications media. After the party was legalized in 1956, APRA operated a newspaper, "La Tribuna," and a party radio station.
6.32--2, AC5. APRA's program of political education was apparently an important party activity. In some areas, many public schools were APRA by default. Many teachers and pupils were party identifiers and their classrooms were often politicized. APRA also established its own schools.
6.33--2, AC5. APRA apparently held party conventions rather frequently. Resolutions and platforms were passed at these meetings. When the party was illegal, these activities were clandestine.
6.34--2, AC5. APRA and its leader, Haya, published many position papers. Many were quite extensive, especially those published prior to our time period.
6.50 Providing for Welfare of Party Members
6.51--2, AC3. It is likely that APRA provided Indian villages with needed supplies. In 1945, the party created mobile units which sent doctors, nurses, teachers, etc., to villages.
6.52--AC1. No information
6.53 1, AC3. An APRA peasant and Indian affairs bureau was established in 1945 as a legal aid service. It is likely that the party continued this activity in some manner during our time period.
6.54--2, AC5. APRA's program of education included the use of party schools and public schools which were dominated by APRA supporters. These schools provided APRA sympathizers with basic, as well as political, education.
* 6.55--AC1. No information

Autonomy Variables, 7.01-7.05
7.01 Sources of Funds
Although UNO was apparently quite wealthy, there is no information pertaining to the sources of these funds.
7.02 Source of Members
No information
7.03 Sources of Leaders
4 (sectors 4 and 3), AC5
The literature file contains no specific information concerning sources of leaders for the party. Our consultant, however, reports that a 1967 survey of party leaders listed 23 percent as entrepreneurs and another 23 percent as lawyers. A few were large landowners.
7.04 Relations with Domestic Parties
7, AC7
UNO failed to enter into an electoral pact with APRA in 1956. The party occasionally cooperated with the MDP-APRA coalition in the legislature during Prado's reign, but no alliance existed. Rumors of an UNO-APRA governmental and legislative pact in 1962 led to a military coup, but the alleged alliance was denied by Odria. After the 1963 elections, UNO and APRA joined in a legislative alliance of opposition. This occurred late in the time period and does not affect our code.
7.05 Relations with Foreign Organizations
5, AC3
There is no evidence suggesting UNO had relations with any foreign organization.

Organizational Complexity Variables, 8.01-8.07
8.01 Structural Articulation
4, AC3
The APRA organization included an Executive Committee, a National Convention, and a Labor Affairs Bureau. The Secretary General was elected by the convention, but the selection procedures for delegates were not discussed in our file. Our consultant states that the delegates were simply coopted.
8.02 Intensiveness of Organization
5, AC3
APRA's lowest level of organization seems to have been the branch. Branches included one village or factory.
8.03 Extensiveness of Organization
5, AC5
APRA apparently established branches throughout the nation. Coverage was probably incomplete. The northern areas of Peru were highly organized.
8.04 Frequency of Local Meetings
6, AC3
It appears that some APRA locals met quite often, about once per week. Other branches seldom met.
8.05 Frequency of National Meetings
No information
8.06 Maintaining Records
4 for 1950-55, AC5
6 for 1956-63, AC5
There is no evidence suggesting that APRA maintained a party archive during our time period. APRA did not publish party propaganda during the first half of our time period, when the party was illegal. After 1956, APRA published its own newspaper, "La Tribuna," and operated a radio station. Political adds probably appeared in non-party media. APRA maintained membership lists, most likely at the lower level of organization. These may not have been complete.
8.07 Pervasiveness of Organization
15, AC5
APRA was divided into numerous socioeconomic sections which had their own organizations. APRA workers, peasants, businessmen, professionals, civil servants, and employers, in addition to many "others," were each organized separately. Party control was probably high since membership was given only to those of extreme loyalty. Some ancillary organizations claimed many adherents
(such as labor and peasants), but most could not.

Organizational Power Variables, 9.01-9.08
9.01 Nationalization of Structure
6, AC3
APRA apparently was highly organized with a discernible party hierarchy. National organs decided policy which was conveyed to socioeconomic sections and local branches. No regional organs were evident.
9.02 Selecting the National Leader
8, AC9
Dr. Haya de la Torre was the founder and leader of APRA. No means of transferring leadership were apparent. Much of the routine of party activities was carried out by the Secretary General, Priale, during our time period. He was elected by vote of the National Convention, as Haya's choice.
9.03 Selecting Parliamentary Candidates
5, AC3
Local organizations seem to decide upon parliamentary candidates, but locals probably select candidates approved or suggested by the national level. In 1956, local organizations rallied support for MDP candidates with only ten days notice from the national leadership.
9.04 Allocating Funds
No information
9.05 Formulating Policy
7, AC5
The executive committee officially proposes party policy, which is routinely approved by the National Convention. Dr. Haya, APRA's founder and philosopher, actually decided policy. Haya, the party leader, controlled the executive committee via his popularity. He could commit the party without the committee's action.
9.06 Controlling Communications
0 for 1950-55, AC3
5 for 1956-63, AC3
APRA controlled no important communications media at any level during the first half of our time period. After the party was legalized in 1956, APRA published "La Tribuna," a newspaper of comparably small circulation, and controlled a party radio station. Both media were apparently controlled at the national level.
9.07 Administering Discipline
4, AC3
The Executive Committee of APRA accused party members and suggested disciplinary measures which were administered after a vote (pro forma) of convention delegates.
9.08 Leadership Concentration
6, AC5
Dr. Haya de la Torre exercised sole leadership of APRA. He could commit the party to binding courses of action personally. Yet in his frequent absences, others, such as Priale, were key actors.

Coherence Variables, 10.01-10.06
10.01 Legislative Cohesion
.90, AC3
APRA's legislative organization appears to have voted together on most occasions. The party required blind loyalty of its members.
10.02 Ideological Factionalism
0, AC5
APRA ideology, embodied in the works of Dr. Haya, was not subject to debate or disagreement by party members. A prime prerequisite to membership was a strong conviction to APRA ideology. Party factions, often labeled "radical" and "moderate," were concerned with strategy and tactics.
10.03 Issue Factionalism
2, AC5
Our information file reports no evidence of issue factionalism in APRA . Our consultant, however, states that some members favored stronger opposition to united states investments and that these people tended to be driven from the party.
10.04 Leadership Factionalism
0, AC5
Dr. Haya de la Torre was the uncontested leader of APRA. While party factions were led by competing individuals, the factions were strategical and tactical. Each faction sought to place its leader, the "radicals" Seone and the "Moderates" Priale, in the position of secretary general.
10.05 Strategic or Tactical Factionalism
6, AC7
Since the 1940's, APRA has been divided into two factions. The "Moderates," led by Ramiro Priale, consisted of the older APRA leaders who were willing to temper ideological fervor in order to secure and maintain power. The "Radicals," led by Manuel Seone, included the younger APRA leaders who repudiated compromise with Peru's conservative "oligarchy" as a means of gaining power. In 1945, when APRA, controlled by Seone's group, gained a legislative majority in support of President Bustamante, the party chose to initiate radical legislation against the wishes of Bustamante. The resulting military coup of 1948 convinced many APRA leaders that moderation was necessary . Priale's faction led the party to its 1956 pact with the MDP. The party gained legality, but several disillusioned radicals left APRA and formed another party in 1958.
10.06 Party Purges
0 for 1950-55, AC3
1 for 1956-63, AC6
In 1959, APRA purged itself of eight "treasonable" members, and our consultant says there were periodic purges of radicals, especially after 1956. Our coding reflects the sum of these expulsions.

Involvement Variables, 11.01-11.06
11.01 Membership Requirements
5, AC8
An applicant for membership in APRA was scrutinized for a period of time by local party chiefs. When these leaders were convinced of the applicant's sincerity, conviction, and loyalty, the applicant received a membership card. There is no evidence of required dues.
11.02 Membership Participation
6, AC3
APRA membership was estowed to only those who demonstrated prospective militancy in party activities. Rigid organization and strict discipline was said to ensure continual member participation in APRA meetings, demonstrations, rallies, and other party activities, but our consultant feels that the situation has been exaggerated.
11.03 Material Incentives
1, AC3
APRA strongly opposed the use of party membership in furthering the material well-being of its members. The fact that APRA mentioned this suggests that material incentives may have motivated a few militants in APRA-dominated areas, but is likely that their number was small. The party nurtured purposive incentives through ideological training and exclusion from membership of those not committed to APRA's goals. In non-APRA regions, party membership may have been a financial liability.
11.04 Purposive Incentives
3, AC3
APRA's members and followers received extensive training in party ideology. Membership was supposed to be contingent upon proven purposive incentive. But our consultant contends that knowledge of party doctrine was weak and much of the APRA's membership consisted of semi-literate sugar plantation workers.
11.05 Doctrinism
3, AC5
APRA's leaders and members frequently referred to the early writings of Dr. Haya, the party's founder, philosopher, and leader. Haya himself interpreted this literature as APRA altered its program.
11.06 Personalism
0, AC3
Although Dr. Haya's charismatic character probably drew many APRA supporters, most of the militants were probably motivated by purposive incentives.