The "ac" code is for "adequacy-confidence"--a
data
quality measure ranging from 0 (low) to 9
(high)
Institutionalization Variables,
1.01-1.06
1.01 year of origin and 1.02 name
changes
1909, AC9
0, AC9
The Netherlands Communist Party was formed
in 1909, when a group of intellectuals and revolutionary idealists
split from the Social Democratic Workers Party (SDAP) to form the
social democratic party. Immediately following the successful
communist revolutionary seizure of power in Russia, this party
established contacts with the soviet UNN, changed its name to the
Communist Party of Holland in 1918, and joined the Comintern as a
faithful member in 1919. The party's only name change since 1918
occurred in 1935 when the party became known as the Communist
Party of the Netherlands.
1.03 organizational
discontinuity
7, AC7
One split occurred during our time period
in 1958 when a group of the CPN leadership was expelled from the
party. These leaders brought with them a minor portion of the CPN
membership and formed a new party, the Socialist Workers Party, in
1959. The SWP attacked the CPN and especially the party's leader,
Paul de Groot, for its lack of openness and stern rules of
discipline. The dissident communists filed a list in the 1959
legislative elections but won only .6 percent of the votes
(compared to 2.4 percent for the CPN) and failed to win any
seats.
1.04 leadership competition
9, AC6
Only one available source discusses the
early leadership of the CPN at length. It credits W. Van
Ravensteyn and D. Wijnkoop, editors of "De Tribune," as the
parliamentary leaders of the party and Hermann Gorter and Anton
Pannekoek as the theoreticians. These two sets of leaders differed
on the question of tactics and communist participation in
trade-unions and parliament. The Gorter-Pannekoek ultraleftist
line was criticized by Lenin, and the two left the party in 1921
and the leadership to Ravensteyn and Wijnkoop. But Ravensteyn and
Wijnkoop lost influence and were ousted as leaders in the 1926
congress. A period of leadership instability followed until the
1930 congress, when Paul de Groot was named general secretary. He
remained in the top party position throughout our time
period.
1.05 legislative instability
Instability is .38, AC9
The Communist Party percentage of seats in
the legislature declined steadily throughout our time period from
a high of 8 percent in 1950 to 2 percent in 1962.
1.06 electoral instability
Instability is .36, AC9
There were three elections during our time period, in 1952, 1956,
and 1959. The communists contested all three, but they won a high
of only 6 percent in the first and went down
thereafter.
Governmental Status Variables,
2.01-2.07
2.01 government discrimination
2 for 1950-56, AC8 -
2 for 1957-62, AC8
Although the CPN has not been outlawed in
the Netherlands, the government's antagonism towards the party is
well known. Government discrimination against the CPN is apparent
since the party is not allotted any government controlled radio or
television time, thereby excluding the party from this media. A
proposal which would cancel all votes received by a party if the
votes from that region did not surpass a fixed minimum for the
region was narrowly defeated in 1958. This law was aimed at
lowering the number of parliamentary groups and probably would
have affected the CPN legislative representation.
2.02 governmental leadership
0 out of 7 for 1950-56, AC9
0 out of 6 for 1957-62, AC9
The position of prime minister in the
Netherlands was filled by a representative of the labor party
(Drees) from 1950 to 1959. Thereafter, the position was filled by
representatives of the catholic people's party (Beel and de Quay)
through 1962.
2.03 cabinet participation
0 out of 7 for 1950-56, AC9
0 out of 6 for 1957-62, AC9
The CPN did not participate in the
formation of coalition cabinets during our time
period.
2.04 national participation
4, AC6
Based on a 1956 survey (sample size of
1234), the CPN's average deviation of votes from the population
distribution was 15.75. The party is primarily regional in
character, finding its greatest support in large cities,
especially Amsterdam, and in the agrarian north of the
Netherlands. The CPN draws virtually no support in the catholic
south of the nation and very little in the Calvinist
east.
2.05 legislative strength
Strength is .06 for 1950-56, AC9, and .03
for 1957-62 AC9
The Communist Party percentage of seats in
the legislature declined steadily throughout our time period from
a high of 8 percent in 1950 to 2 percent in 1962.
2.06 electoral strength
Strength is .06 for 1950-56, AC9, and .02
for 1957-62 , AC9
There were three elections during our time
period, in 1952, 1956, and 1959. The communists contested all
three, but they won a high of only 6 percent in the first and went
down thereafter.
2.07 outside origin
8, AC9
The CPN was formed in 1909 by the ousted
leaders of the SDAP and their followers. See discussion under
variable 1.01.
Issue Orientation Variables, 5.01-5.15
5.01 ownership of means of
production
5, AC6
The CPN advocates the nationalization of
all large private industries, including banks, mines, airlines,
steel and textile mills, and shipping companies. The party also
desires the socialization of all insurances.
5.02 government role in economic
planning
5, AC5
Evidence suggests that the CPN advocates
government prescription and planning in all sectors of the
economy, including production and distribution of all
resources.
5.03 redistribution of wealth
3, AC5
The CPN has demanded an immediate increase
in all wages, the imposition of rent ceilings, the confiscation of
all large homes with subsequent improvements in low cost housing,
and an increase in taxes pertaining to capital property. According
to a survey, most members and supporters of the CPN do not favor a
severe redistribution of property ownership, but all agree in the
demand for redistribution of the national wealth.
5.04 social welfare
5, AC5
The CPN seems to advocate total government
social welfare provisions, including the socialization and
nationalization of all insurances.
5.05 secularization of society
3, AC6
Since the Netherlands is a highly religious
oriented society, the CPN has not proposed the abolishment or
discouragement of religious practices. However, the party favors
the abolition of parochial schools, since the party has proposed
the introduction of a free, neutral, compulsory school
system.
5.06 support of the military
3, AC7
The CPN continually proposes the reduction
by at least one-half of armed forces appropriations by the
government. The CPN probably sees this issue as a step towards
complete obliteration of the military and the establishment of a
"people's militia" as espoused by the party's founders in 1909.
During our time period, however, the CPN made no mention of any
such desire, demanding only a large cut in the military
budget.
5.07 alignment with east-west
blocs
1, AC8
The CPN often expresses favoritism towards
the USSR and has advocated a policy of rapproachment with the
USSR. The party has not advocated the establishment of any
alliance between the Netherlands and the USSR, but does propose
the withdrawal of the nation from NATO.
5.08 anti-colonialism
5, AC9
Throughout the New Guinea issue, the CPN
favored the withdrawal of the Netherlands from the colony and
opposed the stationing of any armed forces on the island.
Concerning the fate of the colony, the party was less sure.
Indonesian incorporation of New Guinea was regarded as equally
evil as continued Dutch control. Both nations were considered by
the party to be colony seeking capitalist nations. However, in
1951 the CPN decided that the colony should be transferred to
Indonesia on the ground that the people of Indonesia considered
New Guinea as a part of their nation and culture, although the
Indonesian government was still not considered deserving of the
colony.
5.09 supranational integration
3, AC9
The CPN has opposed all attempts to include
the Netherlands in plans of integration of Western Europe. The
party opposed the membership of the nation in NATO and the common
market as well as measures to allow international agreements of
the Netherlands override any national bill which conflicts. The
CPN regards de Gaulle and "Nazi" Germany (West Germany) as
governments to avoid . Entanglements with them are out of the
question.
5.10 national integration
1, AC3
The CPN seems to favor some measure of
local control over community issues.
5.11 electoral participation
AC2
The Communist Party did not support the
1917 bill which introduced suffrage to all males over 25 because
the party felt that such an enactment would not aid the population
in its struggle against the elites of the nation. It is also
possible that the party feared decreased support from dissatisfied
and powerless people once the population at large was given a
voice in their government through the vote. There is no
information in our file concerning the CPN position on lowering
the voting age to 23 in 1946 and 21 in 1967.
5.12 protection of civil rights
AC1
No information.
5.13 interference with civil
liberties
3, AC3
Since the CPN wishes to abolish government
discrimination in the allocation of radio and television time, the
party probably supports freedom of expression. However, within the
party itself, such freedom is not common, although open discussion
of issues is claimed. It must also be remembered that government
discrimination in radio-TV time is generally aimed at the
CPN.
5.14 / 5.15 us--soviet experts left-right
ratings
US says 4, communist
Soviets say 3, the party participated in
the Moscow meetings of communist and workers parties in 1957 and
1960 and supported their documents. The party is taking a
nationalist position with respect to national communism more
recently.
Goal Orientation Variables, 6.01-6.55
6.00 open competition in the electoral
process
3.5 for 1st half, AC6
4.0 for 2nd half, AC7
The CPN was basically oriented to the open
competition strategy to achieve its goals. The party nominated
candidates and campaigns during elections. The party did, however,
occasionally attempt to disrupt the political system during the
first half of our period.
6.10 restricting party
competition
0, AC3
The party does not seem oriented towards
restricting competition as a strategy. The party may indeed
disrupt the activities of other parties, but no evidence actually
states or implies such activities.
6.20 subverting the political
system
.5 for 1st half, AC6
0 for 2nd half, AC7
While the CPN basically relied upon open
competition in the electoral process in order to reach its goals,
party members, probably with the party's knowledge and consent,
engaged in disruptive acts against the government in the early
1950s. In one instance, party members and one parliamentarian were
arrested attempting to bribe members of the armed forces to
desert, and in another, several communists were arrested for
causing a disturbance in the visitors' balcony of
parliament.
6.30 propagandizing ideas and
program
6.31--2, AC9. The CPN operates its own
national newspaper, "De Waarheid," as well as other local
newspapers and a monthly magazine. The party is not allowed the
use of national radio or television.
6.32--2, AC6. The CPN operates party
schools, educational conferences, and classes at all levels of the
party hierarchy, coordinated by the central education
department.
6.33--2 , AC6. The CPN passes resolutions
through its central committee, and platforms are passed before
each national election.
6.34--2, AC9. The CPN publishes a daily
newspaper, "De Waarheid," which often contains the official
positions of party leaders. The monthly magazine serves the same
purpose.
6.50 providing for welfare of party
members
AC1
No information.
Autonomy Variables, 7.01-7.05
7.01 sources of funds
7, AC3
Evidence seems to suggest that the CPN
receives most of its support directly from party sources,
including membership dues and revenue received through party
newspaper subscriptions. Most parties in the Netherlands must rely
on such sources since most business contributions reach the
liberal party, which best represents business interests. Usually
about ninety percent of a party's support comes from party
sources, excepting the liberal party.
7.02 source of members
5 (sector 01), AC5
Membership in the CPN is entirely direct,
and most members come from the labor sector of the population.
Although the CPN does operate its own labor union, the EVC, no
evidence suggests that membership in the EVC results in indirect
membership in the CPN.
7.03 sources of leaders
1 (sector 01), AC3
The bulk of the CPN leadership seems to
originate in the labor sector of the population.
7.04 relations with domestic
parties
7, AC9
The CPN did not participate in any cabinet
coalitions during our time period. Until 1959, the CPN usually
fought alone as an opposition party against the government because
none of the other opposition parties wished to cooperate with the
CPN in forming an alliance aimed at the government. When the labor
party became an opposition party in 1959, the two parties were
often aligned against the government, but there was no opposition
alliance.
7.05 relations with foreign
organizations
2, AC7
The CPN normally follows the advice or
dictates of the Comintern, of which the party was a member, or the
Soviet Union. The strength with which the party conforms to these
dictates may vary according to the circumstances within the
Netherlands at the time, as well as the ability of the party to
make abrupt changes in policy without increasing factionalism
within the party.
Organizational Complexity Variables, 8.01-8.07
8.01 structural articulation
9, AC6
Many organs can be identified as existing
within the national sphere of the CPN, including the central
committee, national conference, party congress, political bureau,
secretariat, and the political control committees. Each of these
organs has clearly specified responsibilities. Selection
procedures involve a considerable amount of informal cooperation,
for the central committee, dominated by the secretary general (de
Groot), chooses members of lower national bodies.
8.02 intensiveness of
organization
6, AC6
The basic unit of the CPN is the "cell"
which usually consists of less than thirty party members who must
be involved in the same enterprise (such as a particular factory
or business). Cells which include more than thirty members
normally are subdivided.
8.03 extensiveness of
organization
5, AC3
Since the formation of a cell merely
requires a minimum of three party members within the same
enterprise, it is quite likely that this unit can be found in most
cities and regions of the nation. Coverage probably is most
incomplete in the catholic regions, and the strength of these
organizations probably is greatest in the industrial regions of
the west and north.
8.04 frequency of local
meetings
6, AC3
Since the cell is given many
responsibilities, including the distribution of party literare,
political education, and economic planning and reporting
concerning the state of the members" enterprise, it is quite
probable that this body must have quite frequent meetings of at
least the monthly variety.
8.05 frequency of national
meetings
AC2
Although information exists concerning
national meetings of governing organs, such as the central
committee, no information reports the frequency of these
meetings.
8.06 maintaining records
10, AC5
The CPN expends considerable energies in
publishing party programs and propaganda, especially through the
party's official newspaper, "De Waarheid." Although there is no
mention concerning the existence of any party archive or research
division, the party probably does maintain accurate and complete
membership lists since dues are a requirement and the cells
probably must keep lists of their own.
8.07 pervasiveness of
organization
8, AC5
Ancillary organizations of the CPN have
penetrated some socioeconomic sectors, but party control over them
is mixed and questionable. The EVC, the labor union of the CPN,
generally is highly controlled by the party. But the other
organizations, such as the youth, student, and women's groups, are
partly autonomous of the party in that they are members of the
international bodies of their respective interests and not
actually operated by the CPN. But since most members of these
groups, including the leadership, are members of the CPN, some
control does exist.
Organizational Power Variables, 9.01-9.08
9.01 nationalization of
structure
5, AC6
The CPN seems to be organized in a
hierarchical structure which begins at the top with the central
committee and then filters through the districts into the sections
and finally to the cell.
9.02 selecting the national
leader
7, AC5
The secretary general is appointed by the
members of the political bureau as this organ chooses the members
of the secretariat. However, the political bureau is chosen by the
central committee where actual power is centered. There is
evidence which suggests that choosing the secretary general
involves some measure of inner power struggle.
9.03 selecting parliamentary
candidates
9, AC6
The central committee is charged with the
task of selecting those party members who shall be candidates in
legislature elections.
9.04 allocating funds
5, AC3
Membership dues are probably collected by
the leaders in each respective cell, who transfer most of the
funds to the central committee, the organ which manages all
central funds. Parliamentarians of the party must also donate all
salaries received for their governmental duties.
9.05 formulating policy
7, AC5
Although the task of formulating party
policy is charged to the central committee, all pronouncements of
CPN policy are made by Paul de Groot, the secretary general. De
Groot exerts an extreme amount of power within the central
committee and is often compared with Stalin in the USSR. Policy
probably is not only announced by de Groot but formulated by him
as well. There is one additional factor involved which complicates
the search for the actual formulator of party policy--the
influence of the USSR over the CPN leadership. As has been noted
before (see 7.05), the CPN normally follows the dictates of the
USSR and Comintern concerning party policy. This factor may dilute
some of de Groot's influence.
9.06 controlling communications
5, AC8
The party newspaper, "De Waarheid," is
national in scope and controlled by the national organs of the
CPN. The party is not allowed access to the radio or television
through government refusal to grant the party free
time.
9.07 administering discipline
4, AC6
The central committee has the power to
discipline any CPN representative in parliament and has expelled
members from the party on occasion. The central political control
board, appointed by the central committee, sees to be responsible
for the administration of discipline concerning members of the
party as a whole.
9.08 leadership concentration
6, AC9
Paul de Groot remained the unchallenged
leader of the CPN throughout our time period. He was able to
personally commit the party to binding courses of
action.
Coherence Variables, 10.01-10.06
10.01 legislative cohesion
1.0, AC9
Representatives of the CPN in parliament
always voted as a bloc during our time period.
10.02 ideological factionalism
0 for 1st half, AC5
6 for 2nd half, AC7
Following the "debunking" of Stalin by
Nikita Khrushchev in 1956, the CPN was split into two distinct
factions. Although the question of de Groot's "cult of
personality" was basic to the factionalization, other party issues
were at stake, such as the issue of the EVC's merger with the
socialist trade union, advocated by de Groot and Moscow. Party
dissenters were purged in 1958 and formed a small socialist's
workers party in 1959. This party recognized freedom of expression
within the Communist Party (SWP).
10.03 issue factionalism
0, AC5
Although the CPN was divided into two
groups after 1956, issues did not seem to be of any importance.
Those members expelled from the party in 1958 did not take a
stance on any issue which was different from the position of the
CPN, except in the case of intra-party issues, which basically
were ideological in nature.
10.04 leadership factionalism
0 for 1st half, AC5
6 for 2nd half, AC7
The factionalization of the CPN in 1956 and
resultant purge of party revisionists in 1958 was basically over
the ideology of the party concerning freedom of expression versus
the de Groot "cult of personality." This split within the party
also involved the contesting of de Groot's leadership. The
continued attacks upon de Groot by the purged Socialist Workers
Party demonstrated the leadership factionalism which characterized
the CPN after 1956.
10.05 strategic or tactical
factionalism
0, AC3
The lack of indication of any CPN
factionalism concerning tactics or strategy is suggestive that the
party does not allow open discussion of this issue. The CPN does
not allow any real openness in discussing any part of party
policy.
10.06 party purges
0 for 1st half, AC5
1 for 2nd half, AC9
The CPN experienced at least one purge
during our time period, that of 1958. The purge involved the
expulsion of at least four important party leaders, and these were
followed into the new Socialist Workers Party by approximately 10
percent of the party's membership.
Involvement Variables, 11.01-11.06
11.01 membership requirements
3, AC3
The CPN requires its members to pay party
dues. Registration of membership is most probably required as
well, since the dues must be collected and each party member must
be contacted concerning meetings and required party activities. It
is not known whether the party requires a probationary period of
its members, for although this is typical of communist parties, no
evidence of this requirement rests within our file.
11.02 membership participation
4, AC6
The party requires that all members must
participate in party activities whenever called upon. However,
most members are not requested to perform party activities on any
regular basis, and in fact are seldom summoned to aid the party.
Militants are usually chosen from each cell on the basis of their
convictions, and normally only a select few are selected to
perform party activities frequently. All members are required to
attend meetings and often are forced to attend political education
classes held by the CPN.
11.03 material incentives
0, AC5
It seems very unlikely that any of the
party's militants are motivated by material incentives. In fact,
the opposite may be true. Most party militants are "blacklisted"
by employers whenever they participate in activities of the party,
such as organizing strikes, walk-offs, or any employee demands
felt by the employer to be unreasonable. Therefore, a CPN member
may suffer materially by his militancy.
11.04 purposive incentives
3, AC5
The CPN chooses its militants (those who
are often called upon by the party to perform activities) by
virtue of the member's convictions and his thoroughness in
political education. Militants are usually motivated basically by
purposive incentives.
11.05 doctrinism
2, AC5
The leaders and members of the CPN
continually refer to the works of Marx and of Lenin. Usually these
references are of a general nature, direct quotes quite
uncommon.
11.06 personalism
0, AC4
Although Paul de Groot may be considered to
be a powerful personality, there is no evidence suggesting any
motivation caused by personalism within the CPN.