The "ac" code is for "adequacy-confidence"--a
data
quality measure ranging from 0 (low) to 9
(high)
Institutionalization Variables,
1.01-1.06
1.01 year of origin and 1.02 name
changes
1926, AC5
1, AC9
A Catholic Party was gradually established
somewhere between 1883 and 1926. In 1896 the roman Catholic
representatives in parliament agreed on a common programme, and in
1904 a roman Catholic union of electoral associations was founded.
However, it was only in 1926 (after general suffrage and
proportional representation had been adopted in 1918-21) that the
Roman Catholic State Party was founded. Shortly after World War
Two the Roman Catholic State Party became the Catholic People's
Party.
1.03 organizational
discontinuity
5, AC9
Although parties formed claiming to
represent the Catholic vote (e.g., labor party, Catholic
dissidents), it appears that the only party to split from the KVP
was the Catholic National Party in 1948. In 1955 the Catholic
National Party merged with the KVP.
1.04 leadership competition
11, AC7
There is some ambiguity over the
identification of the leader of the KVP. Authors frequently
identify the chairman of the second chamber parliamentary group as
the "leader of the KVP." For almost all of our time period, that
would have been C.P.M. Romme, succeeded by W.L.P.M. de Kort in
1962. But under our conception of "legitimate" leadership of the
party, the more appropriate position to consider in our scoring is
that of chairman of the party executive outside of the
legislature. That position was held by W.J. Andriessen from the
beginning of our period until 1954, when he resigned because of
bad health. H.W. van Doorn was elected to succeed him and
continued in the position throughout our time period.
1.05 legislative instability
Instability is .04, AC9
The KVP was remarkably consistent in its
legislative representation during our time period, fluctuating
only between 30 and 33 percent of the seats .
1.06 electoral instability
Instability is .04, AC9
Elections were held in 1952, 1956, and
1959. The KVP had 29 percent in the first election and 32 percent
in both others.
Governmental Status Variables,
2.01-2.07
2.01 government discrimination
0 for 1950-56, AC8
0 for 1957-62, AC8
There was no discrimination against the KVP
by the government during the interval studied. (the KVP was part
of the government.)
2.02 governmental leadership
0 out of 7 for 1950-56, AC9
5 out of 6 for 1957-62, AC9
Although the Catholics were represented in
every coalition during the interval studied, a Catholic P.M. led
the coalition only in 1958 (Louis Beel) and from 1959 to 1963
(Edward de Quay).
2.03 cabinet participation
7 out of 7 for 1950-56, AC9
6 out of 6 for 1957-62, AC9
The Catholic Party was in every government
coalition during the period studied.
2.04 national participation
4 for 1950-56, AC6
4 for 1957-62, AC6
The KVP draws its support mostly from the
Catholic south (provinces of Brabant and Limburg). Its support is
also heavier in rural rather than industrial areas. Nonetheless,
the party is national in its character. Based on a 1956 survey
with 1200 respondents, the KVP's average deviation of votes from
the population distribution is 15.
2.05 legislative strength
Strength is .31 for 1950-56, AC9, and .33
for 1957-62 , AC9
The KVP was remarkably consistent in its
legislative representation during our time period, fluctuating
only between 30 and 33 percent of the seats .
2.06 electoral strength
Strength is .30 for 1950-56, AC9, and .32
for 1957-62 , AC9
Elections were held in 1952, 1956, and
1959. The KVP had 29 percent in the first election and 32 percent
in both others.
2.07 outside origin
4, AC9
I have made a distinction between party
formation and organization (from the 1880's to 1926) and founding
in 1926. Accordingly, Schaepman was the impetus behind the
organization of Catholics within parliament. A loose union of
Catholic representatives within parliament occurred shortly after
Schaepman's death.
Issue Orientation Variables, 5.01-5.15
5.01 ownership of means of
production
3, AC7
Although the KVP rejects nationalization in
principle and is quite in favor of private property, the KVP does
not object to nationalization in exceptional circumstances. (e.g.,
after World War Two)
5.02 government role in economic
planning
1, AC5
The KVP strongly opposed extensive
government intervention in economic planning, but accepted limited
government activity in the area. The party apparently acted as a
moderating influence on the socialist policies of economic
planning during the Drees government. When the more conservative
VVD replaced the PVDA in the cabinet coalition, the government
withdrew somewhat from the level of economic intervention reached
under the Drees government. The KVP seemed to have accepted a
level of government activity lower than the one desired by the
socialists, but did not wish to withdraw from the sphere as
severely as espoused by the VVD.
5.03 redistribution of wealth
0, AC7
The KVP favors a just distribution of
incomes, but not a redistribution. Private property should be
enjoyed by all. The government's position is equivocal and best
summed up in this way--more people ought to be given the
opportunity to accumulate private property, especially by means of
wage determination. But also, personal property tax, real estate
tax, and rental tax should be abolished. Thus, the position favors
the status quo, but somehow wants to alter it--the distribution
policy levels and unlevels.
5.04 social welfare
3, AC8
Although agreeing with the existing
situation, the KVP certainly would like to limit the government's
role in these areas.
5.05 secularization of society
3, AC8
The KVP is in practice, though not in party
doctrine, a party restricted to Catholics. It strongly supports
state subsidies to parochial schools, as well as the existence of
sectarian owned radio and newspapers.
5.06 support of the military
AC1
There is no available data.
5.07 alignment with east-west
blocs
5, AC8
The KVP is a supporter of greater European
integration and NATO.
5.08 anti-colonialism
2, AC4
Although the KVP supported granting
independence to Indonesia (and was so adamant that it let the KNP
break off rather than compromise over the issue), the KVP rejected
granting new guinea to Indonesia (in favor of retaining it as a
territory) and voted to give up new guinea only after much
pressure. Low confidence does not indicate lack of information,
rather it reflects an ambiguous party position--the KVP's
"dithering stand" and vagueness .
5.09 supranational integration
3, AC5
In its 1952 program, the KVP pronounced
itself in favor of a federal united Europe under the conditions
that the equality of all participating nations and their national
interests be guaranteed.
5.10 national integration
1, AC6
The KVP supports subsidiary--a policy which
discourages high organizational bodies from performing tasks which
can be performed by lower bodies. This lends itself to policies
which avoid the extension of central powers. The KVP also wants to
preserve religious, cultural, and social
differentiation.
5.11 electoral participation
5, AC6
Since its foundation, the KVP has been in
favor of lowering the voting age from 23 to 21 and public office
requirements from 30 to 23.
5.12 protection of civil rights
3, AC4
There is no indication of any vigorous
stand (or lack thereof) by the KVP. The code is inferred--the KVP
favors private initiative and encouragement rather than vigorous
government enforcement. At the same time, the party is devoted to
the preservation of Catholic rights (who have historically been
discriminated against). This devotion has gradually been extended
to include other groups.
5.13 interference with civil
liberties
1, AC7
The KVP platform advocates "legal
guarantees for publicity of political parties and for their proper
financing." Their stand to retain private radio communication is
largely to preserve the status quo in which the Catholics have a
station. (In Holland, the radio stations are state owned and
licensed, but privately run.) One source notes that the KVP argued
for suppressing communist propaganda, at least in the early
1950s.
5.14 / 5.15 us--soviet experts left-right
ratings
US says 2, center
Soviets say 1, it represents the interests
of monopolistic circles, the higher Catholic clergy, and major
landowners. Its program is based on papal encyclicals and the
reactionary philosophy of neo-tomism.
Goal Orientation Variables, 6.01-6.55
6.00 open competition in the electoral
process
4, AC7
The KVP relies on open competition in
elections to win seats. There is some evidence to suggest that in
the 1952 elections (an unusually heated contest) the KVP condoned
violence against other parties in the south. This was, however, an
exceptional case.
6.10 restricting party
competition
0, AC7
There is some evidence to suggest that the
KVP would seek to eliminate communist campaigning (would like to
restrict newspapers), but besides this the party is dedicated to
electoral competition. The KVP sought to conciliate with the KNP
but not restrict its activities after the 1952 elections. Ac code
is attributed to the possibility that the KVP would like to
restrict communist campaigning.
6.20 subverting the political
system
0, AC8
The relatively high ac owes to the fact
that the party has participated in every government coalition
since 1918 with two minor exceptions
(basic variable 2.03)--the party
participates in electoral competition. There are no indications to
suggest subversion of the political process.
6.30 propagandizing ideas and
program
6.31--0, AC3. The KVP occasionally uses the
Catholic-operated radio station and newspapers to voice party
policy, however it does not operate its own mass
media.
6.32--2, AC9. Party school was established
in 1950 and is located in Baarn.
6.33--2, AC9. Party employs both platforms
and resolutions.
6.34--1 , AC3. There is no information in
the literature--intuition tells me that concerning some issues
(New Guinea, Indonesia) the KVP published statements. Certainly
Professor Romme, both as an individual and a member of his party
did so--he published a book.
6.50 providing for welfare of party
members
AC1
There is no data relating to these
variables. Past research would suggest that the KVP would prefer
private initiative to governmental activity, therefore being
ideologically opposed to most of these activities.
Autonomy Variables, 7.01-7.05
7.01 sources of funds
7, AC6
The KVP apparently gets most of its money
from party membership dues.
7.02 source of members
5, AC6
The KVP's membership is predominately
Catholic. Owing to the church's pleas for Catholic unity and
denial of holy sacrament for members of the socialist party, it
could almost be said that membership in the KVP is dependent upon
being a member of the church. But, membership is not obligatory
.
7.03 sources of leaders
1 (sector 06), AC5
All of the leaders of the KVP have been
Catholic and largely university professors (e.g., Beel, de Quay,
Romme). The only qualification for lesser leaders is to belong to
a Catholic organization--farm associations, labor union, Catholic
management, radio association, or newspaper .
7.04 relations with domestic
parties
4, AC6
The adequacy confidence code is indicative
of the failure of the KVP to fit neatly within a category. Dutch
politics is such that no government can be formed without a
coalition. These coalitions cannot be formed without the KVP, but
the KVP is not dominant in them as far as platform and leadership
are concerned.
7.05 relations with foreign
organizations
3, AC6
The KVP belongs to the Nouvelle Equipes
Internationale and abides by their rules and decisions which
promote international harmony.
Organizational Complexity Variables,
8.01-8.07
8.01 structural articulation
11, AC8
The KVP has a highly structured party
organization, each party organ having clearly defined
responsibilities. Among the most important national organs are the
general council, the executive council, the executive committee,
and the secretariat. Others include the parliamentary groups,
party congress, the youth council, the propaganda council, and
various permanent committees. Selection procedures are also
defined which involve the participation of local party organs (the
election council has, for all practical purposes, the final say
however.)
8.02 intensiveness of
organization
4, AC8
The KVP on the local level is organized
into sections. They number up to 5000 people and have two
delegates to the general council. An additional delegate is
allowed for every additional 5000 people or fraction thereof.
Sections are grouped into 18 districts corresponding to Dutch
electoral administration districts.
8.03 extensiveness of
organization
6, AC5
The KVP is organized into 1200 sections,
having local organizations which appear to be spread throughout
the Netherlands.
8.04 frequency of local
meetings
AC2
Our information is not sufficient to permit
coding.
8.05 frequency of national
meetings
2, AC8
The general council meets
annually.
8.06 maintaining records
16, AC6
The ac reflects lack of information as to
membership lists--it was inferred that a well maintained list
exists because of frequent references in the literature to number
of party members and the fact that members pay dues. The KVP has a
highly organized publishing network including a sympathetic
newspaper (Devolkskrant), and monthly and bi-monthly journals. The
party receives advice from the research institute and center for
political studies ( neither are party organs, but both are
financed by the KVP.) The party also has a central propaganda
council which could be considered a research division.
8.07 pervasiveness of
organization
7, AC6
The KVP has a youth organization, has
frequently been supported by church edicts, and has the Catholic
labor union as an ally. Devolkskrant, a KAB paper, has sometimes
been referred to as the official KVP paper.
Organizational Power Variables, 9.01-9.08
9.01 nationalization of
structure
6, AC8
There exists a tight hierarchical control
of all levels of the KVP emanating directly from the top--the
executive committee, which exercises control by determining who
shall run for office.
9.02 selecting the national
leader
AC1
Although the literature is voluminous,
there is no relevant information.
9.03 selecting parliamentary
candidates
7, AC9
Local sections propose lists of candidates
to a district advisory commission which submits its recommendation
to the election council. The election council draws up a final
list and submits it for ratification by the party
members.
9.04 allocating funds
2, AC3
There is some evidence that party dues are
paid on the local level. No mention is made of distribution. I
would suggest that it is probably the case that funds are funneled
upward, owing to the general inactivity of local sections
(variable 8.04) and the oligarchical nature of the party (variable
9.03).
9.05 formulating policy
6, AC5
KVP programs are drafted by the general
council, a committee of not less than 7 members nominated by the
executive committee. The general council holds meetings with
parliamentary leaders, sections, districts, and extra-
parliamentary groups. All data indicate that consultation before
policy making insures ratification of policies after they are
made. (i.e., the general council adopts the policy finally agreed
upon by the executive, sections, and districts.)
9.06 controlling communications
0, AC6
Although there exist Catholic newspapers
which are influential, there is no daily press publication which
can be considered a direct organ of the KVP . The situation is
similar regarding radio, where the KRO is Catholic but independent
of the KVP. There do exist party publications, but these do not
appear to be widely circulated.
9.07 administering discipline
0, AC8
While in the Netherlands the right to
recall is nonexistent and the only sanction a party has is not to
nominate an obstinate member, the KVP maintains rather tight
control over its members. KVP nominating procedures are the main
means of party discipline. This is further reinforced by church
appeals for unity. In cases where renomination is not important to
the party member (i.e., he can be elected without the party)
sanctions are nonexistent (e .g., Dr. Welter).
9.08 leadership concentration
3, AC5
The executive committee seems to ultimately
be responsible for decisions and policy making, although the
leaders in the first and second chambers of parliament are the
visible party leaders. This group leads the party and selects or
appoints members to groups responsible for party policy and
nominations.
Coherence Variables, 10.01-10.06
10.01 legislative cohesion
1.0, AC5
There is ample evidence to suggest that the
KVP in the second chamber during the period was quite a cohesive
group. Even during politically tense questions, such as the
Indonesian issue, the KVP presented a united front in its
voting.
10.02 ideological factionalism
4, AC6
At various times within the period studied,
the KVP has been plagued with ideological factionalism between its
right and left wings. Professor Duynstee suggested that a separate
political structure representing the right be created within the
KVP. This idea was abandoned. Later Steenberghe agitated for the
rightist cause. Dr. Welter broke away over nonrepresentation of
rightist views. The relatively low ac reflects lack of data
concerning the formal organization of right and left wing
factions.
10.03 issue factionalism
4, AC5
There was only one instance of party
factionalism over an issue (Indonesia). It does not seem to be the
case, however, that this is at all common (this is inferred from a
conspicuous lack of discussion). Perhaps KVP policy formation
procedures discourage issue factionalism.
10.04 leadership factionalism
3, AC5
During the period studied, there have been
two instances where party leadership was challenged within the
party. Professor Duynstee's suggestion for a formal right wing
faction within the KVP was interpreted by the "Economist" as a
direct challenge to authority and Professor Steenberghe's
representation of the rightist's cause (it was said that
Steenberghe did not have a specific following). Low ac reflects
confusion over whether code 2 or 3 is best applicable.
10.05 strategic or tactical
factionalism
AC1
There is simply not enough relevant
literature to even make an inference.
10.06 party purges
0 for 1st half, AC9
0 for 2nd half, AC9
There have been no purges during our time
period.
Involvement Variables, 11.01-11.06
11.01 membership requirements
3, AC8
KVP membership is open to all Dutch
citizens over 18 who agree on the aims of the party. Members are
required to pay dues and there exist accurate counts of membership
size (from which it is inferred that members
register).
11.02 membership participation
0, AC6
The data suggest that participation in
party affairs is the exception, at least on the local level. In
Sassenheim, where 36 percent of the voters belonged either to the
KVP or KNP (this is higher than the national average), the
following characterized politics--political meetings are poorly
attended, even when well-known speakers are hired, and meetings
dealing with more technical party matters are even less atttion
for the selection of a party leader, which permitted the
Venizelos/Pap andreou leadership struggle to continue without
resolution. The choice of Gondicas as a compromise leader in 1958
only produced three factions rather than two and allowed the power
struggle to continue. \par \par (53) 9.03 Selecting Parliamentary
Candidates \par \par 9, ac6 \par \par The file contains no
information on the selection of parliamentary candidates, but our
consultant reports that the candidates were usuallydata, however,
to even faintly suggest a proportion who belong to the KVP for
this reason.
11.04 purposive incentives
AC1
No data.
11.05 doctrinism
2, AC9
The KVP is guided by principles of
Christian morality. Each platform observed in the data had some
reference to the KVP as a champion of Christian principles. For
example, the general political programme stated that the KVP is
guided by "the principle of moral law and divine revelation, and
respect for the pronouncements of the teachings of the church."
Our consultant advises that the party accepts these
pronouncements.
11.06 personalism
0, 3
In the absence of evidence suggesting
charismatic qualities for any party leader, it is assumed there is
little personalism motivating party militants.