

November 13:

Bernstein, The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory, 117-236.
 Part III, "The Phenomenological Alternative"
 Part IV, "The Critical Theory of Society"

Comments: Bernstein's examination of the phenomenological alternative to positivism in social sciences deals with problems in the assumption of intersubjectivity, which is fundamental to positivist social science. His last chapter grapples more specifically with normative analysis and the realization of values in political life.

November 15:

Term identification examination: You will be presented with a list of terms from which I will select a set, probably about 15, which you will be asked to explain in one brief paragraph in an examination during the two-hour class period. Samples of the terms to appear on the list:

behavioralism	first-order v. second order evaluations
postbehavioralism	normative principles v. prescriptions
Caucus for a New Political Science	logical positivism
political theory v. political philosophy	context of discovery v. justification
fact-value dichotomy	scientific method v. technique
theocentric humanism v. anthropocentric	constructed v. natural language
natural law	model v. theory
value cognitivism	scientific theory
difference principle	primitive terms
utilitarianism	synthetic v. analytic statements
procedural v. distributive justice	reductionism
emotivism	noumena v. phenomena
good reasons morality	phenomenology
verstehen	normal science
objectivity v. neutrality	anomalies in science
physicalist v. institutional fact	covering law
public v. private knowledge	scientific revolutions
teleological explanation	paradigm
functional explanation	dogmatic v. methodological v.
scientific explanation	sophisticated falsification
interpretative explanation	auxiliary v. ad hoc hypotheses
epistemology v. ontology	mainstream social science
Hume on causation	language analysis
Hobbes on state of nature	critical theory
Hobbes on power of the sovereign	hermeneutical explanation

Most of these terms will be discussed in your readings, but some will be treated mainly if not solely in class.

VII. ISSUES IN NORMATIVE ANALYSIS: Other Readings

Dallmayr, Fred R. and Thomas A. McCarthy (eds.). Understanding and Social Inquiry. South Bend, Indiana: Notre Dame Press, 1976.

Those who wish to pursue the issues raised by Bernstein (and Moon) will be interested in this collection of articles dealing with "interpretative understanding" of social phenomena. Dallmayr and McCarthy have assembled a dialogue of positions on verstehen, phenomenology, and hermeneutics.

Galtung, J. et al. "Measuring World Development: I and II," Alternatives, 1 (1975), 131-158 and 523-555.

This pair of articles proposes a paradigmatic view of future research on "world development" which has a definite normative cast. In the authors' words, "The Programme is openly, admittedly, unashamedly, value-oriented: it is concerned with indicators of the good life, the good society, the good world." (p. 137) They ask the question of why they, as members of the social elite in rich countries, "are entitled, sitting in our offices, to postulate values for the world." (p. 139) They pose no answer other than they are part of the people and should be allowed to contribute to the dialogue over value allocation. The authors also contend that "the purpose is not to develop social theory." (p. 140) Instead, they plan to build a "platform of basic value dimensions from which, hopefully, new strategies may emerge." (p. 141) Their ten value dimensions (with antonyms) are (p. 524):

1. personal growth (alienation)
2. diversity (conformity)
3. socio-economic growth (poverty)
4. equality (inequality)
5. social justice (social injustice)
6. equity (exploitation)
7. autonomy (penetration)
8. solidarity (fragmentation)
9. participation (marginalization)
10. ecological balance (ecological imbalance)

Only the first, personal growth, is seen as a basic value, the others being subordinate to it but not otherwise ranked. To realize these values, humans have needs. Their classification of needs is somewhat different in the two articles, but an example at the broadest conceptual level is "freedom," which translates into "mobility" at a more concrete level. Most research projects would use data on transportation usage as an indicator of mobility, but Galtung et al. believe that would concentrate on the means rather than the need or end. Thus, they reject the use of years of schooling as an indicator of education and propose working at developing more direct measures of the needs. They hope to specify "floors" and "ceilings" for the satisfaction of these needs and to identify societies which are "maldeveloped"--i.e., not satisfying (underdeveloped) or over satisfying (overdeveloped)--in providing for their citizens' needs. But essentially, they are focusing on the individual human being as the ultimate unit, and social justice is defined "by means of the idea that 'what one has shall not depend on what one is.'" (p. 554) Thus: "The indicator of social justice would be based on the share a country has in the production and consumption of goods and bads: what it produces and consumes for the satisfaction of fundamental needs and less fundamental needs, what it produces and consumes of means of destruction--such as military hardware and software, and depletion/pollution. Many such items could be imagined--e.g., the share in the world total of teachers (for satisfaction of education needs)--and they would all be evaluated relative to the share of the world population, measured in per mille." (p. 555)

I have summarized this pair of articles at length to illustrate what might be involved in a radical departure from "value-free" (or "value-controlled") research. Perhaps someone in the class will be stimulated to read the articles and evaluate the promise of the research project, known as the World Indicators Programme.

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