KENNETH JANDA

A Conceptual Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Political Parties

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HARRY ECKSTEIN and TED ROBERT GURR
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Editors' Introduction

Research projects of wide scope and long duration are increasingly common in comparative politics, which poses new problems of professional communication. The increase in such projects is a consequence of the refinement of our theoretical questions, the need for more and better data to assess them, and the occasional availability of funds to support large inquiries. But the time lag between the inception of such projects and publication of their final reports is often inordinately long. One response to the consequent scholarly dilemmas of prompt communication and the personal ones of recognition is to write articles that report piecemeal on preliminary and intermediate results and findings. Such articles are necessarily fragmentary, however, and in any case are seldom suited to reporting the general research designs, conceptual or analytic schemes, and methodological innovations that are an intrinsic part of such large research undertakings. Moreover materials of the latter kind usually are prepared before most empirical work is begun; they often are of intrinsic scientific value; and their publication may provide feedbacks to their authors of benefit to the subsequent development of the project.

There are few scholarly media other than the mimeograph circuits among cognoscenti by which these "preliminary" materials can be readily circulated. One function that this Sage series will attempt to perform is to
make generally available reports on the conceptual and methodological underpinnings of large-scale projects, when justified by their quality and intrinsic usefulness.

This paper by Kenneth Janda of Northwestern University is the first such report to be included in this series. It provides a brief overview of the purposes and procedures of the International Comparative Political Parties Project, in progress since 1967; but its primary contribution is to set forth the dimensions or variables on which data are being gathered and to provide justifications for doing so by reference to the theoretical and empirical literature. Three especially noteworthy features of the project can be mentioned here. One is its systematic effort to obtain data on variables selected because of their theoretical relevance, whether or not they are readily available. A second is its primary reliance on judgmental scales coded on the basis of narrative materials. The thoroughness and detail with which information is being obtained and coded is perhaps the most impressive feature of all. At its conclusion this project should make available data of a precision, reliability, and relevance that should provide a new standard for non-survey research in comparative politics.

―Ted Robert Gurr  
―Harry Eckstein

A Conceptual Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Political Parties

KENNETH JANDA

This work describes the conceptual framework employed in the International Comparative Political Parties Project, which was established in 1967 for the purpose of conducting the first comprehensive, empirically based, comparative analysis of political parties throughout the world. The project will cover some 150 political parties in 50 countries, constituting about a 50% random sample of party systems stratified equally according to 10 cultural-geographical areas of the world. The time period chosen for study is 1950 through 1962. Data for the analysis will be obtained from the thousands of pages produced on party politics in our 50 countries. While essentially a library research operation, the ICPP Project uses a variety of modern microfilm and computer information-processing techniques in order to manage the vast amount of printed material relevant to the research. Therefore, the project is unique not only in the scope of its substantive objective of analyzing parties throughout the world, but also in the methodology employed to achieve its objective.

At present, we have assembled information files on party politics during 1950-1962 on 50 countries, listed in Appendix A, which also gives the

AUTHOR'S NOTE: An earlier version of this paper appeared as "The International Comparative Political Parties Project," a paper prepared for delivery at the 1969 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in New York.
number of pages and documents in the files for each country. The files now contain 62,496 pages from 3,301 documents on party politics in our 50 countries, an average of 1,250 pages per country. This information bank will provide the data necessary for coding parties on some 100 basic variables incorporated into 11 variable clusters that embody the conceptual framework of the ICPP Project. The information files will be searched rapidly and systematically through computerized microfilm technology to facilitate coding.

The presumed purpose of methodological innovations is to produce substantive progress in research (Janda, 1963). The methodological contribution of the ICPP Project lies in its information-processing technology, which demonstrates how library materials can be tapped on an unprecedented scale for the purposes of systematic research in the behavioral sciences. Because the substantive contributions of the ICPP Project to the study of political parties would not be possible without its innovative approach to research, the project's information retrieval methodology will be presented before the discussion of its substantive objectives. In view of present space limitations and the existence of publications that treat the project's methodology, the following methodological discussion will be brief. The interested reader is directed to other places (Janda, 1967, 1968a, 1968b).

THE INFORMATION RETRIEVAL METHODOLOGY

We plan to handle the massive amount of material generated during the project with the use of Eastman Kodak's MIRACODE system for storage and retrieval of information on 16mm microfilm. The basic components of the MIRACODE system are a special microfilm camera and microfilm reader. The system can store and retrieve individual pages of original documents according to one or more three-digit code numbers assigned to the pages.

Material is prepared for the system by indexing the contents of every page with reference to a set of coding categories. These code numbers are recorded on a separate form and later keypunched onto cards. The punchcards then form the input to a special microfilm camera which writes the keypunched codes in binary form on microfilm next to the appropriate pages of the document being photographed.

Information is retrieved from the microfilm with the use of the MIRACODE retrieval station. A film magazine is placed in the reader and code numbers relating to the inquiry are entered into the keyboard on the console. The reader searches the binary code patterns on the film and stops when the codes match the numbers entered on the keyboard. Upon retrieval, the page image is displayed on the reader, and a hard copy can be printed if desired. Depending on the number of codes per page, several hundred pages of material can be stored on one one-hundred-foot film magazine and searched for specified combinations of code numbers in ten seconds.

Two different sets of numbers are used in indexing material for the MIRACODE system. One set, consisting of three-digit numbers from 000 to 999, is used exclusively as identification codes for specific parties. The other set, which uses only the first two digits of the codes from 000 through 990, is used to index substantive information about parties. The MIRACODE equipment has the capability for differentiating between these two sets of numbers.

IDENTIFICATION CODES

The party identification codes are organized on the basis of ten broad cultural-geographical categories. The first digit of the three-digit code stands for each main division as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code cultural-geographical division</th>
<th>0—Anglo-American political culture</th>
<th>1—West Central and Southern Europe</th>
<th>2—Scandinavia and the Benelux countries</th>
<th>3—South America</th>
<th>4—Central America and the Caribbean</th>
<th>5—Asia and the Far East</th>
<th>6—Eastern Europe</th>
<th>7—Middle East and North America</th>
<th>8—West Africa</th>
<th>9—Central and East Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

The second digit of the three-digit code stands for a particular country with each division. This scheme permits recording up to ten countries within each division, thus accommodating a maximum of 100 countries. Although there are more than 100 countries in the United Nations alone, the coding scheme is adequate for our universe of 92 countries with parties that qualified for inclusion in the Project. The third digit stands for a particular party within each country, providing for a maximum of 10 parties within each country and 1,000 parties overall. These ranges were
also adequate for our universe of about 300 parties, which included not more than 7 in any single country. Sample identification codes for Japanese political parties that qualified for the project are as follows:

541 Progressive (Kaishinto)
542 Left-Wing Socialist (Saha Shakaito)
543 Right-Wing Socialist (Uha Shakaito)
544 Liberal Democratic (Jiyu Minshuto)
545 Socialist (Shakaito, Social Democratic before 1955)
549 General and other parties

Party identification codes are used to tag locations in texts where information about specific parties is presented. The substantive nature of the information is recorded by means of substantive codes.

SUBSTANTIVE CODES

On the basis of our pretest experience in coding literature on political parties, we decided to index only at the two-digit level of classification, which provides one hundred coding categories for substantive information on political parties while retaining room for expansion of the code by activating the third digit.

The substantive codes have been organized in an attempt to answer several basic questions about political parties. Each of these questions encompasses up to ten coding categories. The first digit of the information codes stands for a given question.

Code Questions about Political Parties

0—What is a political party?—definition, function, theory;
1—How do political parties begin?—the origins of parties;
2—What does a party do?—party activities;
3—Who belongs to the party?—party composition;
4—How is the party organized?—party structure;
5—What does the party seek to accomplish?—party goals;
6—Under what conditions does the party operate?—political environment;
7—Under what conditions does the party operate?—social, economic and geographical environment;
8—Are there any other parties in the country?—party system.

Each of the code divisions has been subdivided into a maximum of ten concept categories. The complete set of codes as they stand in the present stage of the parties project is published in the ICPP Codes and Indexing Manual (Janda, 1968c).

Through the systematic application of these codes to documents in our files, we have opened up the literature on party politics in these countries for the purpose of systematic research. The retrieval capabilities of the MIRACODE system will be used to locate all pages in a given country’s information files that discuss each of the basic variables in our theoretical framework. Using special data forms created for each of these variables, we will summarize the information contained on the film and produce a code for each party on each variable. These data will then be analyzed to pursue the substantive objectives of the ICPP Project.

THE SUBSTANTIVE OBJECTIVES OF THE ICPP PROJECT

The need for a comparative analysis of political parties throughout the world is argued at length elsewhere (Janda, 1968a). This paper stresses both the importance of a general knowledge of foreign party politics and the contributions of this general knowledge toward a better understanding of the nature and function of American parties. Despite the growth of scholarly literature on comparative party politics in recent years, (Dahl, 1966; La Palombara and Weiner, 1966; Epstein, 1966; Macridis, 1967; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Sjoblom, 1968; Crotty, 1968; Jupp, 1968; Milnor, 1968; Rose and Urwin, 1969; Sartori, forthcoming) there is still no worldwide analysis of political parties based on empirical data. Using data gleaned from the writings of scholars, reporters, and practicing politicians, the ICPP Project is generating a unique data base to support such analysis.

The major publication of the project is expected to be a book-length study of parties which will deal explicitly with the creation of what might loosely be called “party theory.” I say loosely because I take the term party theory to stand as a general label for three separate and discernible bodies of theory relating to political parties, and I believe that it is premature, if not totally inappropriate, to speak as some do about a “theory of political parties” without specifying which body of theory is intended. The problem is this: references to a theory of political parties are usually made without regard to the conceptual status of party within the so-called theory. In this loose and misleading usage, it is not clear if party constitutes an independent variable, a dependent variable, or simply an organizational setting for the occurrence of political behavior.
Organizing the proposed book into three distinct parts gives explicit recognition to three different usages of party in party theory.

The first part of the book will deal with party as a dependent variable, reviewing, creating, and testing propositions that explain the origin, growth, success, and demise of political parties. This section will treat as independent variables such factors as the electoral system, social composition of the electorate, geography of the country, type of government, and colonial background. The analysis will include countries that do not have parties as well as those which do. Many narrow-range propositions, especially those incorporating the nature of the electoral system, predict to the development of parties as dependent variables in this manner, and this section will codify and test these familiar propositions within this body of theory.

The second part of the book will treat parties as organizational settings within which goals are set, goal-oriented strategies are formulated, division of labor is established, sanctions are employed, and members are rewarded. Much of the empirical research literature on American parties tests propositions involving these factors as both independent and dependent variables, and the concept of a political party enters the theory largely as one type of social organization to which the propositions are applicable. Many of the propositions in Duverger's classic *Political Parties* (e.g., the one which relates the basic element of party organization to its functional orientation) are of this nature, and the more recent book by Eldersveld (1964) theorizes along the same dimension.

The third and most important part of the book will examine the effect of parties as independent variables upon the political life of a country, which is treated as the dependent variable. Many aspects of a country's political life can be singled out for examination as dependent variables within this body of theory. The one aspect which interests me most at this time and which will be given the most attention is the extent to which knowledge of a country's party system accounts for what might be called the "political atmosphere" of a country—more specifically its position on the empirically distinct dimensions, freedom of expression and domestic violence. The essence of my theoretical argument is that party systems can be characterized in terms of the profile of variables describing the parties in the system and, more importantly for explaining the country's political atmosphere, in terms of the distances between variable profiles of parties in the system. The nature and content of these variable profiles will be described following a discussion of the definition of a party in the ICPP Project.

**DEFINITION OF A POLITICAL PARTY**

Definitions should be constructed in light of the purposes they serve. Our purpose in defining a political party is to conduct a comparative analysis of the origin, activities, and consequences of political parties in the government of nation-states throughout the world. There are many social organizations that call themselves political parties, but we are not concerned with accounting for the behavior of every organization that has labeled itself a party. Nevertheless, our definition is likely to include most of the organizations commonly called political parties while excluding organizations, such as interest groups, that are not normally so regarded.

In studying political parties, we are interested in the set of organizations that pursue a goal of placing their avowed representatives in government positions. The components in this definition bear closer examination. A political party is defined first as an organization—implying recurring interactions among individuals with some division of labor and role differentiation. All organizations are acknowledged to have multiple goals; to qualify as a political party, an organization must have as one of its goals that of placing its avowed representatives in government positions. Moreover, these individuals must be avowed representatives of the party, which means in practical terms that they must be openly identified with the party name or label. In Epstein's (1966: 104) words, "The recognizable label (which may or may not be on the ballot) is the crucial defining element." Finally the term placing should be interpreted broadly to mean through the electoral process (when a party competes with one or more others in pursuing its goal) or by a direct act of designation (when the party has no electoral competition). As seen below, pursuing the goal of designating government officeholders can also apply to illegal organizations.

The universe of organizations that meet our definition (i.e., the universe of political parties) can be divided into two sets: those that are legal and those that are illegal. There are some illegal organizations, which may even call themselves parties, that are not organized to provide governmental leadership (i.e., do not pursue the goal of placing their avowed representatives in government positions) and therefore do not qualify as parties under our definition.

The universe of parties as conceptually defined is too large for practical research, and two restrictions must be incorporated into the operational definition that will be used to identify parties for study. The first restriction recognizes that we are interested only in parties that operate in national politics, which excludes some local parties. The second requires...
that the parties achieve a given level of importance in national politics during our time period (1950-1962), defining importance in terms of strength among the population and stability of existence. These criteria are embodied in the specific operational definitions used to identify legal and illegal parties for inclusion in our study.

For legal parties, our operationalization requires that the party win at least five percent of the seats in the lower house of the national legislature in two or more successive elections. The seat requirement and the successive elections requirement are intended to certify the party’s strength and stability within the political system.

For illegal parties, our definition is not so easily specified. Conceivably, size of membership could be incorporated into an operational definition, but membership data on illegal parties (or on legal parties, for that matter) are difficult to obtain and virtually impossible to verify. The concepts of strength and stability of an illegal party will be specified instead in terms of support of a sizable proportion of the population, at least ten percent, which is sustained over a certain period of time, at least five years. The ten percent and five-year criteria are designed to reflect in a roughly comparable way the five percent and two successive elections criteria for legal parties. In applying the operational criteria for illegal parties, it is likely that the country analyst will have to draw inferences from the literature and exercise a considerable amount of judgment in identifying parties for inclusion in the project.

By limiting our attention to political parties that have demonstrated a certain level of strength and stability during our period of interest, we (1) reduce the number of parties to a more manageable level of hundreds, rather than thousands, of units to study; (2) simultaneously focus our research on parties for which information is more likely to be available; and—most importantly—(3) study those parties, both legal and illegal, that are most likely to have measurable consequences upon national governments. Thus our definition is intended to serve the purposes of our study.

PARTY VARIABLES IN THE ICPP PROJECT

The goal of the ICPP Project is to conduct a comparative analysis of the origin, activities, and consequences of political parties in the government of nation-states throughout the world. Our basic unit of analysis is the political party, but we are also studying the environmental setting within which parties operate and therefore need to deal with the nation as another unit of analysis. Because we are concerned with interactions between parties, we must study also the party system as a separate unit of analysis, but as one whose boundaries are coterminous with those of the nation.

In essence, then, we are dealing with two levels of analysis: the party and the nation, which includes the party system. We are creating virtually all of our own data on parties and—by means of aggregating data created on individual parties—we will also be creating original data on party systems. With respect to other aspects of the national environment within which parties operate, we will be dependent on other bodies of data for our variables—excepting perhaps data on electoral systems for which existing data may not be sufficiently detailed for our purposes.

The basic party variables in the project are grouped into variable clusters that pertain to each of eleven general concepts (to be discussed below) in the comparative analysis of political parties. In most instances, the basic variables in these variable clusters constitute different indicators of the concept represented by the cluster. Under the assumption that these indicators are all intercorrelated—which will be subject to empirical verification—they can be combined in an additive approach to concept measurement. By grouping together different indicators of the same concept, we intend both to improve the reliability and discrimination power of our measures and to reduce the severity of the missing data problem.

In other instances, the basic variables in a variable cluster are not at all regarded as different indicators of the same concept that can be added together to improve measurement but instead as component variables that must be combined in a multiplicative approach to concept measurement. This approach makes no assumptions about intercorrelations and works instead with the magnitude and dispersion of scores on the basic variables. A variety of multiplicative formulae might be used to combine the basic variables into a measure for the concept at the variable cluster level.

Certain variable clusters will be combined to form variable profiles for parties. The variable profiles for two or more parties will be combined to form a variable configuration for the party system. A schematic diagram of the hierarchy, from the basic variables to variable profiles is given in Figure 1. The division of variable clusters representing a party’s “external relations” and its “internal organization” conforms to Stanley Udy’s (1965) distinction between the “institutional system” and “internal organization” in “The Comparative Analysis of Organizations.”

EXTERNAL RELATIONS VARIABLE CLUSTERS

Most of the research that treats the party system as an independent variable focuses only on the number of parties in competition, which, as
Crotty (1970) says, “obscures more than it illuminates.” In contrast to the variables subsumed under Udy’s category of “internal organization,” his institutional system embraces variables that describe the party’s interface with society. We assume that parties differ in their external relations and that these profiles for different parties may be more congruent within some countries than within others.

Helmut Unkelbach (1956: 36-41) suggests that a party system is “integrated” when the “distances” between parties are small, and it is “unintegrated” when the distances are great. Following his notion but rejecting his “integration” terminology, I propose to create measures of party system “congruence” by assessing the distances between parties’ scores on external relations variables. In this way, as Eckstein has urged (1968: 444), I hope to examine variations in party systems measured against a far more sensitive and meaningful standard than the number of parties in competition.

The external relations variable profile is composed of seven variable clusters: (1) institutionalization, (2) governmental status, (3) social aggregation, (4) social articulation, (5) issue orientation, (6) goal orientation, and (7) autonomy. Each of these variable clusters is composed of several basic variables which will be combined either in an additive or a multiplicative model to measure the relating concept. Each of these variables and its underlying concepts will be discussed in turn. Space will not permit reproducing here the rather lengthy conceptual and operational definitions that constitute the coding instructions for each basic variable in the variable clusters. These are available in a separate publication (Janda, 1970).

### 1. Institutionalization

Writing in 1955, McDonald (1955: 15-17) observed, “Even a casual examination of party literature and studies will turn up many references to parties as institutions. Like other terms we have noted, institution as a term seems at first to refer to different things depending upon who uses it.” Later in the same work, he says, “Despite the many casual references to parties as institutions it is surprising that there is very little in the way of explicit discussion of the significance of the institution concept as applied to parties as social formation.” Given today’s interest in comparing party politics in different countries, contemporary writing are more explicit in discussing the significance of the institutionalization of parties than those McDonald described fifteen years ago, although they may not use the term itself. For example, Scott (1966: 337) notes that in Latin America:

Little real political party machinery exists at the local level, and what does exist is seldom related directly to a national party. Instead, a few local notables build their own personalistic organizations for each election, allying themselves with national leaders of so-called national parties for reasons of power or material advantage.

And Pye (1966) sees parties in Southeast Asia in much the same light. Huntington is one contemporary scholar who deals explicitly with the term institutionalization and who has labored hard at explicating the concept. He defines institutions as “stable, valued, recurring patterns of behavior” and says, “Institutionalization is the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability.” Huntington proposes to measure the level of institutionalization for a particular organization “by its adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence” (1965: 394). I agree essentially with his definition of institutions in terms of “stable, valued, recurring patterns of behavior,” but I do not agree with his proposed ingredients for measurement. For example, I believe that a party can be highly institutionalized and yet lack independence of other groups (Huntington’s “autonomy”)—as the Labour Party in Great Britain.

McDonald’s review of various definitions of institutions (1955: 16-17) results in a position close to Huntington’s:
What these definitions seem to have in common is their emphasis upon institution as stressing the regularity of action pattern, its nonpersonal aspect, and the expectations that it creates. To regard party as an institution would be in some measure to single out for stress something that might be called the party way of doing things, something that might be designated by the phrase “party politicking” in order to distinguish it from other types of “politicizing.”

Although Sartori (1968: 281 and 293) does not refer explicitly to institutionalization, it seems this is what he means in his concern about “structured” and “unstructured” parties, with structured parties existing in the minds of their followers as “abstract entities” apart from their leaders. Notwithstanding Scarrow’s warning against “reifying” the party in political analysis (1967: 777; but see Ranney, 1968a), it is obvious that party participants often reify the party in their behavior, which is a characteristic response to an institutionalized party. Thus, in the ICPP Project, an institutionalized party is one that is reified in the public mind so that “the party” exists as a social organization apart from its momentary leaders, and this organization demonstrates recurring patterns of behavior valued by those who identify with it. In the absence of sample survey data on popular views of parties, we seek to measure or operationalize the concept of institutionalization with seven basic variables.

1.01 Year of origin: Year of origin is coded by entering the last two digits of the year; e.g., if “1925,” then “25” is entered. Parties originating before 1900 are coded with negative values; e.g., if “1890” the “-10” is entered. Thus the larger the value, the younger the party and the lower its score on this indicator of institutionalization.

1.02 Name changes: A party is assigned a value according to the sum of its scores earned through a scoring matrix that incorporates the magnitude, frequency, and recency of name changes. The larger this score, the lower its institutionalization score.

1.03 Organizational discontinuity: A continuous party organization has a clear history of existence, uncomplicated by a succession of splits and mergers that cloud its path of development. A party will be scored for continuity according to the sum of its scores earned through a scoring matrix that incorporates the magnitude, frequency, and recency of splits and mergers. The lower the score, the more continuity.

1.04 Leadership competition: An institutionalized party features (1) unambiguous identification of the legitimate party leader at the national level; (2) change of personnel in this leadership position over time; (3) leadership change, when it occurs, comes about through an overt process of criticism, challenge by an aspirant for the incumbent’s position, and formal meeting of party members on the issue of leadership change. The larger the score on this variable, the more identifiable the national leadership structure, the more frequent the leadership changes, the more open the procedures for change.

1.05 Legislative instability: Regardless of its overall level of representation in the legislature, an institutionalized party would be expected to show little variance in representation over time. Legislative instability is measured in terms of deviations from the mean percentage of seats held in the lower house of the legislature. The higher the value, the more instability and less institutionalization.

1.06 Electoral instability: Likewise, an institutionalized party would not be expected to show much variance in electoral strength over time. Electoral instability is measured in terms of deviations from the mean proportion of votes won in national elections. The higher the value, the more instability.

1.07 Number of pages indexed: The attention given to a party by scholars is a measure of its identifiability in national politics. Our count of the total number of pages in our file that discuss the party is such a measure.

2. Governmental Status

Key (1964: 200) holds that “the nature of parties must be sought through an appreciation of their role in the process of governance.” If this is true for the study of American parties, which held Key’s attention, then it is certainly true for the comparative analysis of parties across nations, where there is far more variation in the position that parties occupy in the political system. One source of variation lies in the party’s legal status. Obviously, legal parties have an opportunity to participate in government decision-making that is denied illegal parties. Another important source of variation lies in the party’s political strength. A strong party tends to have more impact on public policy than a weak one. Still other sources of variation can be found in the party’s political orientation and its conditions of origin.
Duverger has probably provided the most general conceptual discussion of a party’s “governmental status” in his chapter on “Strength and Alliances” (1963: 281-351). Still, his conception was restricted to the party’s share of the products of electoral competition (he favored using the percentage of seats won in the legislature) and he did not consider some of the broader aspects of governmental status. The tendency to concentrate on the electoral process for indicators of governmental status has focused research on measuring the “competitiveness” of party competition to include something more than the party’s share of the products of electoral competition have promoted a broader view of the party’s position in the political system, but other factors need to be considered to provide an adequate measure of the party’s governmental status.

Within the ICPP Project, “governmental status” refers to the nature and extent of the party’s participation in national politics. A party that is high on governmental status (1) enjoys government favors rather than interference, (2) claims identification with the nation’s chief executive, (3) holds cabinet positions, (4) engages in party activities throughout the country, (5) holds a majority of seats in the legislature, (6) receives strong popular support in elections, and (7) originates “inside” rather than “outside” the government. A party that is low on governmental status will score oppositely on the above measures. In shorthand form, and using today’s parlance, a party that is high on governmental status would be granting or denying access to government-owned communications media. Parties are scored according to the magnitude of the discrimination they experience, with negative and positive signs indicating its direction.

2.02 Governmental leadership: An important indicator of governmental status is the proportion of time that the party furnishes the leader of the national government, commonly the president in congressional-style government or the prime minister in parliamentary systems. This variable can range from 0 to 1, indicating the proportion of time under study that the party claims governmental leadership.

2.03 Cabinet participation: Some parties are not strong enough to win leadership of the national government, but they may gain access to governmental policy making by entering governing coalitions with other parties. This variable expresses the proportion of time that the party participates in the cabinet and ranges from 0 to 1.

2.04 National orientation: Our conception of governmental status is primarily in terms of national politics. Therefore, a regional party that boycotts national elections or otherwise chooses not to compete in national politics would rate low in governmental status. At the high end of our six-point continuum is a party that competes with others across the country and enjoys rather uniform success across regions.

2.05 Legislative strength: We measure legislative strength by the proportion of seats the party holds in the lower house of the legislature during the years studied.

2.06 Electoral strength: Electoral strength is measured by the party’s proportion of the total vote cast in national elections for the lower house of the legislature averaged over the number of elections held. When a party is prevented from participating in elections, boycotts elections, or has its votes invalidated, then we enter estimates of its approximate strength as a negative value to indicate its low governmental status.

2.07 Outside origin: Parties that are formed by governmental officials usually legislators in parliament, are considered “inside” parties as opposed to those formed “outside” the legislature by leaders of legal, or especially illegal, social organizations. Parties’ origins are rated from 0 to 12 according to increasing distances outside the government.
2.08 Percentage of pages indexed: The proportion of pages indexed for each party in a country's information files is an indicator of its importance in the country's politics.

3. Social Aggregation and 4. Social Articulation

"Aggregation" and "articulation" have figured prominently in parties literature since the publication of The Politics of the Developing Areas (Almond and Coleman, 1960). Unfortunately the popularity of these terms has to some extent outstripped their original distinction, so that some authors now treat the terms as virtual synonyms. Some of the confusion appears to be due to Almond's failure to discuss both interest aggregation and articulation explicitly as functions of political parties. He says:

In our definition we reserve the term "aggregation" for the more inclusive levels of the combinatory processes, reserving the term "articulation" for the narrower expressions of interest. This is not the same thing as identifying interest articulation with "pressure groups" and aggregation with "political parties," though again in the developed modern systems these agencies have a distinctive and regulatory relation to these functions [1960: 39-40].

While he recognizes the possibility that an interest group may perform an aggregative function, he does not discuss the possibility that a party may perform an articulative function, leaving the applicability of the concept unclear for parties. As a result, some authors appear to have seized on the notion that aggregation and articulation were simply two ends of a continuum, an interpretation facilitated by Almond's comments that "the functions of articulation and aggregation overlap" and "the distinction between interest articulation and aggregation is a fluid one" (1960: 30).

I contend that articulation and aggregation ought not be linked together in concept construction so that they are viewed as different ends of the same continuum. That procedure promotes a zero-sum conception which implies that moderate to high levels of both interest articulation and interest aggregation cannot coexist as functions of the same structure. Instead, I prefer treating the two as logically separate functions, as they were originally introduced, defined in terms of expressing interests (articulation) and gathering interests (aggregation). Moreover, like Banks and Textor, I regard interest articulation by parties "as a meaningful category of analysis" (1963: 93).

This distinction between gathering and expressing interests conforms nicely to two alternative methods of assessing the social bases of party support that have confronted parties research. Should a party's social following be measured in terms of the proportion of the groups' support it receives or in terms of the proportion of the party's support that comes from each group? Unfortunately from the standpoint of parties' knowledge, this question has been answered largely from the perspective of voting studies, whose very success has both stimulated some aspects of parties research but retarded others. Voting studies seek to explain party choice by social characteristics and thus compute the percentage of group support distributed across parties. The wealth of voting studies thus makes it easy to find data on the percentage of blue-collar workers voting "leftist" in Western democracies, but it is exceedingly difficult to find data on the proportion of leftist vote that comes from the blue-collar workers. I submit that both methods for calculating party support are important, for they can be interpreted as component values in distinct measures of aggregation and articulation. Based on the proportion of the groups' support given to a party, an aggregation measure indicates the extent to which the party represents significant interests within the society. Based on the proportion of the party's support drawn from given groups, an articulation measure indicates the voice that different interests have within the party. Taken separately and together, measures of aggregation and articulation contribute to an understanding of the party's function in gathering and expressing interests in the policy-making process. The conceptual basis and operationalization for each measure will be discussed below, with explicit reference to Almond's initial formulation.

Almond uses aggregation to refer to the process of gathering, combining, and accommodating different interests into policies pressed upon government. This process is difficult enough to study through intensive field research; it is virtually impossible to tap through library research. However, we assume that the process of aggregation follows from the underlying structure of aggregation as reflected by the support that various groups give to parties. We propose to determine the extent to which a party aggregates social interests—that is, gathers interests, combines them into policies, and presses them upon government—by determining the proportion of each social grouping that supports the party. Note that here we are interested in the proportion of the groups' support that is given to each party, and not the proportion of the party's support that is drawn from each group. Party aggregation of social interests will be calculated by computer according to a formula that weights both the magnitude and evenness of support from each social
Several formulae may be tried, but at present we intend to use the following, which employs a multiplicative model for measurement:

\[ \text{Aggregation} = \sum \frac{x}{n} (1-cv) \]

Where:
- \( x \) = proportion of group's support given to party
- \( cv \) = mean deviation of support
- \( n \) = number of significant social groups

Almond uses articulation to refer to the process by which individuals and groups express demands on political decision-makers. Again, the actual demand-making process is difficult enough to study through field research, much less library research. However, we assume that the process of articulation also follows from the structure of articulation as reflected by the proportion of its support that a party derives from various social groupings. In contrast to aggregation, articulation is concerned with the proportion of the party's support that comes from groups and not the proportion of the group's support given to a party. Party articulation of social interests will be calculated by computer according to a formula that gives disproportionate weight to social groupings as they tend to monopolize the party's support. Several formulae may be tried, but at present we plan to use the following, which again is based on a multiplicative model.

\[ \text{Articulation} = \sqrt{\sum (x_1^2 + x_2^2 + \cdots + x_n^2) \cdot \frac{1}{n}} \cdot \frac{1}{1-1/n} \]

Where:
- \( x \) = the proportion of the party's support coming from a given social group
- \( n \) = the number of significant social groups

According to our operationalizations of the two concepts, a party would receive the highest possible score on aggregation by obtaining one hundred percent support from each significant social grouping—regardless of its size in society—and it would receive the highest possible score on articulation if one hundred percent of its support came from any single significant grouping—regardless of its size in society. (What constitutes a significant social grouping will be discussed below.) In general, the higher the aggregation score, the larger the percentage of group support won by the party and the more even the percentages across groups. Assuming that these groups are inputting demands to the party in proportion to their support of the party, then this measure seems to reflect the process of interest aggregation. Similarly, if we assume that the party tends to articulate interests in proportion to their percent representation within the party, then our measure of articulation also appears conceptually appropriate. In general, the higher the articulation score, the larger the proportion of party support that derives from a smaller number of social groupings.

What constitutes a significant social grouping varies considerably across countries. Anderson et al. (1967) identify four categories of "cultural differentiators" that are significant for developing nations: race, ethnicity and language, religion and caste, and regionalism. Rose and Urwin, who are concerned primarily with developed Western nations, identify religion, regionalism and communalism (ethnicity and language) as significant for politics in modern societies and cite urban-rural and occupation as two other significant social groupings (1969: 12-14). Although they list some twenty "dimensions of voter alignment," Lipset and Rokkan concentrate on social status, religion, urban-rural, and regionalism (1967: 527). Converse would add education to this list, for its part as a "prime predictor for the whole class of dependent variables reflecting political interest, participation and mobilization" plus its "remarkable discriminating power as a status measure in predicting to variables on the other side of the watershed—ideology and party position" (1968: 4).

We have selected all six cultural differentiators mentioned above for our treatment of social aggregation and social articulation. Specifically, we include occupation (or social status in lieu of occupational data); religion; ethnic/language/race; region; urban-rural; and education. We follow a flexible data-recording procedure which allows us to accept whatever groupings the research literature identifies as politically significant within each of these six types of social categories. For example, it makes no difference if the literature identifies two significant religious groupings, or five, or none. While we do attempt to introduce some standardization in terminology for recording these subgroups, we can accept unique groupings with no difficulty. Essentially, the data-recording procedure for both aggregation and articulation can be visualized with reference to the sample matrices labeled for occupational aggregation in Figure 2.

The entries in both tables are proportions of support, which are calculated by occupational groups for the aggregation matrix and by party
for the articulation matrix. These data matrices can accommodate any number of parties in a system (including single-party systems) and any number of subgroups in a cultural differentiator. The aggregation and articulation scores will be generated by applying the computing formula for each to the respective data matrices.

5. Issue Orientation

Ever since Edmund Burke described a party as “a body of men united, for promoting by their joint endeavors the national interest, upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed” (1871: 151), orientations toward political issues has been a major basis for classifying and analyzing political parties (see Lisserson, 1958: 133-139). Occasionally, issue orientation is treated very broadly from the perspective of systems analysis, resulting in the classification of parties as “innovator” or “rejector” (Ranis, 1968), “pro” or “antisystem” (Sartori, 1966), “territorial-cultural” or “functional” (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967: 9-13), and “integrative” or “competitive” (Macridis, 1967: 21-22). More often, parties are categorized at a lower level of abstraction according to the general content of the issues or policies they favor. “Religious,” “agrarian,” and “labor” parties are such examples, but the most pervasive classification of issue orientation at this level is the “liberal/conservative” or “left/right” distinction, which frequents the literature and continues to be used despite criticism of irrelevance for contemporary politics. Finally, at the lowest level of abstraction, some parties—primarily minor ones—warrant classification as a “single issue” parties (Ranney and Kendall, 1956: 444-448).

The approach to issue orientation followed by the ICPP Project is to work initially at the lowest level of abstraction, scoring parties on a series of fourteen separate issues, and then to combine party scores on these issues for higher levels of abstraction—including certainly the traditional left/right typology. The issues, which were selected with concern for cross-national relevance, are defined and explained at length in the ICPP Variables and Coding Manual (Janda, 1970); they are listed below by descriptive title.

5.01 Government ownership of means of production
5.02 Government role in economic planning
5.03 Distribution of wealth
5.04 Role of the state in providing for social welfare

5.05 Secularization of society
5.06 Allocation of resources to the military
5.07 Alignment with east/west blocs
5.08 Independence of foreign control
5.09 Supranational integration
5.10 National integration
5.11 Extension of the franchise
5.12 Protection of civil rights
5.13 Interference with civil liberties

In scoring parties on these issues, we follow the common practice of expressing the party’s position as being for or against the policy implied in the issue. The sign of the score indicates a positive or negative position, and the magnitude of the value indicates the strength of the position. To facilitate analysis in combining party scores to classify parties more abstractly, we incorporate the left/right distinction into our scoring, adopting the arbitrary convention that a negative score is associated with a rightist position and a positive score with a leftist position.

Clearly, attributing left/right positions to parties is easier on some issues than it is on others, but despite the imperfect fit for certain issues, the decision of which side should be treated as leftist and which side as rightist proved easier than expected, with the troublesome exception of interference with civil liberties. The appropriateness of this procedure, and the unidimensionality of the traditional typology, will be tested by an empirical analysis of the data once collected. This analysis will be facilitated by the inclusion of the classical U.S. Department “Communist/Conservative” ratings as basic variable number 14 in our issue-oriented cluster.

Obviously, a leftist position on an issue in one country might constitute a rightist position in another, for left and right can be regarded in relative terms. But we have opted for an absolutist approach to scoring issue orientation, which involves formulating common scales for parties in all countries. In order to simplify the scoring task, however, we do not attempt to capture and express the full range of variation between the most extreme positions possible on each issue. Instead, we limit initial scores to the subcategories, “weak,” “moderate,” and “strong” within
received little systematic attention in the parties literature" (1968: 399).
While the literature is lacking in conceptualizing party goals, it nevertheless
prompts Riggs to observe, "Statements about party orientation often
imply judgments about the 'goals' or 'objectives' of parties" (1968: 57).
Dahl warns, "Although it is obvious that oppositions differ in their goals,
it is exceedingly difficult to reduce differences in goals to a manageable
analytical scheme." He proceeds to say that the basic problem is one of
distinguishing between short-run and long-run goals. "I simply postulate
that certain goals, whether long-run or short-run, public or private, are
'dominant' or 'controlling'; and I distinguish between (a) aims or goals and
(b) strategies" (1966: 341).

Put another way, goals and strategies suggest ends and means.
According to Perrow (1968: 305), "Since there is only a relative
distinction between means and ends and since, therefore, any end or goal
can be seen as a means to another goal, one is free to enter the hierarchy
of means and ends at any point." Perrow points out that goal analysis
depends on the purposes of the research, and that one man's goal may be
another man's means or strategy. For the purpose of the ICIP Project, the
primary interest is in the goal of placing avowed representatives in
government positions. This goal can be pursued by means of different
strategies, the three main ones being (1) competing openly with other
parties through the electoral process to win government positions; (2)
disrupting, invalidating, or proscribing the activities of other parties so that
government positions are won by fraud or default; and (3) operating
outside the electoral process to forcibly place members in government
positions or to induce governmental resignations and thus promote access
to office.

The term "strategy" is often used loosely in political science, with the
result that strategy and tactics are frequently juxtaposed and treated
synonymously—especially in the parties literature. Both terms, of course,
have military origins, with tactics referring to localized hostilities where
adversaries are in contact and strategy to planning for the conduct of an
entire campaign or war (Brodie, 1968: 281). Military strategy can be
viewed in relationship to the end goal of winning a war; party strategy can
be viewed in relationship to the party's goal of placing its representatives
in government positions. In their pure forms, the three main strategies for
pursuing this goal distinguish among (a) competitive parties, (b) monopo-
listic parties, and (c) subversive parties, although some parties may follow
various mixes of the three forms. Parties will be scored according to the
estimated proportion of reliance on each.

Each of the pro/con categories. Allowing for a zero or "neutral" point on
the scale, we thus develop a basic seven-point scale, ranging from "strong
negative" to "strong positive" orientations toward each issue. Inspired by
Meisel's distinction in scoring Canadian parties according to differences in
party "program" and "practice," we ultimately work with a scoring matrix
that elaborates our basic seven-point scale into an eleven-point scale that is
sensitive to differences between party program and party practice (see

6. Goal Orientation

It is difficult to maintain a distinction between issue orientation and
goal orientation, for goals are notoriously difficult to conceptualize.
Anderson states, "The concept of goal is one of the most universal, but
also one of the most troublesome, notions in organizational analysis. It has

Figure 2: DATA RECORDING MATRICES FOR CALCULATING "AGGREGA-
TION" AND "ARTICULATION" SCORES
When we move from party strategies to party tactics, we move to the more specific level of local hostilities in the form of activities performed by the party in light of its strategy. The distinction between strategy and tactics may be helped by introducing the notion of the breadth of a party's strategy. A competitive party that follows a narrow strategy (it might be called a narrowly oriented competitive party) limits its activities (tactics) to election campaigning. A monopolistic party that follows a narrow strategy limits its activities to repressing competition. A subversive party that follows a narrow strategy limits its activities to sabotage and disruption. In each case, the tactics employed are all directly related to the strategy. On the other hand, a broadly oriented party may employ a number of tactics (engage in a variety of activities) that are not directly related to the strategy. These indirect tactics might be used in support of two or even all three strategies.

In addition to scoring parties for reliance on each main strategy, we will score parties on a three-point scale for the amount of energy or attention they devote to various party activities, which are classified for their likely usage as direct tactics supporting a given strategy or as indirect tactics supporting more than one. Note that the classification of party activities as direct or indirect tactics is purely heuristic at this point; a factor analysis of the data later will test the adequacy of our classifications.

Activities classified as direct tactics under given party strategies

6.00 Open competition in the electoral process

6.01 Advertising candidates by mass media: radio, TV, newspapers

6.02 Advertising candidates by signs, posters, billboards, mail

6.03 Promoting candidates through direct contact and canvassing

6.04 Holding public meetings and rallies for candidate exposure

6.05 Registering voters, transporting them to polls,

6.10 Disrupting, invalidating, or proscribing opposition activities

6.11 Interfering with opposition advertising

Activities classified as indirect tactics supporting different strategies (political tactics)

6.21 Boycotting elections, destroying ballots or election records

6.22 Terrorizing the population

6.23 Leading strikes and riots against the government

6.24 Sabotaging government facilities

6.25 Attempting assassinations; attempting coups

6.26 Conducting guerilla warfare

6.12 Harassing opposition party workers

6.13 Harassing opposition candidates

6.14 Harassing opposition voters; purchasing votes

6.15 Falsifying vote reports

6.16 Coopting political opponents

6.20 Subverting the electoral process

6.30 Propagandizing ideas and programs

6.31 Operating mass communication media: radio, TV, newspapers

6.32 Operating party schools (distinguish from public schools)

6.33 Passing resolutions and platforms

6.34 Publishing position papers

6.40 Entering alliances with other parties
6.41 Electoral agreements
6.42 Legislative blocs
6.43 Cabinet coalitions
6.44 Supporting candidate for presidential election

6.50 Providing for social welfare (nonpolitical tactics)
6.51 Providing food, clothing, or shelter
6.52 Running employment services
6.53 Interceding with government on citizen's behalf
6.54 Providing basic education, not primarily political education
6.55 Providing recreational facilities or services

7. Autonomy

Anderson broadly defines autonomy as "the degree to which organizations function free of others and thus generally occupy an independent place in society." He points out that students of party organization are interested in two facets of autonomy: "the independence of particular organizations relative to nonparty groups and organizations, and the independence of particular units relative to other units within the overall party organization" (1968: 391). In the ICPP Project, interest in autonomy is limited to the first facet; however, "non-party" would be interpreted to mean "extra-party" groups, which allows for parties that are dependent on other parties. Anderson's definition seems close to Huntington's usage of autonomy in the sense of "the development of political organizations and procedures which are not simply expressions of the interests of particular social groups." However, Huntington's usage is so broad that he requires autonomous organizations to "have their own interests and values distinguishable from those of other social forces." For instance, a political party "which expresses the interests of only one group in society—whether labor, business, or farmers—is less autonomous than one which articulates and aggregates the interests of several social groups." (1965: 401). Under this interpretation, the concept of autonomy shades into the concepts of articulation and aggregation.

I prefer to limit the concept of autonomy to structural linkages rather than shared values and interests. Therefore, we define autonomy as a party's structural independence from other institutions and organizations, whether in or out of the country. This concept becomes especially important in cross-national research, which disclosed parties with widely different relationships to their social and political environment and consequent differences in freedom to act and constraints upon action. We propose to measure this concept through five basic variables, largely as suggested by Huntington.

7.01 Source of funds: It is often contended that a party is beholden to its financial contributors. In this light, the least autonomous state would be that of complete dependence for funds on one outside person, organization or institution; the most autonomous state would be that of obtaining sufficient funds through party activities, which include membership dues or business ventures. High scores on this variable means more party independence in obtaining funds.

7.02 Source of members: Duverger introduced the notion of "direct" and "indirect" party membership, with the distinction hinging on whether party membership was an act of voluntary association with the party as such or a consequence of membership in another social organization (1963: 5-17). Membership in a labor union that also confers party membership is a frequently cited example of indirect membership. Presumably, the existence and extent of indirect membership infringes upon party autonomy, and this is expressed in the operationalization.

7.03 Source of leaders: A party that is led by persons recruited from one of the main institutional sectors of society will develop special leadership links with that sector—be it church, labor, military, business, education, scientific, or the political sector itself. But parties that draw their leaders from different sectors of society will either not develop the special connections or will harbor competing connections. We measure the breadth of leadership recruitment with this basic variable.

7.04 Relations with domestic parties: Some parties eschew any form of collaboration with opposition parties. Others get involved so frequently in electoral alliances or legislative coalitions that the anticipated reactions of their partners limit their freedom of action. Still other parties are
completely absorbed in national front organizations that leave their independent existence in serious doubt. We try to handle this range of possibilities in our operationalization.

7.05 Relations with foreign parties: Party participation in international organizations may be limited to the exchange of information through secretariats or may extend to the acceptance of policy positions established at international party congresses. The greater the influence of the international organization, the lower the score on this variable.

INTERNAL ORGANIZATION VARIABLE PROFILE

Udy defines “internal organization” as “the total configuration of interrelationships between the membership, group structure, and administrative system” (1965: 687). I take this conception to be similar to Anderson’s concern with “organizational role structure” in the study of political parties (1968: 388). The organization of political parties has long held the attention of serious scholars. Initially, their attention was focused on the distinctiveness of party organization as a social phenomenon; such concern can be seen in the writings of Ostrogorski and Michels, both of whom stressed the invidious consequences of party organization (1902 and 1915). More recently, with the valued acceptance of political parties in representative government, scholars have turned to studying the differences in party organization, especially as they relate to the party’s role in governing. Duverger can be cited again as the main source of contemporary concern with organizational concepts in parties research. The first paragraph of the first chapter of his classic work (1963: 4) emphasized the importance of party organization:

It constitutes the general setting for the activity of members, the form imposed on their solidarity: it determines the machinery for the selection of leaders, and decides their powers. It often explains the strength and efficiency of certain parties, the weakness and inefficiency of others. A number of scholars have taken off from Duverger and fashioned typologies of parties based on organizational characteristics (see Macridis, 1967: 8; Rigg, 1968: 58-69; and Jupp, 1968: 38-46). Crotty notes that “party organizational analysis is not new,” but he also points out that it is “not without fault”—“This particular line of inquiry represents one of the oldest in parties’ research and one of the most frustrating” (1970). One source of frustration lies in the hiatus between party research and established organizational theory. Most party scholars have formulated their concepts of party organization without careful regard for the broader literature on organizational theory. True, much of the organizational literature may be practically irrelevant to parties research because of its heavy reliance on research designs that are suitable for captive employee populations but too demanding for scattered party volunteers. Nevertheless, some effort at relating concepts in organizational theory to parties research can help to refine concepts of party organization, to operationalize these concepts using techniques from the organizational literature, to increase cross-national comparability among concepts, and to impose some needed conceptual order on the host of variables presently involved in organizational analysis of political parties.

Anderson’s valuable review of concepts in organizational theory identifies six major dimensions of variation in organizational role structure with special relevance to parties research. These are labeled as “autonomy,” “control,” “consensus,” “involvement,” “formalization,” and “goals.” The first and last dimensions, autonomy and goals were treated as variable clusters within the external relations profile, for it seemed that both were aspects of a party’s interface with society. The internal organization variable clusters in the ICPP Project were built around Anderson’s remaining four dimensions, with some modifications in terminology. The four variable clusters that emerged—“degree of organization,” “centralization of power,” “coherence,” and “involvement”—match Anderson’s dimensions almost exactly and appear to accommodate most of the organizational variables used in parties research. Again, each of these variable clusters comprises several basic variables, which will be given in abbreviated form following the explanation of the concept underlying each cluster.

8. Degree of organization

This variable cluster conforms to Anderson’s “formalization” dimension, which he broadly defines as structured patterns of interactions that are prescribed either by formal rules of procedure or by traditions and unwritten rules. Thus, the more formalized the organization, the more structured the behavior patterns. Because of the tendency within the parties literature to equate formal structure with legal structure, I have adopted “degree of organization” as a label for Anderson’s “formalization” dimension. It appears that differences in the degree of organization are what Duverger means in most of his many, and diverse, references to the structural articulation of the party. If degree of
organization can be equated with structural differentiation, then this cluster also relates to Huntington’s “complexity-simplicity” dimension of political institutions (1965: 399). Within the parties literature, the degree of organization is often cited as a factor in party “effectiveness”—usually measured in terms of electoral turnout and interparty competition in elections (see Katz and Eldersveld, 1961; Cutright and Rossi, 1958; Gatlin, 1968; and Crotty, 1968). From an alternative perspective, the degree of organization is seen as dependent on other variables, such as the party’s ideological commitment and the nature of the electoral system. While the concept of degree of organization appears in all three bodies of party theory mentioned earlier, it figures most prominently in theories dealing with the party as an organizational setting for behavior.

Defining degree of organization as the extent of regularized procedures for mobilizing and coordinating the efforts of party supporters in executing the party’s strategy and tactics (Blau, 1968: 298), we employ seven basic variables in an additive model as operational measures of degree of organization. A number of these measures, outlined below, are inspired by Crotty’s indices of party organization (1968: 298-303).

8.01 Structural Articulation: Some parties operate without formal organizational charts that describe party organs and specify relationships among them. Others have such organizational plans but the lines of authority among organs are blurred or contradictory. Still others operate with clearly specified structures and visible lines of authority. High values on this variable indicate specific and detailed structural organization—but not necessarily “centralized” organization. (See the “centralization” variable cluster.)

8.02 Intensiveness of organization: Duverger emphasizes the importance of the “basic element” in party structure, which is the smallest organizational unit (1963: 17-40). The most intensive type of organization compares to the classic “cell” meeting of small numbers of people in localized areas. The least intensive type corresponds to party notables caucusing at national meetings. The higher the value on this variable, the more localized (intensive) the party organization.

8.03 Extensiveness of organization: Some parties may have very intensive organization but only in parts of the country. A highly organized party should be represented by its basic elements throughout the country. A high score on this variable indicates that the party maintains local organizations in every important region of the country.

8.04 Frequency of local meetings: The existence of local organizations may not contribute much to overall organizations if the basic elements seldom meet. A measure of the frequency of local meetings is another measure of the degree of party organization.

8.05 Frequency of national meetings: The same logic can be applied to meetings of the top elements in party structure. Coordination of party activities cannot be regularized in the absence of leadership meetings. The more frequent these meetings, the greater the degree of organization.

8.06 Maintenance of records: Written records are essential to the development of a high level of party organization. Records here ought to be broadly interpreted to mean the publication of party documents and the conduct of research. At a minimum, party records would be expected to include lists of party activists who could provide manpower for party activities. Our operationalization of this variable incorporates several different forms of record-keeping, and a high score on maintenance of records indicates a greater degree of organization.

8.07 Pervasiveness of organization: Parties vary in their creation and cultivation of ancillary organizations. More highly organized parties are likely to generate organized support for the party among important social groups. Pervasiveness of party organization can be measured through the number of such ancillary organizations and the size of their membership.

9. Centralization of power

This variable cluster refers to Anderson’s dimension of “control”—more specifically to the distribution of control instead of the volume or sources of control. In this sense, it is identical with Duverger’s concepts of “centralization and decentralization,” which, he says, “define the way in which power is distributed amongst the different levels of leadership” (1963: 52). There is some tendency within the parties literature to confuse centralization with organization, or at least to neglect drawing clear distinctions between the two. Duverger (1963: 52-33) for once cannot be blamed for this conceptual ambiguity, for he takes pains to distinguish between centralization and articulation (one of our measures of organization). Nevertheless, discussions of party politics frequently equate strong party organization with centralization of power. Perhaps the confusion is due to the empirical relationship between a high degree of organization and centralization of power. Duverger himself
asserts this relationship, and it appears explicitly in the writings of other authors (see Sorauf, 1964: 160-162). Granting the empirical relationship that often obtains between organization and centralization, I still argue for separating them conceptually in comparative analysis. In this way, we can not only determine the extent of their relationship but also analyze deviant cases: parties that are high in organization but low in centralization or vice versa. The existence of federalism, for example, should explain why some highly organized parties are also decentralized, and low levels of institutionalization should account for some parties that are centralized but loosely organized.

Viewing centralization of power as the location and distribution of effective decision-making authority within the party we define the national party organs as our reference point for “central” location. Thus a centralized party is one which features the concentration of effective decision-making authority in the national party organs, with a premium placed on a smaller number of individuals participating in the decision. We have formulated eight operationalizations of this concept, as reflected in these eight basic variables.

9.01 Nationalization of structure: Formal party organization can give more or less emphasis to national, regional, and local party organizations. If there are no national party organs that exist independently of meetings of regional party leaders, there is hardly a national organization. On the other hand, there may be no provision for regional organizations to interrupt the chain of command from the center. The higher the score, the more structural predominance of national organs.

9.02 Selecting the national leader: Regardless of the amount of authority he gets to wield, the national leader is at least symbolically important, and his selection reflects intraparty politicking. In the most decentralized parties, he is selected by a direct vote of party supporters. In the most centralized, he is named by a small group of top leaders. Our operationalization incorporates a number of intermediate positions in the scale.

9.03 Selecting parliamentary candidates: Despite arguments to the contrary, national approval of constituency candidate selections has been cited as an important factor in centralized party politics. Our measure ranges from complete local choice, determined by votes of party supporters, to complete selection by the national organization.

9.04 Allocating funds: It has often been asserted that power resides in the hands of those who control the purse. In some parties, funds are collected locally and disbursed to the national organization for its support. In others, the situation is completely reversed. A high score on this variable indicates that the national organization determines the allocation of funds for party activities.

9.05 Formulating policy: The same range of variation can be seen in the activities followed by party organs at different levels in speaking out on public and party policy. Although there is some doubt about their effect on final party policy, constituency associations within the British Labour Party continually formulate and press resolutions on the party in its annual conferences (see Rose, 1962; McKenzie, 1955). One does not expect the same activity from congressional districts in the United States. Again, a high score indicates policy is formulated and promulgated at national levels—although it is not necessarily carried out.

9.06 Controlling communications: Along with control of party funds, control of communication is a prime source of power in any organization. Some parties may not have any mass communication media and therefore have nothing to be controlled. In others, we can find examples of varying degrees of local and national operation of communications media, such as newspapers, magazines, and radio. The greater the national participation, the more centralized the control.

9.07 Administering discipline: Distinction can be made between the techniques of discipline, involving specific rewards or punishments, and the identification of party organs that administer the discipline (see Jackson, 1968). A basic variable in the "coherence" cluster deals with techniques of discipline; this variable deals with the organs that are responsible for administering whatever techniques are available. A high score indicates that disciplinary measures are meted out by the national organs.

9.08 Leadership concentration: Parties differ according to the number of individuals who constitute the top party hierarchy. The most centralized party features a single figure as a national leader empowered to make binding decisions in the name of the party. A decentralized party has a series of leaders who may speak in behalf of the party but who are not regarded as authoritatively binding spokesmen. Somewhere in the middle is a situation of collective leadership, which produces binding decisions from group leadership meetings. Our operationalization provides for a
range of leadership concentrations, with a high score indicating domi-
nation by a strong personality.

10. Coherence

This variable cluster relates directly to Anderson’s “consensus,” which
he defines broadly as “the degree of congruence in the cultural
orientations of various individuals and groups comprising an organiza-
tion.” He then points out that parties scholars are interested in the issues
which obtain consensus, in the level of consensus obtained for different issues,
and in the distribution of consensus across party organs (1968: 396-397).
Under this conception, consensus deals primarily with attitudinal agree-
ment among party members. Not only is this type of data unlikely to be
obtained through the library research procedures of the parties project,
but attitudinal agreement by itself appears to be too static a concept for
the comparative analysis of party politics. The fact that party members
disagree over an issue is undoubtedly important, but it is more important
to know how, if at all, that disagreement is expressed in intraparty politics.
Therefore, we choose to focus instead on the concept of “coherence,”
declared as the degree of congruence in the attitudes and behavior of party
members. In so doing, we follow the lead of Huntington, who introduces
the concept of coherence, defines it in terms of consensus, and then
suggests ways that coherence can be measured (1965: 403-405).

The conceptual equivalence of coherence has been included in studies
of party “cohesion” and “factionalism.”19 These studies have sought to
identify the sources of coherence and to assess the consequences of
varying degrees of coherence upon party effectiveness. Our data should be
able to support both types of inquiry, as we operationalize coherence with
reference to six basic variables.

10.01 Legislative cohesion: This variable may not apply to certain party
systems and to some parties (e.g., illegal parties) in other systems. But it is
a useful measure for parties with legislative representation. When suitable
data are available, the mean Rice index of cohesion will be calculated.20
In the absence of such data, the mean index of cohesion will be estimated,
with a value of 100 indicating perfect voting cohesion.

10.02 Ideological factionalism: An ideologically coherent party dis-
plays a united front on matters of party ideology, which is not a topic of
debate among party leaders. A party lacks ideological coherence if it is
divided into labeled factions, of approximately equal strength, that favor
different ideological orientations. A high score indicates high coherence.

10.03 Issue factionalism: Specific issues, rather than overall ideology,
may become the focus for factionalism within the party. Again, the party
is coherent on issues if they are not a topic of debate among party leaders
and if there are no labeled factions that divide the party according to
issues.

10.04 Leadership factionalism: Even in the absence of disputes over
ideology or issues, parties may suffer internal disruption over personality
conflicts between leaders. Or conflict can arise over the choice of party
candidates for public office or nominees for party posts. In either event,
the existence of factions identified with party personalities indicates low
coherence.

10.05 Strategic or tactical factionalism: Party members may agree on
ideology and issues but may disagree on the strategy or tactics to achieve
their ends. This type of disagreement also impairs party coherence.

10.06 Party splits: Splits within a party appear to be a clear indicator
of lack of coherence, but it is also possible that the departure of dissidents
leads ultimately to greater coherence. While this variable is being
tentatively included in the coherence cluster, its contribution to con-
herence is problematic at present.

11. Involvement

Anderson’s last dimension of variation in organizational role structure is
“involvement,” which he does not define but discusses in terms of the
amount and type of participation in the party. Duverger placed great
importance on the amount and type of participation and their relationship
to the concept of party membership.21 The more severe the requirements
for membership, he argued, the greater the involvement in party
activities—ranging from the minimum psychological attachment common
to supporters of American parties to intense psychological and social
attachments that characterize Communist party members. Neumann
incorporated similar distinctions in his classification of parties as providing
individual representation or social integration (1956: 404-405).

In the ICPP Project, involvement is defined as the intensity of
psychological identification with the party and commitment to furthering
its objectives by participating in party activities.22 We seek to opera-
tionalize this concept through an additive model involving these five basic
variables.
11.01 Membership requirements: Some parties, like the two major American parties, have virtually no membership requirements of their own. Throughout the rest of the world, however, party membership is a common and meaningful concept. Even among those which do formally enroll members, parties can differ according to the ease with which membership is attained and the financial costs involved in party membership. The higher the score on this variable, the more difficult and the more costly it is to be a party member.

11.01 Membership participation: Many authors have noted important differences in the degree of involvement in party activities (see Duverger, 1963: 61; Milbrath, 1965: 18; and Barnes, 1966: 351). Following Barnes, we seek to determine whether the party's membership is primarily nominal, marginal, participant, or militant.

11.03 Material incentives: Clark and Wilson (1961) distinguish among types of incentives. “Material” incentives would be akin to the traditional conception of “patronage” as a motivating force for party militants. Some have argued that material incentives provide the strongest motivation for action in behalf of the party (see Epstein, 1967: 101-103). We gauge the proportion of militant members that are motivated by material incentives.

11.04 Purposive incentives: Social values promoted by party action provide “purposive” incentives for party members. We also gauge the proportion of militant members that are motivated by purposive incentives.

11.05 Doctrinism: The more pragmatic the party’s program and performance, the weaker the stimulant for involvement. On the other hand, a party that possesses a body of doctrine and justifies its acts in light of that doctrine offers its members a source of inspiration and encouragement, if not an object for devotion.

CODING THE BASIC VARIABLES

Although the time span of interest to the ICPP Project is 1950 to 1962, the project can still be regarded as providing a cross-sectional picture or “snapshot” of world politics at a given point in time. If we carry the photographic analogy further, we can speak of snapshots with different shutter speeds. The faster the shutter speed, the less the blur of moving objects being photographed. For example, the data collection phase of sample survey research—typically described as providing a cross-sectional view or snapshot of public opinion at a given point in time—often takes two or three weeks to complete. This shutter speed allows time for events to change opinion, but the blurring is assumed to be negligible in most instances and the survey results are treated as showing public opinion at a given time, say November 1968.

Our shutter speed can be likened to a thirteen-year time exposure. Objects or conditions that do not change during this time period should be sharp on the photograph; the more movement, the more blur. While our basic design is cross-sectional, we do provide some test of party “movement” or change in our coding procedure by scoring parties separately for the first and second parts of our time period, 1950 to 1956 and 1957 to 1962. Given the nature of library materials, it was felt that only a two-part division in time could be supported with available information. But at least we have some flexibility in scoring parties that change in external relations or internal organization, and we can produce some knowledge about the rapidity of change for ten of the eleven variables. The “institutionalization” variable cluster—which itself involves observations over time—will not be subjected to this dual coding procedure.

The most important outcome of the ICPP Project will be the comparative data that will be produced on each of the 150 parties in the study. Despite the great scholarly interest in comparative politics and cross-national analysis, virtually no data of any quality are available on the eleven variable clusters described above. The ICPP Project strategy in assembling these data is to invest heavily in careful research and “quality control” procedures in order to produce data of the highest possible reliability and validity—given the limitations of working with library materials.

Obviously, the literature we have indexed and recorded on film will vary in its adequacy for providing information with which to make coding judgments, and our analysts will have more confidence in coding some variables than in coding others. We intend to reflect the adequacy of the documentation underlying any given variable and party and our analysts’ confidence in their coding judgments by accompanying each variable with an “adequacy-confidence” rating, as scored by those who code the variable.

As far as possible with available funds, every variable for every party will be coded independently by two assistants, ideally the members of the two-man research team that read and indexed the literature for that
### Figure 3: ADEQUACY-CONFIDENCE SCALE

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Category label</th>
<th>Conceptual definition</th>
<th>Operational definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>Inapplicable</td>
<td>Variable does not apply to the party coded.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Inadequate: no data</td>
<td>No information is contained in the file on the variable being considered.</td>
<td>Two situations can produce this code: (1) There is a 1:1 division between sources with a &quot;great&quot; discrepancy in the suggested codes, but one code can be favored on the basis of source credibility (2) Data are incomplete in some way, but a code can be inferred from available information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Inadequate: disagreement</td>
<td>Disagreements are found in the file which are not resolvable by reference to source credibility. The disagreement might be resolved by more data, but the information in the file is inadequate.</td>
<td>Two situations can produce this code: (1) There is a 1:1 division between sources with a &quot;great&quot; discrepancy in the suggested codes, but one code can be favored on the basis of source credibility (2) Data are incomplete in some way, but a code can be inferred from available information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Barely adequate:</td>
<td>It is possible to cite this code as the most probable among alternatives, but further research could easily produce a finding at great variance from this one.</td>
<td>Three situations can produce this code: (1) No source has complete information, but a summary code can be made from data from two or more incomplete sources (2) There is a 2:1 division between sources without regard to degree of discrepancy (3) There is a 1:1 division between sources with a &quot;small&quot; discrepancy in suggested codes, but one code can be favored on the basis of source credibility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>lowest confidence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Adequate: low confidence</td>
<td>There is a disagreement in the literature which suggests that the code might not be supported by further research, although the alternative is not greatly discrepant.</td>
<td>There is a 1:1 division between sources with a &quot;medium&quot; discrepancy in suggested codes, but one code can be favored on the basis of source credibility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Adequate: low to medium</td>
<td>There is no strong agreement in the literature on this particular code, but further research is likely to support the code or one close to it.</td>
<td>Three situations can produce this code: (1) No source has complete information, but a summary code can be made from data from two or more incomplete sources (2) There is a 2:1 division between sources without regard to degree of discrepancy (3) There is a 1:1 division between sources with a &quot;small&quot; discrepancy in suggested codes, but one code can be favored on the basis of source credibility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Adequate: medium</td>
<td>The code is not extensively documented in the literature, but there is no disagreement in evidence. Further research would likely support the code, but there are no strong grounds to rule out possible disagreement.</td>
<td>One source cites the summary code with no disagreement in evidence.</td>
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<td>confidence</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Adequate: medium to high</td>
<td>Although the code is quite well documented, the judgment is placed in some doubt because it is not unanimous. Disagreements might occur in further research, but the code would likely be supported.</td>
<td>There is at least a 3:1 division between sources, without regard to the degree of discrepancy, and the overwhelming evidence favors the code.</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Adequate: high</td>
<td>Since documentation of the code is good and no disagreements are apparent, it is probably accurate, although additional documentation is desirable.</td>
<td>Two sources agree on the code and no source disagrees.</td>
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<td>Adequate: highest</td>
<td>The variable code is extremely well documented and no disagreements are apparent; belief in the accuracy of this code is about as high as one could expect in the absence of original field research.</td>
<td>Three or more sources agree on the code and no source disagrees.</td>
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*a. The degree of discrepancy is applicable only to variables of an ordinal or interval nature. Whether a discrepancy is to be classified as "small," "medium," or "great" depends on the particular variable and is established in the operational definitions for each variable, which must be referred to in order to determine or interpret the degree of discrepancy.*
country. The variable code that is eventually keypunched for statistical analysis derives from their independent coding operations. When the coders agree on a variable code, that code will be entered for the variable. When they disagree over coding the variable, an attempt will be made to resolve their disagreement through discussion, involving outside coders if necessary. The adequacy-confidence code that is assigned to the final variable code also derives from both analysts' adequacy-confidence codes, which are independently assigned when the variable is coded. Intercoder conferences and involvement of outside coders are also used to resolve disagreements in rating variables on the adequacy-confidence scale. Figure 3 describes the categories involved in the adequacy-confidence scale. A complete discussion of this scale and its utilization is given elsewhere (Janda, in press).

Two methods will be used to "control errors" in our data—in Naroll's sense of "counteracting their effect on the results of the study" (1963: 12). The first and simpler method is to study scatter diagrams or contingency tables for the presence of deviant cases as disclosed by distance from the regression line or entries in cells off the diagonal. Assuming that the diagrams or tables are constructed to show the relationship between the two variables linked by theory, the presence of deviant cases suggests either measurement error or exceptions to the theory. By examining the cases for the adequacy-confidence scale scores, which can be displayed by appropriate computer routines, the researcher might be able to determine if apparent exceptions to his theory rate low on the scale and represent probable measurement error or if the data seem solid and the theory dubious or incomplete.

The second method of controlling error involves a "stepwise" approach to the calculation of correlation coefficients. By means of flexible computer programs for including and excluding cases from analysis on the basis of their adequacy-confidence scores, correlations can be calculated first for the "best" data, then again for progressively larger sets of data as the quality restriction is relaxed. Assuming that measurement error (as expressed by the adequacy-confidence scale) is random and the hypothesized relationship is true, smaller correlation coefficients should be generated from each progressive relaxation of data quality. If the correlations should happen to increase, serious attention should be given to bias among data at the lower end of the adequacy-confidence scale.

Although problems inherent in library research are not unique to the ICPP Project, the scope of our activities is such that we must develop systematic procedures for evaluating the information that resides in and emerges from our files. We have adopted the methodology of data quality control to help us cope with the problem of data reliability.

The ICPP Project has been in existence for more than three years, and virtually all the activity to date has been expended in preparation of the collection of data on parties. Little actual variable coding has been done. This heavy investment of resources in preparation for data collection is based on a belief that most cross-national studies, which commonly focus on the nation rather than the party as a unit of analysis, neglect data collection in favor of data analysis. As a result, demands are often made of the data that far exceed their quality, and this problem persists and even intensifies as the data are used over and over again in secondary analysis. We have opted for elaborate development of our computer and microfilm information retrieval capability and our data quality control techniques in the hope of producing the best data possible from systematic research into man's written record of party politics across the world. The analysis of these data will begin upon conclusion of coding, which is now under way and scheduled for completion by fall, 1970. Results of the analysis should be forthcoming within a year afterwards.

### APPENDIX

#### STATISTICS ON COUNTRIES AND PARTIES STUDIED BY ICPP PROJECT

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**ICPP AREA FILES**

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<th>No. of pages</th>
<th>No. of parties</th>
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<td>Totals for Countries and Area Files</td>
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**ICPP TEST COUNTRIES**

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<th>No. of pages</th>
<th>No. of parties</th>
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**GRAND TOTAL MICROFILMED**

|                  | 3,635           | 69,872        |

**AVERAGE NUMBER PAGES PER COUNTRY STUDIED**

**NOTES**

1. Primary support for the project has come from the National Science Foundation Grants GS-1418 and GS-2533. Northwestern University's Research Committee generously supported one year's work pretesting the methodology before...
application was made to the National Science Foundation. Northwestern's Council for Intersocietal Studies provided some data-processing equipment and space to facilitate our research and came to our aid with emergency funds when our NSF support was interrupted. More than fifty graduate and undergraduate students deserve to be mentioned for their participation in the project. Space limitations prevent giving proper credit to all of them here, but I wish to identify several by name for their special contributions to this particular paper. Carolyn Billingsley Smith, my capable administrative assistant, has made the job of supervising the project easy for me during this past year and has made important intellectual contributions to the concepts and operationalizations reported herein. Michael Cochran, Raymond Corrado, Robert Drummond, Lee Hunt, Norman Miller, Donald Syvan, John Thomas, and Richard Stook—students in a joint graduate and undergraduate seminar in Spring, 1969—stimulated and corrected my thinking on many points. Gilbert Rotkin and Donald Syvan drafted some of the coding instructions for basic variables, and David Keobler helped at the conceptualization stage. John Thomas aided me in handling the data quality problem. And also the good work of our 1969 Summer Technical Staff—Barbara Fritze, Mary Canillo, Kevin Sherman, Kathetine Schwering, Larry Sims, and Dana Whalen—and our Research Analysts—Raymond Duvall, Danile Fiero, Richard Hala, Jean Jacobson, Jarol Manheim, Howard Matthews, Jeffrey Millstone, Irving Rockwood, Amos Sawyer, Stephen Smith, and Mary Wellin—created a hospitable atmosphere for preparing this paper. Finally, my colleague, William J. Crotty, helped me develop a number of difficult points, and my wife, Ann, helped immeasurably with bibliographic searches. Colleague, William J. Crotty, helped me develop a number of difficult points, and my wife, Ann, helped innumerable with bibliographic searches.

1. See, for example, Lipset and Rotkin (1967: 26-50), where major events in the Western world—the Reformation, church/state conflicts over control of education, and the industrial revolution—are used to account for the organization and orientation of major European parties. Jean Blondel (1969), on the other hand, theorizes about the group bases of parties. See especially chapter 7.
2. See the chapter on “Parties and the Constitution” in Leiserstein (1958: 82-132).
4. The examples of research involving interparty competition are too numerous to give in detail. A recent article that relates interparty competition to public policy in the United States is Lockard, 1968. A cross-national approach to the analysis of government instability in terms of interparty competition is contained in von der Mehden (1964: 54-75). Unfortunately, the later book by Almond and Powell (1966), does not dispel the confusion. The chapter on “Parties and the Constitution” in Leiserstein (1958: 82-132) is a good starting point. Unfortunately, the later book by Almond and Powell (1966), does not dispel the confusion. The chapter on “Parties and the Constitution” in Leiserstein (1958: 82-132) is a good starting point.

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20. This measure was devised by Stuart A. Rice in 1925. His original article is reprinted as “Measuring Cohesion in Legislative Groups,” in Wahlke and Eulau (1959: 372-377).

21. Duverger referred to the amount and type of participation as the “degree” and “nature” of participation (1963: 61-132). Barnes examines the motivations for party participation (1968), and the subject in general is treated extensively in Milbrath (1963).

22. The idea of psychological identification with a party is associated with the work of Almond and Verba (1963). Almond and Verba (1963) proposed measuring party identification across five countries by asking respondents if they would object to the daughter (or son) marrying someone from X party. Przeworski and Teune criticize this procedure (1966-1967) asking if it might not indicate the desire of parents to participate in their daughter’s marriage choice, regardless of party (see also Teune, 1968).

23. An analysis of the coverage of some 8,000 pages of parties literature for nine countries is contained in Janda, 1969.

REFERENCES


Janda / COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL PARTIES


Kenneth Janda is with the Department of Political Science at Northwestern University in Evanston, Illinois.

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