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#### Kenneth Janda

#### Northwestern University

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Illinois' 13th District is located in the northern part of Cook County and consists of ten suburban townships plus the 50th Ward of Chicago. (See Figure 1.) This district was created by the 1961 Illinois General Assembly acting in special session for the purpose of reapportioning the state into twenty-four congressional districts. As a consequence of the 1960 census, Illinois' allotment of congressional seats was reduced one from its previous twenty-five. If the legislature had not redistricted the state to match the new number of congressmen, all twenty-four would have been forced to run at large. Unable to agree on a reapportionment bill during the regular session, the Republicans and Democrats consented to a compromise plan in November 1961.

The old 13th District, which had been one of the nation's largest districts with more than 900,000 inhabitants, was altered considerably in the reapportionment process. The newly created 13th District contained slightly more than 500,000 population. This change had been accomplished by lopping off heavily Republican Lake County to the north, eliminating two and a fraction townships to the south, and appending Chicago's 50th Ward. (See Figure 1.)

The 50th Ward was the only new territory added to the area now known as the 13th District, and the new district retained the salient characteristics of the old. Illinois 13th still included the fashionable old suburbs of Chicago's North Shore-Evanston, Wilmette, Winnetka, and Kenilworth--and the fast-growing communities of Skokie, Lincolnwood, Morton Grove, and Glenview. The district had recently developed some light industry, but




Figure 1: Illinois 13th Congressional District

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most of its labor force was employed in Chicago in white collar or professional occupations. A figure for median income is not available for the new district but it would certainly be high by any standards, for it would include such communities as Winnetka, with a median family income in 1960 of \$20,100; Niles, \$9,317; Wilmette, \$13,661; Skokie, \$9,703; Morton Grove, \$9,821; Lincolnwood, \$13,223; and Evanston, \$9,193.

The area had always voted strongly Republican; Republican candidates for Congress from the previous 13th District had never failed to receive at least 66% of the vote at the general election. The new district figured to remain Republican, although some observers concluded that the margin would be somewhat reduced.

Besides being predominantly Republican, the voters in this area showed a remarkable consistency in choosing their representatives to Congress.

With only one interruption since 1934, the name "Church" had commanded a majority of the vetes in the general election. With the exception of 1941-42 when he unsuccessfully sought the Republican nomination for the Senate, Ralph E. Church represented the same general territory in Congress from 1934 to his death in 1950. Upon the death of her husband, Mrs.

Marguerite Stitt Church was elected to Congress and remained there through 1961, when her district was altered through reapportionment. In spite of the redistricting, Mrs. Church's automatic nomination and her nearly automatic re-election were again predicted for 1962. Democratic leaders in the district voiced their pleasure that the district had been reduced in size, but they did not express hope of being able to beat Mrs. Church the following November.

# The Consequences of Reapportionment on 13th District Politics

The most immediate effect of reapportionment upon politics within the district was the abrupt appearance of a vacancy for the office of Republican State Central Committeeman. The incumbent committeeman resided

in Lake County, which was no longer part of the district. Two prominent Republicans declared for the office scon after the vacancy was realized, and others declared their candidacies shortly thereafter. Local Republicans were promised a real contest for the office, which under Illinois law is filled directly by the voters in the party's primary scheduled for April 10, 1962.

An even more important consequence of reapportionment occurred later, when Mrs. Church, at  $68_6$  decided that this was the proper time for her to retire from politics, enabling a new person to represent the new district. Her announcement on December 7 came as a complete surprise to Republicans and Democrats alike.

Some prominent Republican leaders who harbored Congressional ambitions were now free to seek the post held in fief for a quarter of a century by the Church family. Ralph E. Church, Jr. had not expressed any desire to continue the dynasty, at least not on that dimension of 13th District politics. He had already declared himself a candidate for the office of State Central Committeeman. While the Republican Party suffered no lack of interested candidates for the congressional office, the early jockeying among the candidates soon made it clear that State Representative Marion E. Burks of Evanston was the man to beat for the nomination.

The leaders of the Democratic Party within the district found themselves taking heart at the turn of events. The previously monstrous 13th District had been reduced to a campaignable size and the hopelessly Republican Lake County had been disposed of in the process. They had, moreover, gotten a parcel of Democratic votes with the addition of the 50th Ward, and the population increase in the suburbs was thought to be bringing in new Democrats daily. Finally, they would no longer be confronted with the popular Mrs. Church in the general election. Faced with their best chance ever for a Democratic victory for Congress in the general election, 13th District Democrats

undertook the unfamiliar and sobering task of selecting a candidate instead of looking for one.

## The Democratic Primary

As is often the case with the minority party in predominantly oneparty districts, the Democratic leaders in the 13th District seemed to
enjoy somewhat more control over the recruitment processes within their
own party than did the Republicans within theirs. The Democrats, for
example, also experienced a vacancy for the office of State Central
Committeeman because of redistricting, but the vacancy did not produce a
public contest for the office. Instead, the 11 district committeeman
(one from each of the 10 townships and the committeeman from the 50th
ward) quietly named one of their kind as their chairman, and this person
was subsequently endorsed as the committeemen's choice for the State
Central Committee. He encountered no opposition in the primary.

The Democratic leaders demonstrated the same control over the situation in picking the Democratic candidate for congressmen. In contrast
to the situation in the Republican Party, no Democrat was bold enough to
announce his candidacy for Congress in advance of the committeemen's
meeting to interview and endorse a candidate for the office. The Democratic
committeemen were especially concerned with selecting an attractive candidate
to run against the Republicans in November, and it was likely they would
seek a new face for the task. After two long sessions of interviews during
which they considered the merits of thirteen persons seeking the nomination,
the committeemen had still not selected their candidate.

The eventual announcement of their selection came as a complete surprise to most political observers. The committeemen endorsed one "John A. Kennedy," a man who had not been among those interviewed for the position and who had not been mentioned previously in connection with the congressional nomination. The explanation for Kennedy's selection seems to be simply that he was the

type of candidate wanted and he made himself available for the nomination.

The Democrats were looking for a successful Democratic businessman to run for Congress. One of the more prominent committeemen suggested to Kennedy, who was an officer in a local Democratic Club and president of a prosperous manufacturing concern, that he consider seeking the office.

Kennedy did, and, after concluding that he could win against a new Republican candidate in the new district, Kennedy decided to ask for the nomination. He notified the committeemen of his interest in the nomination and they endorsed him as the Democratic candidate for Congress. He also encountered no opposition in the primary.

### The Republican Primary

From the beginning the nomination process within the Republican Party did not figure to match the Democrats for orderliness. At least two persons announced their candidacies in advance of official action taken by the district committeemen--who were also publicly entangled in the contest for State Central Committeeman--and several more made their candidacies known through their actions. Although a contest for the Republican nomination was pretty much assured from the start, observers of the scene put State Representative Burks far in front of other aspirants. The committeemen from two townships with the largest vote in the district (Evanston and New Trier) indicated that they would support Burks for the nomination. The understanding was that support of Evanston's Burks would be exchanged for support of New Trier's David E. Brown, one of the leading candidates for State Central Committeeman.

Despite grumblings from the district's western townships, which complained of Evanston's long domination of the congressional seat, Burks received the endorsement of the 13th district committeemen voting the number of Republican votes cast in their townships the previous primary. With one western township committeeman himself challenging David Brown and Ralph Church, Jr. for the office of State Central Committeeman, the township committeemen failed to

produce an endorsement for that office, leaving it a wide open race.

With the important 13th District endorsement in hand, Burks seemed headed for victory in the primary. Several erstwhile candidates conceded him the race and withdrew from the field, which was eventually reduced to four. Burks seemed to face little threat from the other three. One of the others, Edward L. Gordy, had labeled himself as a political eccentric with his peculiar campaign techniques (demonstrating chemical reactions before his audiences) and unpopular stands on issues (favoring Red China\*s entrance into the United Nations). Another, Raymond Morley, exerted little effort in the campaign beyond filing a petition to put his name on the ballot. The only one of the three who could be considered a serious contender was youthful (29) Donald Rumsfeld, who lacked organizational support.

The complexion of the campaign for the Republican nomination for Congressman changed entirely with the disclosure of financial irregularities in the operations of the Central Casualty Company. Burks was the chairman of the board of the Evanston-based insurance company, which was saized by the state department of insurance. The department director stated that Burks was not involved in any of the questionable financial transactions, which were attributed to the president of the family-owned corporation, but several Republican leaders urged him to withdraw from the race. Burks refused.

Opposition to Burks developed from Republicans who were concerned about his integrity, sagacity, or sense of responsibility re his role as chairman of the troubled insurance company. Some suggested that a Republican with a clouded record would not win in the new district in November, and they urged support of Donald Rumsfeld, the only feasible alternative. (Mrs. Church rejected consideration of a write-in campaign.) Burks, defense of his role in the operations of Central Casualty left sufficient ambiguities and unresolved questions—such as why he sought nomination for a high public office without disclosing his knowledge of the irregularities, which he know as early as

November. His defenders urged their fellow Republicans not to abandon such an experienced legislator and proven conservative for his youthful and less conservative opponent, Donald Rumsfeld.

Rumsfeld had some appealing features as a candidate in his own right.

He pointed out that his youth would permit him to build up seniority—

a key to serving the district well in Congress. He was not entirely with—

out experience in political affairs, having been a political science major

at Princeton and an administrative assistant to two congressmen for a total

of fifteen months. Republicans from the western townships were inclined to

favor the fact that he came from Niles Township, which was in the "midwest"

of the district. Rumsfeld, moreover, had already begun to acquire a smatter—

ing of support from some prominent Republicans who were not completely sold

on Marion Burks and his rock-solid brand of conservatism.

Rumsfeld, who described himself as an "intelligent conservative," did not challenge Burks on ideological grounds and was careful not to press the comparison between his "national" experience and Burks three terms in the state legislature. The position taken by Rumsfeld in the campaign was that he was the only Republican candidate who could win in November, contending that the 13th District could no longer be taken for granted by the Republicans. Curiously enough, Burks made the same contention and urged the Republicans not to nominate a youthful candidate who could be beaten by the Democrat's Kennedy.

As the campaign unfolded, Rumsfeld supporters managed to wrestle endorsements from several township party organizations, although Burks was still given the edge among the regulars. Rumsfeld also won endorsements from several newspapers, prominent Republicans, and nonpartisan political organizations. The two split the endorsements from the Women's Republican Clubs and the Young Republicans. Few party organizations returned endorsements without first engaging in some bitter debate, and some failed to reach agreement on an endorsement. The local political reporters rated the primary election as a

toss-up between the candidates.

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Overlaying the Burks-Rumsfeld battle for the congressional nomination was the Church-Brown-MacArthur fight for Republican State Central Committeeman. (A third candidate, Roland R. Moore, Jr., was not considered a threat to the others.) A follower of the campaign might have presumed, however, that they were totally unrelated races perhaps in different primaries, for both groups of candidates carefully avoided becoming embroiled in the other's troubles. Brown, whose candidacy had originally been liked with Burks', took pains to dissociate himself from Burks' campaign. The alignment was such that one might easily have been for Burks and Church as for Burks and Brown. Agreement on the most desirable congressional candidate did not imply agreement on the State Central Committeeman choice.

### The Results of the Primary

The voter turnout in the individual townships at the 1962 Republican primary was exceptionally large for a non-presidential year. It was the largest since the 1952 Presidential primary, when the Taft-Eisenhower contest draw voters to the polls. Donald Rumsfeld thoroughly trounced Marion Burks by a margin of two-and-a-half to one, carrying every township but Hanover, which had the smallest Republican vote. The completeness of his victory can be seen in the returns from Burks own Evanston Township, where Rumsfeld won majorities in all but 13 of the 91 precincts, including Burks own.

In contrast to the landslide decision given Rumsfeld in the congressional race, the contest for State Central Committeeman was extremely close, and the winner was not known for certain until a couple of weeks after the election, after all the returns had been carefully checked. Ralph Church was acknowledged the winner by a scant 782 votes over Alexander MacArthur of Palatine. David Brown trailed Church by about 2,500 votes, with Moore a distant fourth. Church

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won a majority in only his home township, Evanston, but he ran a close second in every other one except tiny Hanover.

# Prospects for the General Election

During the primary campaign both major Republican candidates spoke darkly about the prospects of a Democratic victory in the fall. Although the possibility existed more than ever before, the probability seemed less likely once the primary was over and the Republicans stopped telling one another they might lose. Within the Republican camp, the perception of the district reverted to a position a few shades shy of its former status. Ralph Church predicted Rumsfeld would win by approximately 65,000 votes. Rumsfeld, while less optimistic, characterized the district as moderately Republican—between 55 and 60%. He figured on carrying all ten townships within the district by sufficient margins to offset the expected Democratic majority in the 50th Ward, which he thought Kennedy would carry by 8,000 to 10,000 votes.

John A. Kennedy, who immediately gave signs of conducting a vigorous campaign, was not inclined to revise his estimate of the prospects for a Democratic victory in November. Kennedy said he thought he was running in what was close to a swing district. He attributed this change not only to redistricting—which was important—but to the tremendous population growth in the area. Niles Township, which was the largest township in the district, was becoming stronly Democratic, and many of the new voters settling in the suburban area were thought to be confirmed Chicago Democrats. Kennedy calculated he could win the district by carrying only two areas: Niles by 7,000 and the 50th Ward by 22,000.

The 50th Ward constituted the big question mark in the forthcoming general election. The uncertainty of the situation facing both candidates was compounded by the vact that the ward itself had been reapportioned in 1961, losing some 10,000 voters in the process, but no one was sure whether or not the voters lost were mostly Democratic or Republican. The Republicans

attempted to reduce uncertainty in the situation and better their showing within the area by planning a house-to-house canvass for the month of August. Kennedy planned to maximize his votes in the area by working very closely with the regular Democratic ward organization. He expected to benefit from the large number of Jewish names which would appear on the Democratic ballot in the 50th Ward in November, and he also expected to profit from dissension within the Republican ranks as a result of the bitter primary fight.

Rumsfeld felt that the rugged primary fight would actually help his campaign in November, for he had an opportunity to become known in the district and to develop a functioning organization. He played down the idea that his campaign produced lasting animosities within the party and noted that Burks' statement after his defeat in the primary had urged Republicans to support Rumsfeld in November. Rumsfeld felt that he had done nothing wrong in the campaign and that most of Burks' supporters were strongly behind him.

beginning their campaigns in earnest. The task Rumsfeld has before him is to hand onto the Rapublican wates in the district, which he intends to do by emphasizing his Republican identification. Kennedy's task is to win the independent vote and the votes of weak Republicans. This he realizes he must do by playing down his Democratic affiliation and emphasizing his maturity and successful business experience. Kennedy is certain to seek a debate with Rumsfeld, and Rumsfeld is certain to try to avoid one. In this connection, Kennedy may try to pin the label "Ducking Donald" on Rumsfeld. If he is successful, Rumsfeld's fortunes may be linked with the size of the crowds at Disneyland. But the vote for the Republican candidate is less likely to be affected by the happenings in the comic strip than the vote for the Democratic candidate will be by another Kennedy's Washington activities, which have ceased to be funny to the Republican stockholders of the North Shore.