Path: Table of Contents > Essay on Party Politics > Party 265
Dutch Christian Historical Union, 265
Variables and Codes for 1950-1962
For the concepts and variables below, use these links to Political Parties: A Cross-National Survey:
Institutionalization
Governmental Status
Issue Orientation
Goal Orientation
Autonomy
Organizational Complexity
Organizational Power
Organizational Coherence
Membership Involvement
The "ac" code is for "adequacy-confidence"--a data quality measure ranging from 0 (low) to 9 (high)

Institutionalization Variables
, 1.01-1.06
1.01 year of origin and 1.02 name changes
1898, AC7
0, AC9
There is room for disagreement concerning the exact date of origin of the Christian Historical Union. In 1894, the parliamentary party of the ARP divided over the extension of the suffrage. The faction which opposed extension of the franchise was organized in 1898 as the Free Anti Revolutionary Party. In 1903, the Free ARP joined with a smaller group, the Christian Historical Electoral League, to become the Christian Historical Party. In 1908, this party merged with a smaller Frisian Christian historical organization, to form the Christian Historical Union. Most authors fix the year of origin of the Chu as 1908, the year the party took its present name. However, we have chosen 1898, for the literature states that the two groups which joined in 1903 and 1908 were distinctly smaller than the free anti- revolutionary group. Thus the events of 1903 and 1908 are considered instances of early name changes, but they were too early to be counted as name changes for the purposes of scoring variable 1.02. There were no changes in the party's name during our period of interest.
1.03 organizational discontinuity
1, AC6
The Chu experienced one very minor split in 1946 when a small number of the party's leading personalities in the pre-war Chu joined other groups to form the Dutch labor party. The party has not experienced any mergers.
1.04 leadership competition
11, AC5
Our information file contains no discussion of the process of leadership change in the chu. It is clear that our period began with H.W. Tilanus holding both positions of party chairman and leader in the second chamber. In 1958, H.K.J. Beernink replaced him as party chairman, but Tilanus continued as leader in the second chamber throughout our period. In keeping with our conception of "legitimate" leadership, we regard the chairmanship as the relevant position for our scoring of leadership change.
1.05 legislative instability
Instability is .05, AC9
The Chu held 8 to 9 percent of legislature's seats during our time period. During the entire 1st half of the period, the Chu held 9 percent of the seats, and varied between 8 to 9 percent during the second half.
1.06 electoral instability
Instability is .05, AC9
The Chu won 8 to 9 percent of the votes in legislative elections throughout our time period.

Governmental Status Variables, 2.01-2.07
2.01 government discrimination
0 for 1950-56, AC6
0 for 1957-62, AC6
There is no information which would suggest any government discrimination either for or against the chu, and our consultant concurs.
2.02 governmental leadership
0 out of 7 for 1950-56, AC9
0 out of 6 for 1957-62, AC9
The position of prime minister in the Netherlands was filled by a representative of the Labor Party from 1950 through 1958, and thereafter by representatives of the Catholic People's Party through the end of our time period.
2.03 cabinet participation
7 out of 7 for 1950-56, AC9
6 out of 6 for 1957-62, AC9
The Chu was represented in every cabinet coalition formed during our time period, usually occupying two cabinet posts.
2.04 national participation
5, AC6
Based on a 1956 survey (sample size of 1234), the chu's average deviation of votes from the population distribution was 6.75. The party is national in character, but its success is highly variable across region. The Chu finds greater support in the north and east where the Dutch Reformed Church is strongest, and finds its least support in the south where the Catholic church dominates.
2.05 legislative strength
Strength is .09 for 1950-56, AC9, and .08 for 1957-62 , AC9
The Chu held 8 to 9 percent of legislature's seats during our time period. During the entire 1st half of the period, the Chu held 9 percent of the seats, and varied between 8 to 9 percent during the second half.
2.06 electoral strength
Strength is .08 for 1950-56, AC9, and .08 for 1957-62 , AC9
The Chu won 8 to 9 percent of the votes in legislative elections throughout our time period.
2.07 outside origin
4, AC9
The Chu was formed by leaders of the Dutch Reformed Church who were also members of parliament and, until 1894, members of the Anti-Revolutionary Party.

Issue Orientation Variables, 5.01-5.15
5.01 ownership of means of production
3, AC5
The Chu opposes nationalization of industries and is an advocate of free enterprise. The party pursues policies resembling those of the ARP concerning ownership of the means of production.
5.02 government role in economic planning
1, AC3
Based on limited information, the Chu position on government economic planning is similar to that of the ARP. The party opposes extensive government interference, but does support limited activity.
5.03 redistribution of wealth
3, AC5
The Chu and most of the party's supporters (according to a survey) oppose any large change in the distribution of wealth. The party seems to favor government inactivity in this area.
5.04 social welfare
3, AC4
Like the ARP, the Chu favors a program of social welfare which is initiated and operated by the private sector. Only when the private sector fails to provide sufficient coverage should the government interfere, and then only to amplify coverage.
5.05 secularization of society
5, AC7
The uniting force within the Chu is the Dutch Reformed Church, which is the protestant church of the monarchy and nobility. The Chu, more than the ARP, favors the idea of a state church as a central focus for the nation's existence and the individual's life.
5.06 support of the military
5, AC5
Since the Chu strongly supports Dutch membership in NATO and seeks the reestablishment of Dutch power and influence, it is quite likely that the party is very pro-military.
5.07 alignment with east-west blocs
5, AC5
The Chu is in agreement with the other four major parties of the Netherlands (KVP, VVD, PVDA, ARP) concerning the nation's role in the "cold war " between the USSR and the USA. The party strongly favors continued Dutch membership in NATO. However, some Chu members advocate some rapproachment with the USSR, short of abandoning NATO.
5.08 anti-colonialism
5, AC7
The Chu totally opposed any plan which would solve the new guinea issue by relinquishment of some Dutch control over the colony. The position of the Chu throughout the controversy remained adamant--new guinea must remain a colony of the Netherlands until the population was fully ready to accept the responsibility of independence. At that time, new guinea should be granted independence within the kingdom of the Netherlands. The Chu remained firm in its position until the cause became obviously hopeless.
5.09 supranational integration
1, AC5
The position taken by the Chu concerning the integration of Western Europe seems to be quite similar to that of the ARP. The Chu formally supports furthering such integration, but opposes any deterioration of Dutch national identity. Some Chu leaders openly question the wisdom of uniting European nations.
5.10 national integration
1, AC3
The Chu seems to advocate some measure of decentralization in Dutch government, but without eroding the symbolic and actual powers of the monarchy.
5.11 electoral participation
5, AC5
Historically, the Chu opposed the concept of universal adult suffrage. The Chu was formed principally by the nobility and the upper-middle class of the 19th century who disagreed with ARP policies and theology. The main policy disagreement was concerning the enfranchisement bill, which was debated for many years before being introduced. The ARP favored the bill, while the new Chu opposed it. The Chu voted against the enfranchisement bill of 1917 which nevertheless passed. Presumably, the Chu now accepts the situation.
5.12 protection of civil rights
1, AC3
The Chu probably considers the protection of civil rights to be an inappropriate matter for government action.
5.13 interference with civil liberties
3, AC3
The Chu seems to advocate freedom of expression as an acknowledged and enforced government policy. The party seems to believe that the media should be totally free of government action, except for moral censorship.
5.14 / 5.15 us--soviet experts left-right ratings
US says 1, conservative
Soviets say 1, it is the party of the upper protestant bourgeoisie and major landowners. Its program, with the exception of church questions, is not very different from that of the Anti-Revolutionary Party.

Goal Orientation Variables, 6.01-6.55
6.00 open competition in the electoral process
4, AC9
The Chu relies exclusively upon open competition within the electoral process in order to place party representatives in government positions. The Chu participated in every election during our time period.
6.10 restricting party competition
0, AC8
No evidence suggests that Chu goal orientation includes the strategy of restricting competition. The party relies solely on open competition to achieve its ends.
6.20 subverting the political system
0, AC8
There is no indication of Chu strategy oriented to subverting the political system. The Chu professes that the party does not seek political power, but only wishes to provide its followers a channel through which they may participate in the political system and voice the authority of god's word. It is highly unlikely that the Chu would include within its strategy the subversion of the political system.
6.30 propagandizing ideas and program
6.31--1, AC5. The Chu does not own or operate any national media, but there is some indication that the party occasionally performs this activity in some local areas by means of local newspapers.
6.32--0, AC5. The Chu does not operate any party schools.
6.33--2, AC8. The Chu publishes election platforms and resolutions passed by the party.
6.34--1, AC5. Since the Chu is often divided on various positions, it probably does not publish position papers as often as other Dutch parties.
6.50 providing for welfare of party members
0, AC5
The Chu seems to perform no activities related to social welfare. Some members do teach at the Free Calvinist University, but this is not party activity.

Autonomy Variables, 7.01-7.05
7.01 sources of funds
7, AC6
Members of the Chu pay dues ranging between 12 and 25 guilders per year. These funds provide approximately 98 percent of the total resources available to the party.
7.02 source of members
5 (sector 06), AC9
Membership in the Chu is entirely direct, and nearly all members belong to the Dutch Reformed Church.
7.03 sources of leaders
1 (sector 06), AC8
Most leaders of the Chu are recruited from the Dutch Reformed Church and protestant-Calvinist organizations.
7.04 relations with domestic parties
4, AC9
The Chu participated in government coalitions, and therefore weaker parliamentary alliances in support of the coalitions, throughout our time period.
7.05 relations with foreign organizations
4, AC8
The information in our file suggests that the Chu belonged to the NEI through an Equipe in conjunction with the Catholic People's Party and the ARP. Our consultant confirms this assertion.

Organizational Complexity Variables, 8.01-8.07
8.01 structural articulation
4, AC3
The only national organs of the Chu which have been identified are the parliamentary group and the executive committee. The functional responsibilities and selection procedures of these organs are unknown from the information in our file.
8.02 intensiveness of organization
4, AC3
The Chu seems to be organized down to the ward basis, as evidenced by mention of Chu political meetings in the village of Sassenheim.
8.03 extensiveness of organization
5, AC3
The Chu probably is well organized at the ward level throughout the nation, but with much less strength in the catholic south than in the protestant regions of the north.
8.04 frequency of local meetings
AC1
No information in our files.
8.05 frequency of national meetings
AC1
No information in our files.
8.06 maintaining records
11, AC5
The Chu expends little if any energies in publishing party propaganda , although the party may publish some small local newspapers. Our consultant states that the Savorin Lohman foundation is the research division of the Chu. Since the Chu collects dues from its members, it is quite likely that the party maintains quality membership list
8.07 pervasiveness of organization
13, AC7
The Chu has penetrated many socioeconomic sectors by means of protestant organizations such as the Protestant Labor Union, employer's association, and farm union. The Chu wields little control over these organizations since there are no formal links between them and the party. Relatively few adherents are claimed by the organizations.

Organizational Power Variables, 9.01-9.08
9.01 nationalization of structure
4, AC3
There is little information regarding the distribution of power within the Chu, but it seems that the national organs exercise some authority over the regional and local organs. Since party leaders from the executive committee and parliamentary group often disagree with official party policies, it is likely that national organs constitute competing power centers.
9.02 selecting the national leader
AC1
No information in our files.
9.03 selecting parliamentary candidates
AC1
No information in our files.
9.04 allocating funds
5, AC3
Since nation wide figures are available concerning the collection of membership dues, it is highly probable that funds are allocated by national organs of the party.
9.05 formulating policy
6, AC3
The Chu strongly believes in allowing its parliamentary organization representatives to formulate party policy as decisions become necessary. But since the party does announce party positions before elections, the parliamentary group probably is not the only policy formulator.
9.06 controlling communications
3, AC3
The Chu does not own nor operate any national media, but may control some local, more insignificant newspapers.
9.07 administering discipline
0, AC8
The Chu does not seem to administer any type of discipline concerning its representatives and members. Each Chu parliamentarian is allowed to vote his wishes without fear of party disciplinary measures.
9.08 leadership concentration
1, AC5
Many leaders of the Chu frequently make pronouncements on behalf of the party, but none are considered to be authoritatively binding as spokesmen.

Coherence Variables, 10.01-10.06
10.01 legislative cohesion
0.40, AC5
Parliamentary representatives of the Chu are allowed to vote as they wish on any issue. As a result, it is not uncommon for the party's parliamentarians to split in half, or 60-40, on any given vote. The party does display some cohesion on bills which draw Chu members together, such as those pertaining to religion or an issue basic to Chu beliefs and the theology of the Dutch Reformed Church. The "average" split in votes for the Chu probably approximates 70-30.
10.02 ideological factionalism
5, AC5
The Chu, due to its religious base, is comprised of both liberal and conservative Calvinists. These groups can be considered as forming separate party factions, and in fact often are the source of the lack of parliamentary cohesion experienced by the party.
10.03 issue factionalism
5, AC6
The Chu split into two separate, and nearly equal, factions during the new guinea controversy. While one faction favored the retention of new guinea in the status of a Dutch colony indefinitely, another advocated the eventual independence of the colony within the kingdom of the Netherlands.
10.04 leadership factionalism
2, AC3
There is some evidence to suggest that the leadership of the Chu is often contested. The lack of party discipline leads to factional tendencies concerning leadership, but does not establish labeled groupings of leadership followings.
10.05 strategic or tactical factionalism
1, AC3
There is no indication of strategic or tactical factionalism within the Chu. Disagreements probably do arise, however, since the party is quite lacking in cohesiveness.
10.06 party dues
0 for 1st half, AC5
0 for 2nd half, AC5
No involuntary departures from the Chu occurred during our time period.

Involvement Variables, 11.01-11.06
11.01 membership requirements
3, AC5
Members of the Chu pay annual dues ranging from 12 to 25 guilders, and since dues are collected, it seems likely that members must register with the party.
11.02 membership participation
2, AC3
Although little information exists pertaining to the activities of party members, it seems likely that the majority of members at least attend occasional meetings (often held in church halls) and perform some type of service on behalf of the party.
11.03 material incentives
AC1
No information.
11.04 purposive incentives
1, AC3
Since the Chu represents the interests of the Dutch Reformed Church and seeks the establishment of a state church dominated by the Dutch Reformed, it is probable that some militants are motivated by purposive incentives.
11.05 doctrinism
1, AC5
There is some evidence of Chu doctrinism in that occasional references are made to the principles of the Chu which basically are religious oriented.
11.06 personalism
0, AC3
Because leadership is not really concentrated in any single individual , personalism does not seem to figure as a motivational basis for militants.