The "ac" code is for "adequacy-confidence"--a
data
quality measure ranging from 0 (low) to 9
(high)
Institutionalization
Variables, 1.01-1.06
1.01 year of origin and 1.02 name changes
1832, ac7
0, ac9
Since the origins of the Conservative Party antedate the era
of democratic politics, its year of origin is difficult to fix
exactly. The earliest and most defensible date is 1832, when party
organization outside parliament grew in response to the reform
act. But 1867, the year of the second reform act with its radical
extension of the franchise and the foundation of the national
union is an alternative possibility, since it marks the party's
commitment to a nationwide electoral effort. There were no name
changes in the period. The soubriquet "and Unionist" was added to
the party's name with the absorption of the liberal Unionists in
1912. The party appears in Ulster simply as the "Unionist Party"
and for the purposes of this survey the link between the sections
of the party in Ulster and those in England, Wales and Scotland
will be treated as an electoral and legislative alliance rather
than as an organic link, in order to exclude anomalies. The party
is colloquially known as the "Conservative" or "Tory" party.
1.03 organizational discontinuity
0, ac9
There was no organizational discontinuity in this period.
1.04 leadership competition
13, ac7
The party leadership changed hands twice in this period,
passing from Sir Winston Churchill to sir Anthony Eden in april
1955, and from Eden to Harold Macmillan in January 1957. During
our period, there were no formal rules for selecting a leader
though custom dictated that he appear elected by a convention of
the conservative members of both houses, all prospective
candidates thereto and the executive council of the national
union. In fact the "election" was an acclamatory device and the
leader was supposed to be " evolved" not elected. The
recommendation of the outgoing incumbent, soundings of the party
activists and MPs and a good deal of covert manuevering aided such
"evolution." in 1965, formal election replaced evolution as the
method of leadership selection.
1.05 legislative instability
Instability is .05, ac9
Conservative strength in the lower house rose steadily during
our time period from 48 percent in 1948 to 58 percent in
1962.
1.06 electoral instability
Instability is .04, ac9
General elections were held in 1950, 1951, 1955, and 1959.
Although the conservatives won a majority of the seats from 1951
on, they failed to win a majority of total votes cast in any of
these elections, coming closest with 49.6 percent in
1955.
Governmental Status Variables,
2.01-2.07
2.01 government discrimination
0, ac9
There is no evidence of discrimination against the party in
the period. The position of the electoral boundaries favored the
Labour Party in 1950-51 but this was coincidental and not
deliberate.
2.02 governmental leadership
5 out of 7 for 1950-56, ac9 and 6 out of 6 for 1957-62,
ac9
The conservatives led the government almost completely
throughout our time period, from october 1951 until december 1962.
Although the maximum statutory life of a government is five years,
the average gap between elections was 3.7 years from 1918 to 1970.
In this period an election was held an average every 3.25 years.
The party won 3 out of the 4 elections in the period, each time
increasing its margin of victory.
2.03 cabinet participation
5 out of 7 for 1950-55, ac9 and 6 out of 6 for 1956-62,
ac9
Conservative ministers monopolised cabinet seats during their
party's administration and were completely excluded from them when
in opposition.
2.04 national participation
6, ac9
Party support was spread universally if not evenly across the
country. Support was stronger in rural and suburban areas than in
industrial towns and cities. The chief regions of conservative
predominance were Ulster, the highlands and islands of Scotland,
south east England, the west country, Wessex, the east and north
ridings of Yorkshire and East Anglia. This distribution can be
explained largely but not entirely in terms of occupational
residence, since the conservatives are traditionally the party of
the privileged and middle classes, although they also have
significant working class support. In rural areas the remnants of
deference voting and the absence of strong trades union activity
are usually held responsible for conservative preferences. Based
on 1959 survey data, the average deviation of conservative support
from the population distribution in five main regions was only 1.7
percentage points.
2.05 legislative strength
Strength is .52 for 1950-56, ac9 and .57 for 1957-62, ac9
Conservative strength in the lower house rose steadily during
our time period from 48 percent in 1948 to 58 percent in
1962.
2.06 electoral strength
Strength is .47 for 1950-56, ac9 and .49 for 1957-62, ac9
General elections were held in 1950, 1951, 1955, and 1959.
Although the conservatives won a majority of the seats from 1951
on, they failed to win a majority of total votes cast in any of
these elections, coming closest with 49.6 percent in 1955.
2.07 outside origin
4, ac7
The party was founded by Tory leaders within parliament who sought
to organize electoral registration following the reform act of
1832.
Issue Orientation Variables, 5.01-5.15
5.01 ownership of means of production
2, ac7
The party's attitude to the ownership of the means of
production in this period was somewhat ambiguous. Party oratory
consisently denounced state ownership in principle and aligned
itself with free private enterprise and on accession to power in
1951 the party denationalized several industries, notably steel
and road haulage. Both actions and rhetoric, however, were
deceptive. As a consequence of their crushing electoral defeat in
1945 the party leadership had come to realise that certain
social-democratic programmes, including a degree of
nationalisation, were inseparable from electoral success. In
opposition, therefore, the party concentrated its attack upon
recently and inefficiently nationalised industries, while
criticising only the management of others. In government,
moreover, the extent of denationalisation was less than pledged
and the party even voluntarily expanded the state sector into
electrical generation by atomic power, seeking credit for this
action in its propaganda.
5.02 government role in economic planning
0 for 1950-56, ac7 and 2 for 1957-62, ac7
The party's reiterated preference for a free economy was of
course relative, though this was obscured by the impractical and
outdated rhetorical laissez faire. Practical concern for economic
prosperity necessitated the exercise of Keynesian controls over
purchasing power, as well as support of the pound. The existing
concentration of economic decision-making on the treasury and bank
of England represented a fait accompli of control and
centralisation that the party was unwilling to reverse. "Voluntary
moderation" was urged in wages and prices and informal
negotiations between the government, the unions and the employers
supplemented this. The party did show itself opposed to excessive
centralisation, at least at first, and fixed prices for farm
produce for instance were replaced by a system of subsidies and
marketing boards. On the other hand, the party was perfectly
willing even to propose fresh controls, as with its advocacy from
opposition of an excess profits tax, and with the failure of
voluntary methods, passed over to increasingly stringent controls.
The Selwyn Lloyd chancellorship in particular marked an increased
penetration of government into economic life with its national
plan, wage freeze, regional development policies and proposals for
EEC membership.
5.03 redistribution of wealth
1, ac9
The Conservative Party did not seek to redistribute wealth and
stood for the preservation of economic inequalities as a
consequence of differential efforts and contributions. By ignoring
massive loopholes in the redistributive taxation and inheritance
duty system it inherited, the conservative government escaped the
consequences of ambiguity in practice. Unearned incomes remained
heavily taxed and social prejudice against excessive wealth
necessitated its justification by economic and social "spin-off"
but wealth remained concentrated in very few hands.
5.04 social welfare
4, ac9
The Conservative Party realised after 1945 that a social
welfare programme had the support of a vast electoral majority.
Right-wing resistance was mollified by the continuing co-existence
of a private sector for health, insurance and pensions, and the
party accepted the principle of universal social welfare through a
compulsory system of public assistance. The party tempered its
enthusiasm, however, by continuing to stress the value of
self-reliance and by insisting that the nation could not afford a
comprehensive social welfare programme. Cuts in food subsidies and
increases in insurance contributions for health service
constituted part of a policy to reduce reliance on the state to
the poorest classes only. Capital development of the welfare
system on the other hand was not grudged and increasingly large
sums were spent on government educational facilities and
services.
5.05 secularization of society
1, ac9
The Conservative Party traditionally stood for the protection
of the established church but its attitude was one of benevolence
towards all Christian sects and tolerance towards other religions.
Religion had ceased to be an important political issue by this
period as dissent became socially respectable. Freedom of worship
and the exemption of church property from taxation supplemented
state support for the Anglican church. The permeation of the state
education system by the Anglican church was paralleled by
insistence upon some form of religious instruction in other
schools. Far from being secularising, the party displayed great
respect for both the church of England in particular and
christianity in general and could be embarassed by clerical
objection to its policies, as occurred in colonial Africa. Social
factors continued to dictate that the overwhelming majority of
conservative MPs were members of the established church.
5.06 support of the military
3, ac9
The Conservative Party was consistently supportive of the
armed srvices in this period, regarding the international area
best held by negotiation from strength. The Korean experience,
however, resulted in an increasing reliance on nuclear capacity
with consequent reductions in priority for conventional military
forces. Although a sizable minority of conservative MPs had had
military careers, there are no indications that the military was
excessively favored over other programs once the necessity for
military preparedness is accepted in the first place, although
rearmament did strain the economy. Presumed sympathy with military
values aided the party's implementation of measures such as the
ending of conscription.
5.07 alignment with east-west blocs
5, ac9
The Conservative Party continued and strengthened its
commitment to the western alliances (NATO, SEATO, etc.) in this
period, refusing recognition to the People's Republic of China and
the DDR. The formation of the western European union worked the
consolidation of NATO in specifically European terms. However, in
the second part of the period, after Suez, dwindling faith in the
American alliance saw increased committment to Europe and
conciliatory moves towards the ussr. A strong opposition to
communism whether in Malaya, Lebanon or Europe remained a
touchstone of policy.
5.08 anti-colonialism
1 for 1950-56, ac7 3 for 1957-62, ac7
The Conservative Party was slow to come to terms with the
"winds of change" blowing through the colonial world and in the
first part of the period stressed the maintenance of the
Commonwealth and imperial preference rather than decolonisation.
Independence, however, was not seen as undesirable in principle
but rather as premature and as circumstances changed the party
revised its policy, as for instance over cyprus. Reservations
remained in certain areas, nevertheless, and efforts to protect
white minorities in Kenya or the Federation of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland were pursued in the face of widespread African
resistance. The republic of South Africa was gently but firmly
condemned, especially after its rejection of Commonwealth
membership in 1961, but commercial and "kith and kin" ties hedged
policy with johannesburg, as indeed with salisbury. The party's
attitude to the constitutional position of Ulster remained
unchanged.
5.09 supranational integration
1 for 1950-1956, ac9 and 1 for 1957-1962, ac9
The Conservative Party identified itself strongly with the
preservation of national sovereignity throughout the period.
However, as economic difficulties increased, the conservative
government moved closer to political and economic rapprochement
with europe. The formation of efta in 1960 was followed by an
attempt to join the EEC, although difficulties in accommodating
Commonwealth trading privileges to the European tariff agreements
were partly responsible for the deadlock of negotiations. The
party's support of the UN, including cochairmanship of the 1954
Geneva conference on Indochina, was motivated more by traditional
considerations of international security than a desire to set
precedents for world government.
5.10 national integration
1, ac7
The attitude of the Conservative Party to national integration
reflected indifference to nationalist movements in Wales and
Scotland. The nationalist vote was only 2 to 5 percent of the
Welsh and .5 percent of the Scottish vote.
5.11 electoral participation
5, ac9
The Conservative Party supported the maintenance of universal
adult suffrage, introduced in 1928. The party did pledge the
reinstatement of the university seats in 1950 but did not act on
this thereafter.
5.12 protection of civil rights
3, ac9
The Conservative Party cherished a concept of the unwritten
liberties of the British subject but preferred to rely on cultural
pressures and common law to protect civil rights. Written formulas
were thus deemed unnecessary, despite the existence of strong
strains of class discrimination and rather weaker ones of race and
religion within society. In 1961, however, legislation was
introduced to restrict the immigration of Commonwealth citizens, a
clear concession to colour prejudice as well as economic
strain.
5.13 interference with civil liberties
3, ac9
The Conservative Party advocated the recognition and
enforcement of civil liberties in this period, except as concerned
deliberate provocations of breaches of the peace. "D" notices to
censor press releases that jeopardized national security or
embarassed the government were used, but infrequently. Extremist
political groups were tolerated, if watched, as long as they did
not plan violence.
5.14 / 5.15 us--soviet experts left-right ratings
US says 1, conservative
Soviets say 1, represented by the ruling classes of England and
reflects the interests of major financial and industrial capital
and landowners. Members also include upper military officers,
civil servants, part of the bourgeoisie intelligentsia, merchants,
and workers aristocracy.
Goal Orientation Variables, 6.01-6.55
5.01 ownership of means of production
2, ac7
The party's attitude to the ownership of the means of
production in this period was somewhat ambiguous. Party oratory
consisently denounced state ownership in principle and aligned
itself with free private enterprise and on accession to power in
1951 the party denationalized several industries, notably steel
and road haulage. Both actions and rhetoric, however, were
deceptive. As a consequence of their crushing electoral defeat in
1945 the party leadership had come to realise that certain
social-democratic programmes, including a degree of
nationalisation, were inseparable from electoral success. In
opposition, therefore, the party concentrated its attack upon
recently and inefficiently nationalised industries, while
criticising only the management of others. In government,
moreover, the extent of denationalisation was less than pledged
and the party even voluntarily expanded the state sector into
electrical generation by atomic power, seeking credit for this
action in its propaganda.
5.02 government role in economic planning
0 for 1950-56, ac7 and 2 for 1957-62, ac7
The party's reiterated preference for a free economy was of
course relative, though this was obscured by the impractical and
outdated rhetorical laissez faire. Practical concern for economic
prosperity necessitated the exercise of Keynesian controls over
purchasing power, as well as support of the pound. The existing
concentration of economic decision-making on the treasury and bank
of England represented a fait accompli of control and
centralisation that the party was unwilling to reverse. "Voluntary
moderation" was urged in wages and prices and informal
negotiations between the government, the unions and the employers
supplemented this. The party did show itself opposed to excessive
centralisation, at least at first, and fixed prices for farm
produce for instance were replaced by a system of subsidies and
marketing boards. On the other hand, the party was perfectly
willing even to propose fresh controls, as with its advocacy from
opposition of an excess profits tax, and with the failure of
voluntary methods, passed over to increasingly stringent controls.
The Selwyn Lloyd chancellorship in particular marked an increased
penetration of government into economic life with its national
plan, wage freeze, regional development policies and proposals for
EEC membership.
5.03 redistribution of wealth
1, ac9
The Conservative Party did not seek to redistribute wealth and
stood for the preservation of economic inequalities as a
consequence of differential efforts and contributions. By ignoring
massive loopholes in the redistributive taxation and inheritance
duty system it inherited, the conservative government escaped the
consequences of ambiguity in practice. Unearned incomes remained
heavily taxed and social prejudice against excessive wealth
necessitated its justification by economic and social "spin-off"
but wealth remained concentrated in very few hands.
5.04 social welfare
4, ac9
The Conservative Party realised after 1945 that a social
welfare programme had the support of a vast electoral majority.
Right-wing resistance was mollified by the continuing co-existence
of a private sector for health, insurance and pensions, and the
party accepted the principle of universal social welfare through a
compulsory system of public assistance. The party tempered its
enthusiasm, however, by continuing to stress the value of
self-reliance and by insisting that the nation could not afford a
comprehensive social welfare programme. Cuts in food subsidies and
increases in insurance contributions for health service
constituted part of a policy to reduce reliance on the state to
the poorest classes only. Capital development of the welfare
system on the other hand was not grudged and increasingly large
sums were spent on government educational facilities and
services.
5.05 secularization of society
1, ac9
The Conservative Party traditionally stood for the protection
of the established church but its attitude was one of benevolence
towards all Christian sects and tolerance towards other religions.
Religion had ceased to be an important political issue by this
period as dissent became socially respectable. Freedom of worship
and the exemption of church property from taxation supplemented
state support for the Anglican church. The permeation of the state
education system by the Anglican church was paralleled by
insistence upon some form of religious instruction in other
schools. Far from being secularising, the party displayed great
respect for both the church of England in particular and
christianity in general and could be embarassed by clerical
objection to its policies, as occurred in colonial Africa. Social
factors continued to dictate that the overwhelming majority of
conservative MPs were members of the established church.
5.06 support of the military
3, ac9
The Conservative Party was consistently supportive of the
armed srvices in this period, regarding the international area
best held by negotiation from strength. The Korean experience,
however, resulted in an increasing reliance on nuclear capacity
with consequent reductions in priority for conventional military
forces. Although a sizable minority of conservative MPs had had
military careers, there are no indications that the military was
excessively favored over other programs once the necessity for
military preparedness is accepted in the first place, although
rearmament did strain the economy. Presumed sympathy with military
values aided the party's implementation of measures such as the
ending of conscription.
5.07 alignment with east-west blocs
5, ac9
The Conservative Party continued and strengthened its
commitment to the western alliances (NATO, SEATO, etc.) in this
period, refusing recognition to the People's Republic of China and
the DDR. The formation of the western European union worked the
consolidation of NATO in specifically European terms. However, in
the second part of the period, after Suez, dwindling faith in the
American alliance saw increased committment to Europe and
conciliatory moves towards the ussr. A strong opposition to
communism whether in Malaya, Lebanon or Europe remained a
touchstone of policy.
5.08 anti-colonialism
1 for 1950-56, ac7 3 for 1957-62, ac7
The Conservative Party was slow to come to terms with the
"winds of change" blowing through the colonial world and in the
first part of the period stressed the maintenance of the
Commonwealth and imperial preference rather than decolonisation.
Independence, however, was not seen as undesirable in principle
but rather as premature and as circumstances changed the party
revised its policy, as for instance over cyprus. Reservations
remained in certain areas, nevertheless, and efforts to protect
white minorities in Kenya or the Federation of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland were pursued in the face of widespread African
resistance. The republic of South Africa was gently but firmly
condemned, especially after its rejection of Commonwealth
membership in 1961, but commercial and "kith and kin" ties hedged
policy with johannesburg, as indeed with salisbury. The party's
attitude to the constitutional position of Ulster remained
unchanged.
5.09 supranational integration
1 for 1950-1956, ac9 and 1 for 1957-1962, ac9
The Conservative Party identified itself strongly with the
preservation of national sovereignity throughout the period.
However, as economic difficulties increased, the conservative
government moved closer to political and economic rapprochement
with europe. The formation of efta in 1960 was followed by an
attempt to join the EEC, although difficulties in accommodating
Commonwealth trading privileges to the European tariff agreements
were partly responsible for the deadlock of negotiations. The
party's support of the UN, including cochairmanship of the 1954
Geneva conference on Indochina, was motivated more by traditional
considerations of international security than a desire to set
precedents for world government.
5.10 national integration
1, ac7
The attitude of the Conservative Party to national integration
reflected indifference to nationalist movements in Wales and
Scotland. The nationalist vote was only 2 to 5 percent of the
Welsh and .5 percent of the Scottish vote.
5.11 electoral participation
5, ac9
The Conservative Party supported the maintenance of universal
adult suffrage, introduced in 1928. The party did pledge the
reinstatement of the university seats in 1950 but did not act on
this thereafter.
5.12 protection of civil rights
3, ac9
The Conservative Party cherished a concept of the unwritten
liberties of the British subject but preferred to rely on cultural
pressures and common law to protect civil rights. Written formulas
were thus deemed unnecessary, despite the existence of strong
strains of class discrimination and rather weaker ones of race and
religion within society. In 1961, however, legislation was
introduced to restrict the immigration of Commonwealth citizens, a
clear concession to colour prejudice as well as economic
strain.
5.13 interference with civil liberties
3, ac9
The Conservative Party advocated the recognition and
enforcement of civil liberties in this period, except as concerned
deliberate provocations of breaches of the peace. "D" notices to
censor press releases that jeopardized national security or
embarassed the government were used, but infrequently. Extremist
political groups were tolerated, if watched, as long as they did
not plan violence.
5.14 / 5.15 us--soviet experts left-right ratings
US says 1, conservative
Soviets say 1, represented by the ruling classes of England and
reflects the interests of major financial and industrial capital
and landowners. Members also include upper military officers,
civil servants, part of the bourgeoisie intelligentsia, merchants,
and workers aristocracy.
Autonomy Variables, 7.01-7.05
7.01 sources of funds
1 (sector 04), ac6
No figures available for this period but projection from data
available for later years indicates that the party received about
two- thirds of its financial support from commercial and business
circles, notably the city and certain large firms. Constituency
sources of funds, taken as a whole, did not cover current
expenditure. Sporadic appeals for election funds or moneys to
cancel deficits are presumably also met by business concerns and
wealthy private supporters.
7.02 source of members
5, ac9
Membership of the Conservative Party is on an individual basis
only. Membership in 1953 was given as approximately 2,800,000 in
the wake of a vigorous recruitment drive.
7.03 sources of leaders
2 (sectors 04, 03), ac9
The leaders of the Conservative Party in this period came
almost without exception from the upper and middle classes, with
the professions and business supplying nearly three-quarters of
the total of mps. The largest single group was that of company
directors and managers with roughly 25 percent followed by the
legal profession with 23 percent and the armed services with 11
percent. The teaching profession and small businessmen, however,
were barely represented and MPs of private means alone gradually
disappeared in this period. Those chosen for cabinet office tended
to come from the higher strata of their callings, and those with a
more traditionally upper class background were more likely to
attend cabinet than their numbers would suggest. Some 75 percent
of conservative MPs had public (private) school educations and
those without them had less chance of attaining cabinet rank.
7.04 relations with domestic parties
6, ac9
The party did have an arrangement of co-sponsorship of
candidates with the small national Liberal Party, not to be
confused with the opposition Liberal Party. Conservative party
strength in parliament was augmented by some 20 National Liberals,
who accepted the Conservative whip. A comparable arrangement
existed with some 10 Ulster Unionists, who also accepted the
conservative whip. An attempt was made to woo the Liberal Party in
1951 and an alliance was made in bolton to prevent Labour
victories in its two constituencies as a result of three-cornered
fights, but long-term alliances failed to appear.
7.05 relations with foreign organizations
5, ac9
The party had no affiliations with international organisations,
the more so since a narrow definition of patriotism was attractive
to many of its supporters.
Organizational Complexity Variables,
8.01-8.07
8.01 structural articulation
9, ac9
Six major national organs were identifiable for the
Conservative Party in this period, three within the legislature
and three without. In parliament the leader's consultative
committee or "shadow cabinet" aided in the formation of policy
when the party was in opposition, the 1922 committee of backbench
MPs met weekly to discuss issues on an informal basis and the
conservative members in the Lords had their own organisation and
leader. The party outside the legislature had the annual party
conference, the central council and the executive committee of the
national union of Conservative and Unionist associations. The
latter body met six times a year on average and heard the reports
of its standing committees on women, trade unions, finance, the
young conservatives, etc. The party also possessed an
administrative organ with its central office and research,
publicity, and other departments that paralleled and coordinated
with the advisory committees to the executive committee. The
important advisory committees on finance, candidate selection (for
both the legislative and administrative office) and policy also
reported to the central office, whose chairman and deputies were
appointed by the party leader in parliament. As with the national
leadership position, informal cooptation lay behind apparently
elective processes, though the functions of the various organs
were well specified in standing orders.
8.02 intensiveness of organization
4, ac9
The Conservative Party was organized in nearly all
constituencies and tried as far as possible to extend its
organisation to the ward level. Paid full time party agents
existed in most of the constituencies.
8.03 extensiveness of organization
6, ac9
Conservative local associations were spread more or less
evenly over the country.
8.04 frequency of local meetings
6, ac6
Records are incomplete, but ward meetings seem to have
occurred on average once a month, though divergencies from the
norm were great in places.
8.05 frequency of national meetings
5, ac9
The executive committee of the national union met on average
six times yearly in this period, the central council and party
conference annually.
8.06 maintaining records
16, ac9
The central office of the party organisation published a
considerable quantity of printed matter, maintained a research
department and kept extensive records. Membership lists are
notable for quality.
8.07 pervasiveness of organization
6, ac9
The Conservative Party was represented by several youth and
women's movements but only the young Conservative and Unionist
association succeeded in attracting wide membership, mostly as a
result of its social activities. Claiming a membership of 150,000
in 1955 it was the largest political youth movement in a liberal
democracy. Organisations of conservative teachers, lawyers, trades
Unionists and others remained small. Partisan self-selection for
membership and a lack of ideological doctrinism in the party
ensured easy central control of these organisations. Employers
organisations, such as the federation of British industry, were in
no sense controlled by the party, although naturally friendly
towards it.
Organizational Power Variables, 9.01-9.08
9.01 nationalization of structure
5, ac9
Conservative party was organized into twelve area councils in
England and Wales and two divisions in Scotland. Area councils met
from two to four times yearly, while area executive committees
functioned in the interim. An agent of the central office
represented the interests of the national party, acting as
honorary secretary for the area council. These regional
organizations in the Conservative Party, which had no restrictions
on the topics they could discuss, exercised somewhat more
independence of action than their counterparts in the Labour
Party.
9.02 selecting the national leader
7, ac7
The leader emerged from an obscure process of elite
interaction and consensus building, ratified by acclamation by
party membbers in both houses, conservative candidates, and the
executive committee of the national union. When the party was in
power, the monarch conditioned the choice of leadership by naming
the prime minister. Upon the resignation of Anthony Eden in 1957,
for example, sounding in the two houses and the constituency
parties were made by lords salisbury, kilmuir, and others, and the
queen chose Harold Macmillan to succeed Eden as prime minister
upon advice from conservative leaders. Macmillan subsequently
became party leader, but some concern was registered over the role
of the monarch in the process. This was heightened after our time
period with the selection of home to replace Macmillan in 1963. As
of 1965, this informal process was replaced by balloting among all
conservative mps, with a 15 percent majority required to win the
leadership on the first ballot.
9.03 selecting parliamentary candidates
5, ac7
The national union's standing advisory committee on candidates
submitted a list of potential candidates to the constituency,
which was also able to suggest names of its own. A selection
committee within the constituency drew up a list of candidates to
be interviewed by the executive committee in the constituency,
which recommended a candidate to the association for approval. The
choice must also have been approved by the central office, and
almost invariably was.
9.04 allocating funds
2, ac6
Funds were collected at all levels of the party organisation,
with most of the funds raised by constituency associations.
Locally collected moneys were allocated to the centre but the
constituencies collectively received more than they supplied. The
central board of finance seemed to be responsible for dunning
wealthy private supporters at the regional level.
9.05 formulating policy
7, ac9
The formation of policy was the sole responsibility of the
party leader, acting on the advice of his cabinet or consultative
committee colleagues and the standing advisory committtee on
policy. The 1922 committee and the party conference acted as
sounding-boards for rank-and-file sentiments and party policy had
to take these into account. However, deference to the leader's
decision ensured the adoption of even initially uncongenial
policies. Policy initiatives often came from informal
organisations such as the bow group
As well as through established channels.
9.06 controlling communications
7, ac9
Party control of communications media was concentrated at the
national level and such communications were influential within the
party. Press releases from the chief and area publicity officers
often reached the independent national and local press.
9.07 administering discipline
4, ac9
The party leader controlled the personnel at central office,
acting through the party chairman he appointed. The party whips,
appointed by the leader, controlled the members of the house and
may withdraw the whip, the party's regular communication
memorandum. The leader can dismiss his cabinet colleagues at will
or whim, as Macmillan did in 1962.
9.08 leadership concentration
6, ac9
Leadership in the party was concentrated in the leader, who may
commit the party to binding courses of action. This power,
however, was maintained by the circumspection of the leader, who
had to be careful not to overburden the patience of his followers,
who might revolt in a body if pushed too far.
Coherence Variables, 10.01-10.06
9.01 nationalization of structure
5, ac9
Conservative party was organized into twelve area councils in
England and Wales and two divisions in Scotland. Area councils met
from two to four times yearly, while area executive committees
functioned in the interim. An agent of the central office
represented the interests of the national party, acting as
honorary secretary for the area council. These regional
organizations in the Conservative Party, which had no restrictions
on the topics they could discuss, exercised somewhat more
independence of action than their counterparts in the Labour
Party.
9.02 selecting the national leader
7, ac7
The leader emerged from an obscure process of elite
interaction and consensus building, ratified by acclamation by
party membbers in both houses, conservative candidates, and the
executive committee of the national union. When the party was in
power, the monarch conditioned the choice of leadership by naming
the prime minister. Upon the resignation of Anthony Eden in 1957,
for example, sounding in the two houses and the constituency
parties were made by lords salisbury, kilmuir, and others, and the
queen chose Harold Macmillan to succeed Eden as prime minister
upon advice from conservative leaders. Macmillan subsequently
became party leader, but some concern was registered over the role
of the monarch in the process. This was heightened after our time
period with the selection of home to replace Macmillan in 1963. As
of 1965, this informal process was replaced by balloting among all
conservative mps, with a 15 percent majority required to win the
leadership on the first ballot.
9.03 selecting parliamentary candidates
5, ac7
The national union's standing advisory committee on candidates
submitted a list of potential candidates to the constituency,
which was also able to suggest names of its own. A selection
committee within the constituency drew up a list of candidates to
be interviewed by the executive committee in the constituency,
which recommended a candidate to the association for approval. The
choice must also have been approved by the central office, and
almost invariably was.
9.04 allocating funds
2, ac6
Funds were collected at all levels of the party organisation,
with most of the funds raised by constituency associations.
Locally collected moneys were allocated to the centre but the
constituencies collectively received more than they supplied. The
central board of finance seemed to be responsible for dunning
wealthy private supporters at the regional level.
9.05 formulating policy
7, ac9
The formation of policy was the sole responsibility of the
party leader, acting on the advice of his cabinet or consultative
committee colleagues and the standing advisory committtee on
policy. The 1922 committee and the party conference acted as
sounding-boards for rank-and-file sentiments and party policy had
to take these into account. However, deference to the leader's
decision ensured the adoption of even initially uncongenial
policies. Policy initiatives often came from informal
organisations such as the bow group
As well as through established channels.
9.06 controlling communications
7, ac9
Party control of communications media was concentrated at the
national level and such communications were influential within the
party. Press releases from the chief and area publicity officers
often reached the independent national and local press.
9.07 administering discipline
4, ac9
The party leader controlled the personnel at central office,
acting through the party chairman he appointed. The party whips,
appointed by the leader, controlled the members of the house and
may withdraw the whip, the party's regular communication
memorandum. The leader can dismiss his cabinet colleagues at will
or whim, as Macmillan did in 1962.
9.08 leadership concentration
6, ac9
Leadership in the party was concentrated in the leader, who may
commit the party to binding courses of action. This power,
however, was maintained by the circumspection of the leader, who
had to be careful not to overburden the patience of his followers,
who might revolt in a body if pushed too far.
Involvement Variables, 11.01-11.06
11.01 membership requirements
1, ac7
The "model rules" of the Conservative and Unionist central
office specified signing an enrollment form and paying a
subscription, but certainly these practices were not universal
among conservative constituency associations . This was especially
true for subscriptions, for voluntary political work was more
valued than party subscriptions.
11.02 membership participation
0, ac6
Of a stated 2,805,000 members in 1953 only 100,000 or so were
politically active, attending meetings or working for the party at
elections or fund raising drives.
11.03 material incentives
0, ac5
Party work was largely voluntary and unpaid so that material
incentives were almost non-existent, especially at the lower
levels. However, since political partisanship, donations and
activity were the usual paths to civilian decorations and honors,
such incentives were thus important to some middle class
aspirants.
11.04 purposive incentives
3, ac4
The majority of party activists seemed motivated by political
convictions and thus were led to political work by its purposive
incentives.
11.05 doctrinism
0, ac9
References to a corpus of literature in justification of party
philosophy or policies is rare as the Conservative Party's
political tradition is perceived as organic. Burke and the Bible
are often quoted in speeches and the ideas of Samuel Smiles, Adam
Smith and others are detectable in content but no structured
doctrine is detectable.
11.06 personalism
0, ac9
The Conservative Party was a well institutionalised organisation
and changed its leaders several times in the period without
trauma. Personalism was of little importance to party
activists.