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Chapter 10: Centralization of Power (pp. 108-117), this is p. 115
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4

Control of media is mixed: the national and local/ regional organizations share about evenly in the control of media, regardless of whether they are influential or not influential.

5

National organization controls media of its own, but the media are not regarded as influential .

6

National organization does not have any direct control of media of its own, but through censorship and distribution of information it controls the content of local or regional media.

7

National organization controls media of its own, and the media are regarded as influential.

Coding Results. Tables 10.6a and 10.6b establish our experience in coding about three quarters of the parties for the locus of power in "controlling communications." The quality of the information in the literature is good, producing relatively high AC codes, but the significant correlation of .38 between BV906 and AC906 reflects a tendency to conclude that the party does not control a newspaper if the literature fails to mention one. Although we have elaborated an eight-point scale for BV906, ranging from 0 to 7, just three of the scale positions account for about 85 percent of the parties. In nearly half the cases, the national committee controls influential media (code 7). Around 20 percent of the parties stand at the other extreme of the scale, publishing no party newspaper at all. The significant fraction of the remainder have national organizations in control of unimportant media (code 5). From the standpoint of interval scaling, one might question whether this latter scale position ought not be rescored toward the lower end of the scale under the argument that control of "uninfluential" media contributes little to centralization of power. This possibility of rescoring needs to be considered when analyzing the data.

TABLE 10.6a: Mid 1950s: BV9.06 Controlling Communications

TABLE 10.6b: Early 1960s: BV9.06 Controlling Communications

Basic Variable 9.07: Administering Discipline

The term "discipline" carries negative connotations in the sense that it suggests punishment rather than reward. If we take rewards to mean pleasures, satisfactions, or gratifications that an individual person enjoys, and punishment to refer to other experiences that a person does not enjoy, then the denial of rewards when they are expected can be interpreted as a form of punishment. Our concept of discipline thus includes both rewards and punishments used as inducements to motivate individuals to conform to group behavior.

Before considering some typical techniques of discipline, we must identify the class of individuals who are the targets of discipline. Obviously, any party member might be the target of party discipline, but we are interested only in the class of party members who are governmental officials or candidates for governmental office, with particular emphasis on parliamentary or legislative office. We want to determine how the party disciplines the behavior of these members in conformity with group behavior or party principles.

In reviewing specific techniques of discipline that are associated with inducing conforming behavior from governmental officials or candidates for governmental office, we restrict ourselves primarily to those that are purely within the party's capability for delivery rather than the government's. For example, rewarding conforming behavior with a government contract may involve the party directly, but this is not purely a party act. On the other hand, expulsion from the party is a disciplinary action that is purely internal to the party. One main reason for drawing this distinction is to control for the additional techniques of discipline in the form of patronage that are available to governing parties but not nongoverning parties.

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